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THE
LIFE AND CAREER

OF

MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., K.C.B.,

BRITISH ENVOY AT CABUL,

TOGETHER WITH A ~~1~~ ~~7~~ OUTLINE

OF THE

SECOND AFGHAN WAR.

COMPILED BY

KALLY PROSONO DEY.

Calcutta:

PRINTED & PUBLISHED BY J. N. GHOSE & CO., PRESIDENCY PRESS,
8, CHITPORE ROAD, CORNER OF LALL BAZAR.

1881.

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R.C.

THE FOLLOWING PAGES

ARE

Respectfully Dedicated to His Excellency

SIR SALAR JUNG, BAHADOOR, G. C. S. I.,

Whose Worth as a Statesman and Philanthropist,

IS WELL-KNOWN TO THE PEOPLE OF INDIA ;

AND

WHOSE PATRIOTISM TO INDIA,

AND

DEVOTION TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT,

Have on many Occasions been Exhibited.

P R E F A C E .

WHEN the terrible news of the massacre of the British Embassy at Cabul was flashed through the country, there was a feeling of universal grief throughout India. Whatever may have been the differences of opinion in men's minds about the policy of the Afghan war, those differences were forgotten in the general lamentation for the loss of the lives of those gallant British officers, who, in the performance of their duty, fell victims to the treachery of a fanatical nation, destitute of all sense of truth and honor. Of the three brave officers who, together with their small escort of fifty men, were so treacherously and ruthlessly butchered by the Afghans, SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI was the Chief, and it is my purpose to give in these pages a brief sketch of the life and career of that distinguished officer. In placing this book before the public, I need scarcely say, I claim no higher title than that of a compiler, as almost all my materials have been collected from the public prints of the day.

KALLY PROSONO DEY.

16th July, 1880.

NOTE TO PREFACE.

I REGRET very much, that this short Biography has been so long delayed, by circumstances over which I had no control. Domestic bereavement, and other causes, have conspired to prevent its appearance at as early a period as I could have wished.

My best thanks are due to Lady Cavagnari, who has kindly supplied me with information which, otherwise, I could not easily, if at all, have obtained, and who has taken a deep interest in this little volume.

The following letter, in answer to enquiries made of Madame Cavagnari will interest the reader :—

THE PRECINCTS,

ROCHESTER.

Kent England, Dec. 11th 1879.

SIR,

I received your letter by last mail enclosing one addressed to Madame Cavagnari, which I forwarded to her. She has returned it to me, and begs me to answer the questions you ask in it, which being of a similar character to those you ask of me, my letter will be sufficient.

Major Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., was born at Stenay, Department of the Meuse, France, on the 4th of July, 1841. His Father the Count, Major Adolph Cavagnari served in the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon, and afterwards became equerry to Prince Lucien Bonaparte. He was descended from the ancient Kalian family of Panea, and married Caroline, third daughter of Mr. Hugh Lyons Montgomery of Laurenstown Co Down, Ireland.

In 1851, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari entered Christ's Hospital, where he was educated; and after studying there for six years, he passed the necessary examinations at Addiscombe; and passed direct as a Cadet into the service of the Honorable East India Company, in April 1858, and joined the 1st Bengal Fusiliers (now 101 Bengal Fusiliers) served with that Regiment through the Oude Campaign of 1858 (Indian Mutiny Medal) appointed to the Staff Corps in July 1861, and gazetted an Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab. He held political charge of the Kohat District from April 1866 to

6th May 1877, when he was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar; and served as Chief Political Officer in the following Hill expeditions.

1. Bizote expedition and capture of Gara, February, 1869.
2. Expedition against Kabul Khel Waziris, April, 1869.
3. Blockade of Kohat Pass, Afridis, 1875-1877.
4. Jawaki Expedition, 1877-78.
5. Sapri Expedition, February, 1878.
6. Shakote Expedition, March, 1878.
7. Utonaukhel Expedition, March, 1878.

In September, 1878, he was appointed to accompany Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission to Kohat, &c., &c.

I hope these details may be of use to you ; and that your work may be a success. Sir L. Cavagnari married in November, 1871, Mercy Emma, second daughter of Henry Graves, Esq., M. B., F. R. S., of Cookstown Co., Tyrone, Ireland.

Your faithfully,

MERCY EMMA CAVAGNARI.

I take the present opportunity of thanking the Government of India, and the following gentlemen :—

The late lamented Sir George Pomeroy Colley, K.C.B., Captain Sawyer, Assistant Secretary in the Military Department, Nawab Abdul Luttf Khan, Bahadoor, Baboo A. T. Banerjee, Baboo Debendra Dutt, and others I might name, without whose encouragement and assistance, this brief record of a very noble life, would not have been undertaken and completed.

KALLY PROSONO DEY.

NO. 32, KALLY DASS SINGHEE'S LANE,
Calcutta, 18th August, 1881.

*David Baron McKee.
1 College Row, Calcutta.*

MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I.

Major Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., was born at Stenay, Department of the Meuse, France, on the 4th of July, 1841. His grand-father was Private Secretary to Napoleon the First, his grand-mother was a French lady. His father, General Adolphe Cavagnari served in the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon, and afterwards became equerry to Prince Luciene Bonaparte. General Adolphe Cavagnari married Caroline, the third daughter of Mr. Hugh Lyons Montgomery, of Laurenstown, county Down, Ireland, and Louis Cavagnari was the issue of this match. In 1851, at the age of ten, Louis Cavagnari entered Christ's Hospital, London, and, after studying there for six years, he passed the necessary examinations at Addiscombe and became a direct cadet of the Honorable East India Company in April 1858. He arrived in India on 12th July 1858, and joined the 1st Bengal Fusiliers.

It was a terrible time for India then. The great sepoy mutiny was raging in all its fury, and the British Empire in the East was shaken to its foundations. Thus before he was out of his teens, Louis Cavagnari had to experience all the untold hardship of a soldier's

life, and had had the opportunity of winning laurels on the field of battle or falling a martyr to the cause of his country. He served with his regiment throughout the Oudh campaign of 1858-59; and, like the other memorable heroes of that period whose combined efforts prevented the overthrow of the British Empire in India, Louis Cavagnari, boy as he was, had also his share of the great work. He was present with a detachment of his regiment, under the command of Major T. Wheeler on the 30th of October 1858, when five guns were captured from the Nussirabad Brigade, and the intrepidity he had shown throughout, did not go unrewarded, for, when the distribution of honors came, the breast of the boy Cavagnari was emblazoned with the Indian Mutiny Medal.

In July 1861, Cavagnari was appointed to the Staff Corps, and gazetted an Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab. Possessed of remarkable energy, indomitable courage, and a genial character, he soon acquired distinction in the Frontier service, and was ultimately appointed Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, in which capacity he had to conduct numerous negotiations between the British Government and the Frontier tribes; a duty which he discharged with great ability and tact. He held political charge of the Kohat District from April 1866 to May 1877 when he was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of

Pesháwar. He served as Chief Political Officer in the following Hill Expeditions :—

1. Bizole Expedition and Capture of Gara, February, 1869.
2. Expedition against Cabul Khel Waziris, April, 1869.
3. Afridi Expedition, 1875-77, (Blockade of Kohat Pass).
4. Jawaki Expedition, 1877-78.
5. Sapri Expedition, February, 1878.
6. Shahkote Expedition, March, 1878.
7. Utmankhel Expedition, March, 1878.

When the despatch of a British mission to the Amir Shere Ali under Sir Neville Chamberlain, the Commander-in-chief of the Madras army, was decided upon, Major Cavagnari was attached to the staff, and he was, from first to last, the most prominent figure in the Afghan negotiations, from the time when he knocked at the gate of Ali Musjid, in September—to the date of his massacre on the 3rd September 1879. Here it will not be amiss to quote a passage from the letter of the *Time's* correspondent with the Khyber Force. "It is difficult," wrote the *Time's* correspondent, "to do full justice to the way the negotiations have been conducted by Major Cavagnari, and the mingled firmness and conciliation which he has displayed. The Government has, indeed, been excellently served by him in this difficult and delicate affair. The Amir shows unmistakable feelings of attachment to Major Cavagnari." But the most interesting sketch of Sir Louis Cavagnari is supplied by the special correspondent of the *Times of India*,

in the course of an account of an adventurous ride they took together through the Khyber Pass just before the war was declared. "Let me," said the correspondent, "describe to you Major Cavagnari, who has already played a prominent part, and will play a still more prominent part in our Frontier policy. He is about five feet nine inches in height, and slimly but powerfully built. Broad shoulders, set on a powerful chest, small and well-knit limbs, and an elastic, buoyant step betoken the utmost strength united with intense activity and powers of endurance. At first sight Major Cavagnari might be thought to be a learned professor ; his countenance wears a thoughtful and abstracted expression, which is intensified by the use of spectacles. But the placidity of expression on a closer scrutiny is lost in the resolute firmness of the lower face. He has a singularly pleasing and mild tone of address and conversation, and is a most agreeable host. Major Cavagnari is one of that school of frontier warriors and administrators of whom Nicholson and Edwards were the grand representatives in a past generation. We have had few more heroic and wiser chiefs than the custodian of our Khyber Frontier, who, by the influence of his character and strength of will keeps in awe, and quells the fierce turbulence of these savage mountaineers." Of the personal courage of Major Cavagnari, the following is an exemplary

instance. "Cavagnari," wrote a correspondent, "although he never loses his temper, can on occasion hit wonderfully straight from the shoulder,—I remember once riding with him to an appointment he had with some Afridis to settle some vexed land question. I remained on the road, while he alone, in the centre of about a dozen stalwart ruffians, armed to the eyebrows, walked round the field. Presently the loud angry accents of a dispute reached my ears. The Afridis were surrounding Cavagnari, gesticulating with passionate vehemence, some with hands on their daggers. Cavagnari stood quiet, perfectly fearless, utterly impassive. Suddenly I saw the biggest of the Afridis go down like a bullock, and Cavagnari, with unruffled composure, returning his hand into his pocket. He had knocked the ruffian down, and the swift thoroughness of the act cowed the fierce hillmen. About halfway on the return journey, Cavagnari remarked apologetically, 'It was absolutely necessary. Please don't think I lost my temper. I was perfectly cool, but I was forced to maintain my ascendancy,' and then he added meditatively, 'and I wanted also to save my life.' "

The courage with which Major Cavagnari faced the dangers that surrounded him on all sides in an enemy's country, immersed in barbarism, marks him out as no mean hero, while the tact and judgment he displayed in carrying on the negotiations with

the savage tribes inhabiting the mountainous tracts of Afghanistan, make him conspicuous as a diplomatist of the highest order. The Mission which Sir Louis Cavagnari led to Cabul, constitutes the last chapter of that eminent man's life. And as this last chapter of his life is also the brightest, and at the same time the most important one, it is my purpose to record the details of it, collected from the ephemeral writings of the day, in this permanent shape.

Since the time of Peter the Great projects for establishing commercial relations with India at the expense of England, for replacing the English rulers of India, and finally for destroying the power of England by depriving her of her possessions in Asia, have been unquestionably entertained by the Russians. The Emperor Paul devised various projects for invading India. It was he who first formed the idea of attacking India by two different routes—one by way of Persia, Herat, and Candahar, the other by way of Khiva, Bokhara, and Balk. Every successive Emperor since the days of Paul has devised or considered plans for invading India. Alexander I, when allied to Napoleon in 1807; Nicholas, when the British Government sent the first mission to Cabul under Burnes, in 1837, and again at the time of the Crimean war, and lastly Alexander II. at a recent period; all these Emperors have had plans submitted to them for the invasion of India. Moreover,

as an English journal pointed out sometime ago, on the authority of a well-known Russian journal, "every General, every staff Commander, who has gone into the steppes from Khruleff to Tchernaiief, has sent home to the war office some plan for the invasion of India ;" and though many of these projects may have been mere fantastic schemes elaborated for the sake of wiling away the time, the progress of the Russians in Central Asia, must itself be looked upon as little else than an advance against India.

Khiva is regarded as an important station on the road to India. The first expedition that Russia sent against this place was in 1707. The object of this expedition was to proceed still further than Khiva. After occupying Khiva, Prince Bakovitch-Cherkasski, the chief of the expedition was instructed to "send a merchant on thence to Amou-Daryer (Oxus) : ordering the same to ascend the river as far as vessels can go, and from thence to proceed to India, remarking the rivers and the lakes and describing the way by land and water, but particularly the water way to India by lake or river, returning from India the same way ; or, should the merchant hear in India of a still better road to the Caspian Sea, to come back by that and to describe it in writing." Besides the real merchant, a naval officer, Lieutenant Kojar, with five or more "navigators

were to be sent to India in merchants's attire. The expedition had been announced to the Khan as an embassy of a friendly character. But nevertheless, the Prince and nearly the whole of his troops were cruelly murdered. This expedition, the Russian historian tells us, "threatened Khiva with final extinction, and accidental circumstances alone prevented this result."

It was Peter's desire to send out a second expedition, and preparations were made with that end in view, but events in Europe compelled him to change his mind.

In 1800, Emperor Paul sent out a hastily and somewhat "wildly organized" force against Khiva with instructions to continue the march to India.

Paul entertained the idea of invading India from Astrabad, by the road through Herat and Candahar. In a communication to Napoleon on the subject he proposed that, with a combined army of 70,000 men, France and Russia should "chase the English from India, liberate that rich and beautiful country from the English yoke, and open new roads to England's commercial rivals, and especially to France." "The country," said Paul in answer to some objections by Napoleon, "is not savage ; it is not barren. The soil is not like that of Arabia and Libya, covered with dry sand ; rivers water it at almost every step. There is no want of grass for fodder. Rice grows in

abundance, and forms the principal food of the inhabitants."

The Russo-French alliance, however, broke up, and the project of a Russo-French expedition to India came to the ground. But Paul did not lose heart nor did he abandon his long cherished idea, and in 1801 he sent General Orloff with an army composed of Cossacks and horse artillery, from the Don to Orenburg, and from Orenburg towards Khiva, on arrival in which place he was to have arranged for himself an expedition to India. The General, in less than a month, traversed upwards of 450 miles, but when he had just reached the heights of the Irgiz, to the north of the Aral Lake, Paul's life came to an untimely end, and Alexander I. having ascended the throne, commanded him to abandon the enterprise.

From the reign of Peter the Great down to the present day, throughout her career of conquest in Central Asia, the eye of Russia has been resolutely fixed upon India. Thus for nearly two centuries the Russian Frontier in Asia is advancing towards India, slowly but surely. At the beginning of the eighteenth century it was 2,500 miles from the English. In the hundred years following the distance was reduced by 500 miles, and in the early years of the present century it was shortened 1,000 miles. Since the Crimean war the intervening territory has been narrowed about

400 miles. It is, then, evident that England and Russia must come into direct contact in Central Asia sooner or later. The two nations are entering into a long course of rivalry like that which existed for upwards of a century between England and France, and which finally came to an end, in the field of Waterloo. It is the gradual advance of Russia towards India that has induced the British Government to endeavour to consolidate the Western Frontier of India. Whether or not Cabul is really to be the Waterloo that shall put an end to the long-existing rivalry between Russia and England, is yet to be seen. It is plain, however, that circumstances are gradually driving the two rival nations towards that end.

The circumstances under which the fatal Mission to Cabul was sent are fully explained in the Secretary of State for India's Despatch to the Government of India. It is as follows :—

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA'S DESPATCH
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON THE
AFGHAN QUESTION.

“ India Office, London, Nov. 1878.

“ Secret, No. 49.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

“ My Lord,—1. The letters* and telegraphic despatches which your Government has transmitted to me, reporting

* No. 53 secret, August 5, 1878 ; No. 61, secret, August 19, 1878 ; No. 67, secret August 27, 1878 ; No. 79, secret, September 9, 1878 ; No. 86,

the circumstances connected with the reception of a Russian mission to Cabul in July last and the subsequent rejection by the Amir Shere Ali Khan of the special Embassy accredited to his Court by your Excellency, have been considered by Her Majesty's Government with the care due to their importance.

"2. The various communications which have from time to time passed between the Government at home and that of India, ending with Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 4th of October last year, contain a complete exposition of the general policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan, and set forth, moreover, the considerations which lately induced Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to place their relations with the Amir on a more satisfactory footing. In order, however, that no misapprehension may exist on this subject, I deem it advisable to recapitulate some of the leading features of that policy, and to trace the course of events which have led to the present condition of affairs on the Frontier.

"3. Although much difference of opinion has existed, and still exists among eminent authorities on the subject of the Frontier policy to be pursued by the Indian Government, that difference has reference rather to the methods to be followed than to the objects in view. The consistent aim of the British Government during a series of years had been to establish on its north-western border a strong, friendly, and independent State, with interests in unison with those of the Indian Government, and ready to act in certain eventualities as an auxiliary in the protection of the Frontier from foreign intrigue or aggression. The Treaty of 1855† negotiated by Lord Dalhousie, with the

secret, September 16, 1878 ; No. 93, secret, September 26, 1878 ; No. 95, secret, October 3, 1878.

† Article I.—Between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Amir Dost Mahomed Khan Wallee of Cabul and of those countries now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Amir, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. Article II.—The Hon'ble East Indian

approval of Lord Aberdeen's Government, and still in force' bears witness to the importance then attached to friendly relations with Afghanistan: It was described by the Governor-General (†) in words which fully explain its intended effect:—The treaty gives to the Government of India on its Western Frontier as complete security against a foreign and distant enemy as it is possible for us in the nature of things to compass.

"4. The question, however, has assumed special prominence since the period of the transfer to the Crown of the direct administration of India. The growing interest in the subject has been the result partly of the increased responsibilities assumed by the Government of Her Majesty in maintaining her Indian Empire, and partly of the intestine disorders to which Afghanistan became a prey after the accession of the present Amir to the throne in 1863. Upon Lord Lawrence devolved the direction of the policy to be adopted in the new state of affairs, and that statesman considered that the objects of the British Government would be best obtained by abstaining from active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and by the friendly recognition of the *de facto* rulers of that country, or of portions of it, without undertaking inconvenient liabilities on behalf. On this basis Lord Lawrence thought that the British Government would have the greatest chance of gaining the permanent friendly alliance of the Afghan people. The outposts of Russia were then distant from the borders of Afghanistan, and His Lordship's Government attached no special importance to the

Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein. Article III. His Highness Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, Wallee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his part and on the part of his heirs to respect the territories of the Honorable East India Company and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of Honorable East India Company.

"† Minute, 30th April, 1855, in Secret Letter, No. 3, of the 10th May 1855."

probability and danger of the growth of the former Power in the direction of India, which, they considered, would in any case best be restrained or rendered innocuous by a friendly understanding on the subject between the English and Russian Cabinets.

"5. The views of Her Majesty's Government of that day on the subject of their relations with Afghanistan were in complete harmony with those of Lord Lawrence. They did not desire to exercise active influence at Cabul, not to interfere in the conflicts then rife between contending parties in Afghanistan long as those conflicts did not jeopardise the peace of the Frontier. This policy was, therefore, adhered to, although not without some inconvenient results, during the civil war which raged for so many years after Shere Ali's accession, and might not unreasonably be thought suited to the circumstances of the time. But the final and unaided success of the Amir in regaining his throne in the autumn of 1868 in some measure changed the position of affairs, and in the opinion both of Lord Lawrence and of Her Majesty's Government, justified some intervention in Highness's favor and the grant to him of such assistance in money and arms as appeared conducive to the maintenance of his authority.

"6. The policy followed by Lord Mayo's administration in its dealings with Afghanistan was to a considerable extent in accord with the course of action thus finally adopted in the autumn of 1868 by his predecessor. While, however, Lord Mayo did not deviate in any material degree from the attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan which had been so long maintained, he recognised Shere Ali as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* ruler of that country, and, in a letter addressed to that prince, engaged to view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. This step, added to the marked personal influence obtained by Lord Mayo over the Amir, was sufficient at the moment to remove a certain feeling of resentment which had been generated in his mind

by the apparent indifference shown by the British Government to the result of his struggle for power, and at the same time, rendered His Highness' position at Cabul more assured than that of any previous ruler.

"7. The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not up to this period assumed dimensions such as to cause uneasiness to the Indian Government. Lord Mayo agreed, therefore, in the views of his predecessor that the best means of averting interference on the part of the Turkistan authorities in the affairs of Afghanistan would be by a frank interchange of views on that subject between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Her Majesty's Government had independently arrived at the same conclusion, and early in 1869 initiated friendly negotiations at St. Petersburg, which terminated in a very distinct understanding on the subject, and in the recognition by a Czar's Government of the limits of the Amir's territories in complete accord with the wishes of Shere Ali and of the British Government.

"8. The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the ruler of Cabul. The Capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the spring of 1873 and the total subordination of the khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by His Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to His Highness by the British Government. Actuated by his fears on this score His Highness sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer of that year charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India.

"9. Finding that the objection of the Amir was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Gov-

ernment if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared* to assure him that under certain conditions the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share† His Highness' apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Amir that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season.‡ The effect of this announcement on His Highness, although conveyed in conciliatory language, was not favorable; the policy which dictated it was unintelligible to his mind, and he received it with feelings of chagrin and disappointment. His reply to Lord Northbrook's communication was couched in terms of ill-disguised sarcasm; he took no notice of the Viceroy's proposal to depute a British officer to examine the northern frontier of Afghanistan; he subsequently refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar to India through Cabul; he left untouched a gift of money lodged to his credit by the Indian Government, and generally assumed towards it an attitude of sullen reserve.

"10. Such was the position of affairs when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office in 1874. The maintenance of Afghanistan as strong and friendly Power had at all times been the object of British policy. The method adopted in attaining that object had not met with the success that was desirable. Its accomplishment was nevertheless a matter of grave importance, and it had now to be considered with reference to the rapid march of events in Turkestan. Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference the probable influence of these events upon the character of an Asiatic Prince whose dominions

* Telegram from Viceroy, July 24, 1873.

† Telegram to Viceroy, July 26, 1873.

‡ Letters from Viceroy, 6th September, 1873, in Secret Letter, No. 75 dated 15th September, 1863.

were thereby brought within a steadily narrowing circle between two great military empires, and although no immediate danger appeared to threaten British interests on the Frontier of Afghanistan, the situation in Central Asia had become sufficiently grave to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. Her Majesty's Government considered that the first step necessary was the improvement of their relations with the Amir himself. With this object in view they deemed it expedient that His Highness should be invited to receive a temporary mission at Cabul, in order that an accredited British Envoy might confer with him personally upon what was taking place, might assure him of the desire of the Queen's Government, that his territories should remain safe from external attack, and at the same time might point out to him the extreme difficulty of attaining this object, unless it were permitted by him to place its own officers on his Frontier to watch the course of events beyond it. It was true that the Amir's relations with the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan had of late become more intimate, and that a correspondence which that official had commenced with the Cabul Durbar in 1871, and which at one time had caused serious disquiet to the Amir was being carried on with increased activity, while His Highness' original practice of consulting the Indian Government as to the replies to be sent to General Kaufmann's communications had been discontinued. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government were willing to believe that Shere Ali, if his intentions were friendly, would be ready to join them in measures advantageous to himself, and essential for the protection of common interests.

"11. In view of these interests and of the responsibilities which had morally devolved upon the British Government on behalf of Afghanistan; looking also to the imperfect information available in regard to the country in respect to which those responsibilities had been incurred, Lord Northbrook's Government

had in 1873 expressed the opinion that the temporary presence in Afghanistan of a British officer, as then proposed by them, might do much to allay any feelings of mistrust lingering in the minds of the Afghan people, and might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing permanent British representatives at Cabul, Herat, and elsewhere. Encouraged by this opinion, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that, although Lord Northbrook's efforts to attain the desired object had not met with success, the time had come when the measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed. Your predecessor in council had, indeed, while appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from it, frankly represented to Her Majesty's present advisers the difficulties attending the initiation of it; he believed the time and circumstances of the moment to be inopportune for placing British agents on the Afghan borders, and was of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress of events justified more specific assurances to Shere Ali, which might then be given in the shape of a treaty, followed by the establishment of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. Her Majesty's Government, however, were unable to agree in this view; they deemed it probable that if events were thus allowed to march without measures of precaution on the part of the British Government, the time would have passed when representations to the Amir could be made with any probability of a favorable result; and they considered it important that the actual sentiments of His Highness in reference to which different opinions were held by different authorities, should be tested in good time.

"12. Accordingly, on your Excellency's departure from England to assume the Viceroyalty, Her Majesty's Government instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that some active countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian Government. It was clearly impossible, however, to

enter into any formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the Amir some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British Government. While Her Majesty's Government, therefore, authorised your Excellency to concede to His Highness substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy responsibilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, were prepared to allow a British agent or agents access to positions in his territories (other than at Cabul itself) where, without prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they would acquire trustworthy information of events likely to threaten the tranquility or independence of Afghanistan.

"13. The measures which your Excellency adopted on your arrival in India to give effect to the instruction of Her Majesty's Government were framed with discretion and in a spirit of consideration towards Shere Ali. You sent your Native Aide-de-Camp, Ressaldar-Major Khanan Khan, to that Prince, charged with the duty of informing him of your desire to depute temporarily to his capital, or to any other point in Afghan territory agreeable to His Highness, a special Envoy, whose mission was not merely to be one of compliment, but one for the discussion of matters of common interest to the two Governments; and you took care to convey to His Highness verbal assurances of the friendly character of your advances to him, but Shere Ali rejected your overtures and declined to receive your Envoy.

"14. Your Excellency exhorted the Amir to consider seriously the consequence of an attitude which might end in compelling the British Government to look upon him thenceforth as a Prince who voluntarily desired to isolate his interests from those of the British Government. In a conciliatory spirit you abstained from pressing upon him the reception of your Envoy,

and you acceded to a suggestion of His Highness that your Vakil at Cabul should make personal representations to you on the Amir's behalf. These representations proved to be a recapitulation of grievances, dating from 1872, and were briefly as follows:—

“1. The communication which he had received from the late Viceroy in 1874 on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned.

“2. The decision on the question of the Seistan boundary.

“3. The gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to the Amir.

“4. The repeated rejection of his previous requests for an alliance and a formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his son, Abdullah Jan.

“15. These grievances appear to weigh heavily on His Highness' mind, and you, therefore, lost no time in assuring Shere Ali, through the Vakil, of the friendly feeling of the British Government towards him, of your desire to remove, by a frank exchange of views, all causes of irritation on his mind, and of your willingness to accede to his proposal that, in lieu of Sir L. Pelly proceeding to Cabul, an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from your Excellency at Peshawur.

“16. Your Vakil thereupon returned to Cabul charged with the duty of explaining to the Amir, with the assistance of a clearly-worded *aide memoire* the favorable treaty which the British Government was prepared upon certain conditions to negotiate with him and its desire to clear up past misunderstanding. His Highness evinced no cordiality in his reception of him; but after some delay he deputed to Peshawur his minister Syud Nur Mahomed Shah there to carry on with Sir Lewis Pelly the negotiations which Her Majesty's Government had considered of sufficient importance to have taken place on Afghan soil with the Amir himself. Although the Amir had been informed in writing both of the concessions which the British Government

was ready to grant to him and the conditions attached to them, and although, at the same time, it was signified to him that it would be of no avail for him to send his Envoy to Peshawur unless His Highness were prepared to agree to those conditions as the bases of the proposed treaty, it became apparent in the course of the conference that the Minister had received no specific authority to accept them. As, moreover, the language and conduct of Shere Ali, which had so long been dubious, became openly inimical, you judiciously took advantage of the sudden death of His Highness' Envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been practically rejected.

"17. This step in your part, as well as all proceedings throughout the year preceding the conference, met with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. As observed by my predecessor in his despatch of October 4, 1877, Her Majesty's Government had felt justified in hoping that the advantages which they were ready to tender to the Amir, would have been accepted in the spirit in which they were offered. At the same time the attitude of His Highness for some years past had been so ambiguous as to prepare them for a different result. Far, however, from regarding the possibility of failure as affording sufficient grounds for total inaction and continued acquiescence in the existing state of relations with the Amir, they had arrived at the conclusion that while the prevailing uncertainty as to His Highness' disposition rendered caution necessary in their advances, it was in itself a reason for adopting steps which would elicit the truth. From this point of view Her Majesty's Government could not regard the result of the Peshawur Conference as altogether unsatisfactory in as much as they were no longer left in doubt as to the reality of the Amir's alienation which has previously been a matter of speculation. On the other hand, the proceedings at the Conference and the previous negotiations had placed before the Amir in a clear light the views of Her

Majesty's Government as to their existing obligations towards him, and had at the same time informed him of the terms so favorable to his interests, on which they were willing to draw closer the bonds of union between the two countries, and to place their mutual relations on a footing more advantageous to both.

"18. Their overtures having been thus treated, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that no course was open to them but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve until such time as the Amir might better realise his own position and interests. This view has been anticipated by you in the final assurances conveyed to the Afghan envoy by Sir Lewis Pelly, and your policy since the close of the Peshawur Conference has been in accordance with it. While carefully watching the course of affairs in Afghanistan, so far as the imperfect means of obtaining information has admitted, you abstained from all interference in them, in the hope that time would enable His Highness to realise the dangers accruing to himself by the rejection of the friendly advances of the British Government. That hope, however, has not been realised. The Amir has persisted in his unfriendly isolation and ultimately having two years ago declined to receive a British Envoy, even temporarily, within his territory, on the ground that he could not guarantee his safety, nor thereafter be left with any excuse for declining to receive a Russian Mission, he welcomed with every appearance of ostentation an Embassy from the Czar, despatched to his Court at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between this country and Russia might be imminent.

"19. In these circumstances your Excellency represented to Her Majesty's Government that a policy of inaction could no longer be persisted in, and that the Amir's reception of the Russian mission at such a time and under such circumstances left him no further excuse for declining to receive at his capital an Envoy from the British Government. Your Excellency proposed,

therefore, to demand the reception of a mission to Cabul, headed by an officer of rank, in the person of Sir Neville Chamberlain, whose name and family were held in high esteem by the Amir.

"20. This proposal was approved by Her Majesty's Government. It was evident that a potentate who willingly admitted to his capital, at a critical period, Envoys of a Power which at the moment might be regarded as making its advances with object not friendly to the British Government, could not reasonably refuse to receive a mission from a Power with which he had continuously been in alliance. Your Excellency in Council did not anticipate any such refusal, and Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to question the soundness of your opinion on this point, based as it must have been, on the best information at your command.

"21. The anticipations both of your Excellency and of Her Majesty's Government were, however, disappointed by the event. In a friendly letter carried to Cabul by the Nawab Golam Hussein Khan, you informed the Amir of the date on which Sir Neville Chamberlain was to leave Peshawur, and you give His Highness adequate time in which to issue orders to his local officials for the reception of the mission. You caused it, moreover, to be intimated to His Highness and his officials that a refusal of free passage to the mission would be regarded by you as an act of hostility. The orders sent to the Afghan officers at Ali Musjid were nevertheless the reverse of what you had a right to expect, and Major Cavagnari who went in advance of your Envoy was distinctly informed that any attempt to enter Afghan territory would be resisted by force, of which an ostentatious display was at once made.

"22. This conduct on the part of the Amir was wholly without justifications. He was aware from various communications addressed to him by your Excellency's predecessors that the Russian Government had given assurances to the Government of Her Majesty to regard his territories as completely beyond its sphere

of action ; he was equally aware that the whole policy of the British Government since his accession to the throne had been to strengthen his power and authority and to protect him from foreign aggression, although the methods adopted for doing so may not have at all times accorded with His Highness' own views : he had received from the British Government evidence of goodwill manifested by large gifts of money and arms, as well as by its successful efforts in obtaining from the Czar's Government its formal recognition of a fixed boundary agreeable to himself, between his Kingdom and the neighbouring khanates ; his subjects had been allowed to pass freely throughout India to the great benefit of the trade and commerce of his country, and in no single instance has the Amir himself or any of his people been treated unjustly or inhospitably within British jurisdiction. By every bond of international courtesy as well as by the treaty engagement of 1855, existing between the two countries binding him to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, the Amir was bound to a line of conduct the reverse of that which he adopted.

" 23. In reporting to Her Majesty's Government the forcible rejection of your friendly mission, your Excellency expressed the conviction of the Government of India that this act deprived the Amir of all further claim upon the forbearance of the British Government, and necessitated instant action. Her Majesty's Government were, however, unwilling to accept the evasive letter brought from Cabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan as Shere Ali's final answer to your Government, and determined to give him a short time for reconsideration. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government acknowledged fully as binding on them the pledges given by Sir N. Chamberlain to the friendly Chiefs and people who undertook the safe conduct of his mission, they decided to make an effort to avert the calamities of war, and with this object instructed your Excellency to address to His Highness

a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront which he had offered to the British Government, the reception of a permanent British Mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who attended Sir N. Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. These instructions were promptly carried into effect by your Excellency's Government, and the Amir has been informed that unless a clear and satisfactory reply be received from him by Nov. 20, you will be compelled to consider his intentions as hostile, and to treat him as a declared enemy.

"24. It only remains for me to assure your Excellency of the cordial support of Her Majesty's Government in the onerous circumstances in which you are placed, and to state that I have received the commands of Her Majesty to publish this despatch for the general information of the public, in anticipation of the papers connected with the important question with which it deals. Those papers are in course of preparation, but as they cover a period of not less than fifteen years they must necessarily be voluminous.

"I have the honor to be, my Lord, your lordship's most obedient humble servant."

"CRANBROOK."

It will not be out of place to insert here the letters which Lord Lytton wrote to the Amir Shere Ali immediately before the despatch of the British Mission to Cabul. I should mention here that the tone of the Viceroy's first letter was considered objectionable by many when the correspondence with the Amir was published, and Lord Lytton was found fault with. It has been remarked that the letter

was not so courteous as it ought to have been. One gentleman, writing from the Traveller's Club, London, went the length of characterising the letter in question as "one of the most bullying, discourteous letters ever addressed to an independent Eastern Chief from our Indian Foreign Office." But I may mention here, upon the authority of a well-informed English journal that the letter was not Lord Lytton's composition. It bore his signature, but had none of the marks of his literary composition. The following are the letters alluded to :—

No. I.

*From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,
to His Highness Amir Shere Ali Khan, Wali of Cabul
and its Dependencies, Dated Simla,
14th August, 1878.*

The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Cabul and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan, has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with Your Highness upon matters of importance which concern the interest of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason, I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who is known to Your Highness, His Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit Your Highness immediately at Cabul, in order that he may converse personally with Your Highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can

be best arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the preservation of friendship between the two Governments by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to Your Highness, by the hand of Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C. S. I., a faithful and honored Sirdar of my Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that Your Highness may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars and to all other authorities in Afghanistan upon the route between Peshawur and Cabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his retinue through the dominions of Your Highness.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness.

No. II.

Letter to His Highness the Amir of Cabul, dated Simla, 23rd August, 1878.

After the despatch from Simla of my letter, dated 14th August, 1878, which Nawab Gholam Hussien Khan will deliver with this letter to Your Highness, I received from Peshawur the melancholy news, that Your Highness has suffered a great affliction in the untimely death of Sirdar Abdullah, Khan, the Heir-Apparent to Cabul, and its dependencies. I desire to express to Your Highness personally the sincere regret which this intelligence has caused to me; but life and death are in the hands of God, and resignation to His will is unavoidable. In consequence of this calamity, I have directed my Envoy to postpone for a short time his departure, in order that Your Highness may not be troubled

by any public business, however important and urgent, until the usual period of mourning shall have elapsed.

Nawab Gholam Hossein Khan was the bearer of the Viceroy's letters to the Amir. This gentleman was the British Envoy in Cabul for many years before Ata Mahomed Khan's appointment, and was thoroughly well liked and appreciated by most of the Afghan Sirdars. He arrived at Cabul with the Viceroy's letters on the 10th September 1878, and was received with marked honor and hospitality at the Court of the Amir. He had a private interview with the Amir on the 12th, when he delivered the letters of which he was the bearer. In the meantime preparations were in progress at Peshawur for the despatch of the mission to Cabul. Suitable tents, stores, and horses were being purchased, servants hired, and other details arranged by Major Waterfield, the energetic Commissioner of the Peshawur Division. Sir Neville Chamberlain left Simla on the 8th September 1878, and reached Peshawur on the 12th. Immediately on his arrival at Peshawur, Sir Neville placed himself in communication with Major Waterfield, and also with Major Cavagnari, who was then specially charged with the conduct of the British intercourse with Cabul and the Afghani tribes.

The position of affairs, as described by Sir Neville Chamberlain himself, was as follows :—

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The Mission was directed to leave Peshawur on the 16th September, or as soon after as possible, so as to reach Cabul about the end of the month, by which time the full period of mourning and of the Fast (Ramzan) would have ended. This was also the time named by the Amir's Minister as the period when His Highness the Amir would be able to attend to state affairs. Major Cavagnari, in obedience to instructions, previously communicated to him by His Excellency the Viceroy, was then in course of arranging with the independent Khyberi tribes for the safe conduct of the mission through the pass as far as Ali Musjid, at which place it would come into contact with, and under the protection of, the officers of the Amir. All the necessary arrangements with the independent tribes were going on satisfactorily, when, all of a sudden, on the morning of the 14th, information was brought to Major Cavagnari that Faiz Mahomed Khan, the Commandant of the Amir's troops, stationed at Ali Musjid, had sent in to Peshawur to call back to the Pass all the Khyberi maliks, or head men, who were then carrying on negotiations with Major Cavagnari. The maliks applied to Major Cavagnari to know what course they should adopt, as they felt that if they disobeyed, the allowance they were in receipt from the Amir might be stopped. This action on the part of the Amir's officials was considered discour-

teous, if not hostile ; for the occupation of Ali Musjid by the Amir's troops had been of no long duration, whilst, indeed, it could at no time have been carried out had the measure been objected to by the Government of India. It was, however, thought to be impossible that such occupation could, under any circumstances, be accepted by the British Government as being allowed to interfere with, or to become a bar to the right of the British Government to hold independent relations with these tribes, or to interfere in any manner with the previously existing relations with them.

Deeming it unreasonable to accept the position assumed by Faiz Mahomed, and at the same time being unwilling to give the Amir any plausible ground of complaint, Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed the following courteous and friendly letter to Faiz Mahomed, explaining to him the object of the Mission and the motive of the British Government for arranging with the Pass men for its safe conduct as far as the Ali Musjid :—

No. 1.

*From His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, G. C. B. G. C. S. I.
To Faiz Mahomed Khan, Commandant of H. H., the Amir's
Troops at Ali Musjid—Dated, Peshawur, 15th September 1878.*

A. C.—I write to inform you that, by command of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India a friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort is about to

proceed to Cabul through the Khyber Pass, and intimation of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Gholam Hossein Khan.

I hear that an official from Cabul has recently visited you at Ali Musjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has now been received that you have summoned from Peshawur the Khybari headman with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, I therefore write to enquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the British mission to Dhakka or not, and I request that a clear reply to this enquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from Peshawur. It is well known that the Khyber tribes are in receipt of allowances from the Cabul Government, and also, like other independent tribes on this Frontier, have relations with the British Government. It may be well to let you know that, when the present negotiations were opened with the Khyber tribes, it was solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, in the same manner as was done in regard to despatch of our Agent, the Nawab Gholam Hossein Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was well-known that the object of the British mission was altogether of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan.

I trust, that in accordance with the instructions you have received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required assurances

that the Mission will be safely conducted to Dhakka. I shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most urgent. But at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no alternative but to make whatever arrangement may seem to me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own Government.

The purport of the above letter was explained by Major Cavagnari to the maliks, who fully understood and approved of its conciliatory nature, and expressed themselves willing to abide by the result. They were further told that up to that time it was considered that their previous arrangements with the Amir were held to be in force; that nothing had occurred to put an end to them; but that if the Amir, because of their relations with the British, stopped their allowance, it would then be continued to them by the British Government. At this period, Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote to His Excellency the Viceroy that he was not sanguine of receiving a satisfactory answer, for he felt that a man in a subordinate position like that held by Faiz Mahomed Khan, would never dare assume the responsibility of acting as he had done without orders, and that, therefore, he had most probably carried out the instructions he had received from Cabul. But, so far from Faiz Mahomed feeling any embar-

rassment in replying to Sir Neville Chamberlain's letter, he did so at once, and his answer was received on the afternoon of the 16th. The following is the reply in question :—

No. 2.

Translation of a letter from Faiz Mahomed Khan, to His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain (letter not dated.)

A. C.—Your friendly letter which you sent me by the hands of Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan has reached me to-day, the 17th Ramzan (16th September). I was gratified by the perusal thereof and feel obliged.

Kind (Sir), you mention therein that you have been ordered to proceed on a friendly Mission to Cabul, and that you are negotiating with the Afridis for an escort to Dhakka. But the Afridis are a faithless (literally, "fearless") and covetous race. No confidence can be reposed in their engagements. Their headmen and chiefs are all with us, and in receipt of allowances from His Highness the Amir. The letter which my kind friend Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawur, wrote on the subject of the advance of a friendly Mission to Cabul, I have forwarded by the hands of my servant to the Mir Akhor, our superior and chief at Jellalabad; but as yet we have received no orders from Cabul or Jellalabad which we might communicate to you, whether to let the British Mission proceed or to stop it. When we hear that the Amir has no objection (to your going), we shall do you good service and escort you to Dhakka, whether there be any Afridis or not; for the friendship between you and the late Amir Sahib is clearer than the sun. When we receive orders from the Capital (Cabul) to invite you, we shall be bound to serve you well. But as yet we have received no orders to let you go. We are servants to carry out the orders of (our master).

Should you come without His Highness' permission or orders, it will lead to a collision between us and the Afridis on one side and you on the other; all hopes of friendship will be lost.

While I was writing this letter, a man arrived from Dhakka with news that the Mir Akhor would shortly be here with two sowars. As he is a great man, he may have brought some orders which he, by way of friendship, will communicate to you. He will also learn your views, ("jawab-o-sawal"). What I have stated above is all that I have to communicate. Further, you are at liberty to do what you like. Whether you stop at Peshawur until the Mir Akhor arrives, and has a friendly communication with you, or you proceed at once by force; you can do what you choose.

There could be no room for misunderstanding Faiz Mahomed's meaning. He was a soldier in command of an out-post; had no orders to allow the Mission to pass, and would stop it by force of arms if need be. The position thus assumed was in fact to imply that the relations then existing between the Amir and the British Government were tantamount to a state of war: and thus all doubt was removed as to the nature of the orders given to Faiz Mahomed, or the source from which they emanated. Just one ray of hope might, however, be extracted from his last paragraph. The Mir Akhor was, he said, just about to arrive at Ali Musjid from Dhakka: he might be the bearer of fresh instructions from Cabul; and he recommended Sir Neville to delay the advance of the Mission.

News of the Mir Akhor's arrival duly reached

Sir Neville Chamberlain. This official has been very aptly described as the "sourest old fanatic in Afghanistan and the bitterest enemy of the Kafir, English or Russ." It was reported that the Mir Akhor's object, far from being of a friendly character, was to see that Faiz Mahomed did not flinch from the execution of his orders. It soon became apparent that both Faiz Mahomed and the Mir Akhor were endeavouring their utmost to make the Afridis close the Pass to the advance of the Mission. All reserve was thrown aside now, and, with the sanction of the Viceroy, the Afridi Maliks were told (on the 19th) that British Government was ready to deal with them independently of all other considerations, and the promise of indemnifying them for any loss they might sustain from the Amir withdrawing his allowance, was repeated to them.

On the 20th September, the Maliks announced the willingness of their clansmen to escort the Mission to Ali Musjid, or to any nearer point until the Mission should come into contact with the Amir's officials; and that they would, if necessary, give it safe conduct back to Jamrud. They asked for one day's time to enable them to make the necessary arrangements for the security of the Pass.

On the 21st September, the Mission moved to Jamrud. For the first three or four miles, the road from Peshawur to Jamrud lies due west through rich

cultivation and groves of young *sisoo* trees to Burj-i-Hari Singh, a tower where a picket under ordinary circumstances warns peaceful travellers that if they venture further west, it is at the risk of their lives. Beyond Burj-i-Hari Singh a bare gravelly desert stretches to the foot of the Khyber Hills, some seven or eight miles off. Three miles from the mouth of the Pass lies the half-ruined Fort of Jamrud, a somewhat picturesque structure, lying just inside British territory, and held for the British by the chief of a village in the neighbouring plain. Just to the east of its crumbling towers, the British camp was pitched.

The Mission was composed as follows: Envoy, General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G. C. B., G. C. S. I.; second in command Major Cavagnari, C.S.I.; attached—Surgeon Major Bellew, C.S.I.; Major St. John, Royal Engineers; Maharaj Pertab Singh Bahadur of Jodhpore; Nawab Obaidullah Khan, Shahibzadah of Tonk; personal staff of the Envoy—Military Secretary, Captain Hamick; Aides-de-camp, captain Onslow, Madras Cavalry; Lieutenant Chamberlain, Central India Horse; Rassuldar-Major Mahomed Aslam Khan, 5th Bengal Cavalry; Interpreter, Kazi Seyud Ahmad, Foreign Office Attache. With the escort were Colonel Jenkins, the Guides, commanding; Major Prinsep, 11th Bengal Lancers; Major Stewart and captain Battye, the Guides, with a total

of 234 fighting men, Natives of the escort. The rest were camp-followers, including over 200 people, camel-drivers and others, belonging to the Commisariat, which carried nine days' rations for man and beast. The carriage consisted of 315 camels, about 250 mules, and 40 horses. The whole would have formed a *cortege* considerably over a mile in length.

Major Cavagnari was ordered by His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain to ride on towards Ali Musjid as soon as possible after the arrival of the camp at Jamrud, taking with him only a small escort of the Guides, and the headmen of the British Frontier villages and of the friendly Khyberis, to demand from the Amir's officials permission for the advance of the Mission. The tact and temper displayed by Major Cavagnari on this very delicate and perilous errand have been justly considered on all hands as "admirable." The following report of his interview with Faiz Mahomed Khan will be read with interest :—

From—Major N. Cavagnari, C. S. I., on Special Duty, Cabul

Mission—To His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G. C. B., G. C. S. I., Envoy Extraordinary, Cabul

Mission—Dated 22nd September 1878.

In obedience to your Excellency's instructions, I left Peshawur early yesterday morning, with the view of proceeding to the fort of Ali Musjid in the Khyber Pass, in order to ascertain from the Amir's officials in charge of this post, whether they would permit

the British Mission to pass through the Khyber, and be responsible for its safety and proper treatment during its journey to Cabul or not.

2. On arrival at Jamrud, where the camp of the Mission was pitched, I communicated with Colonel Jenkins, Commanding the escort, and it was arranged that he and Captain W. Battye, with a small escort of cavalry, should accompany me on my mission.

3. Negotiations had been concluded on the previous day with the Khyber headmen present at Peshawur to escort the British Mission from Jumrud to Ali Musjid, or to any other point within the Khyber at which the Amir's officials might be stationed, and back to the British Frontier, if it was necessary to return. I, therefore, sent off the Khyberis, who had preceded me to the camp at Jumrud, to make arrangements through the Pass ; and I deputed messengers to Ali Musjid to inform the Mir Akhor and Faiz Mahomed Khan, the Commandant of the fort, that I with two other British Officers, were leaving Jumrud for Ali Musjid, in order to have a personal interview with them.

4. After waiting a sufficient time at Jamrud to enable the Khyberis and my messengers to get well ahead, I left camp and entered the Pass. On reaching Mackeson's bridge, I was met by one of my messengers, who was returning from Ali Musjid, and who informed me that Faiz Mahomed Khan had desired him to return and request the officers to halt at whatever place the messenger should meet them, and that he would come to interview them. As this was palpably an attempt to gain time—a line of conduct the Amir's officials are specially proficient in—and as it was my object to get as near Ali Musjid as possible, so that there should be no question as to the responsibility of the Amir's officials for any obstruction I might meet with, I directed the messenger to return and inform the Khan that I intended to proceed onward until I met him.

5. When we reached the heights above Lala China, which

are about a mile from Ali Musjid, and within sight of the fort, some of the Khyber headmen met us, and informed me that the ridges in front of us, which completely commanded the remainder of the road to Ali Musjid, were held by the Amir's levies (Khasadar,) who would not let our party pass. We also observed large numbers of men descending from Ali Musjid to strengthen these positions, indicating beyond doubt that there was every intention to oppose us if we attempted to proceed. As these pickets were within the limits of that portion of the Pass the Khyberis who accompanied me were responsible for, I sent a party of them to parley with the levies; but the latter threatened to fire if any one approached. I, therefore, sent another messenger to Faiz Mahomed Khan, inviting him to come and meet me, or to arrange for my safe passage to Ali Musjid, as his men held command of the road and refused to allow my party to advance. As some time passed and no definite answer was received, I sent one of the Kalil Khans who had accompanied me, to ascertain the position of affairs; but shortly afterwards I received a report that the Khan had been stopped, and was not permitted to advance.

6. I then prepared to write a letter to the address of the Mir Akhor and Faiz Mahomed Khan, informing them that I had been stopped by the advance pickets of the Ali Musjid post under their command, but that I intended to proceed until fired upon, and that, if this occurred, the responsibility would be theirs, and that the act would be held to indicate that as the Amir of Cabul's representatives absolutely declined to allow the British Mission to advance. I intended to let a reasonable interval pass, and then, if no satisfactory reply was received, Colonel Jenkins and I, with a few men were to advance towards Ali Musjid until fired upon, when we would have retired under cover of the remainder of the escort which was to be left with Captain Battye on the heights where we had halted.

7. Before this letter was ready for despatch, a message was brought me from Faiz Mahomed Khan to the effect that he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed of the stream just below where we halted, and that, on his arrival there he would send for myself and three others and would hear anything we had to communicate.

8. As it appeared to me that it would have been an indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz Mahomed Khan should send for me, as well as to be dictated to as to the number of men that should accompany me (it would have been different had I been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort of Ali Musjid, when, of course, I would only have entered the post with as many men as the officers in command chose to admit), I determined to advance at once with as many men as I thought fit to take, and endeavour to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan before he should reach the spot named by him.

9. Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or two of the Guide Cavalry, with some of the Khyber headmen and the Native gentlemen, (Nawab Bahadur Shere Khan, Arbab Sarfaraz Khan, Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan, Afridi Khan, Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, Abbas Khan, and several others) descended without delay into the bed of the stream, and advanced to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan. A party of Afridis, headed by Abdulla Nur, a Kuki Khel Afridi Malik in receipt of special allowances from the Amir, attempted to stop me, saying that only four persons should advance. I rode past him, telling him that my Mission concerned the Cabul officials, and that I desired to have no discussion with the Afridis. The Malik made no further opposition—in fact, he knew that most of his tribe were with me, and he himself was only acting a part to save his allowances.

10. After meeting Faiz Mahomed Khan and exchanging salutations, I pointed to what I considered a suitable place for an interview—it was a water-mill with some trees close by it, and

on the opposite side of the stream to the spot originally named for the place of meeting. Faiz Mahomed Khan was accompanied by the Naib, or Deputy of the Mir Akhor, a considerable number of the Ali Musjid levies, and some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of the Khyber, and their respective followers.

11. When we had seated ourselves, I commenced the interview by pointing out to Faiz Mahomed Khan that he and myself were servants of our respective Governments, and had met to carry out whatever orders we had received; so that, whatever the result of our meeting might be, there need be nothing personal between him and myself. After the Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment, I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the British Government had decided on sending a friendly Mission of European British officers, accompanied by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of Cabul; that the Mission was encamped at Jumrud, and intended to proceed through the Khyber on the following day; that, in consequence of various reports received, I had been deputed by my Government to ascertain from the Amir's officials at Ali Musjid whether they had received instructions, or were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and proper treatment of the Mission during its journey to Cabul, or not; and I hoped that, if there was any latitude for independent action in the orders he had received from Cabul, he would do all he could towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the two Governments. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner, and that actuated by such motives, he had allowed Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan to proceed without any detention, but that his action in this respect had met with disapproval from the Cabul Durbar; that if he had not been friendly disposed, he would not have consented to the present interview, or have restrained his levies from firing on my party; that he had received no orders from the Amir

to let the Mission pass his post ; and that, without such orders, he could not let it proceed ; but that, if the Mission would only wait for a few days, he would communicate with Cabul and ask for orders. I replied that my orders were distinct, and that I was instructed to say that the Mission would advance on the next day, unless I received a reply from the Amir's officials that its advance would be opposed ; and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself such a heavy responsibility as to say he would oppose the advance of the British Mission, unless his orders were clear and distinct in the matter ; for whatever his reply was, it would be considered as that of the Amir of Cabul. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied that he was only a sentry, and had no regular troops, but only a few levies ; but that such as his orders were, he would carry out to the best of his ability, and that unless he received orders from Cabul, he could not let the Mission pass his post. I rejoined, to this, that it did not signify what the actual strength of his post was, as the Mission was a friendly one and bent on peaceful objects, and again urged him not to take such a grave responsibility if he had any option in the matter. He replied that it was a very heavy matter for him to decide upon ; as on the one hand, he could not act without orders from Cabul, while, on the other hand, he was told that his reply would be considered as that of the Amir of Cabul. He then began with much warmth to question the friendly intention of the British Government by stating that it was not a sign of friendship for the British authorities to negotiate direct with the Khyber tribes, who were subjects of the Amir of Cabul, and in receipt of allowances from that ruler, and induce them to escort Nawab Gholam Hussein, and also some British officers (meaning my party) without the Amir's permission. I replied that there was no cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendly Mission would have met with any opposition, as such Missions are never

opposed in any civilized country ; and that the arrangements made with the Afridis were merely to induce them to undertake the safe conduct (" *badragga* ") of a peaceably-disposed Mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a right to undertake in its own country. Faiz Mahomed Khan continued with increasing warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an uneasy sort of murmuring commencing amongst the people around, which appeared to me (and, as I afterwards ascertained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and to some of the Native gentlemen with me) to indicate that, if the discussion was any longer prolonged, the movement alluded to might assume a more decided form, which might possibly be one which our small party could not deal within a suitable manner. I, therefore, interrupted the Khan by saying that the subject was one which it did not behove subordinates to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the British Government would give him a suitable answer. I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly understood him to say that, if the British Mission advanced as intended on the following day, he would oppose it by force ; and he replied that such would be the case. I then got up and shook Faiz Mahomed Khan by the hand and assured him that I had no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and that I hoped to meet him again on some future occasion. I then turned to the Native gentlemen who were with me, and asked them if they did not consider a clear and decisive answer had been given ; and they replied that it was so.

12. In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an interview to settle this point, as the hostile preparations made by the Ali Musjid garrison on seeing my party approach, notwithstanding that my object in coming, and the small strength of my escort, had been communicated to, and received by, the Commandant of the fort, and the Amir's representative, the Mir Akhor, would ordi-

narily have been quite sufficient to indicate pre-determined affront, and insult; and I believe that, with any other of the Amir's officials, but Faiz Mahomed Khan, who, from first to last, has behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favorably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and myself, a collision of some kind would have taken place. The general belief is that Faiz Mahomed Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mir Akhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir to supervise Faiz Mahomed Khan's management of Khyber affairs, and to see that, without orders to the contrary, he checked the advance of the British Mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Mahomed Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is possible to imagine what more could be done to effect the Amir's object.

13. The Khyberis, as far as their conduct was tested, acted faithfully to their engagements, and but for their assistance, we should not have been able to bring matters to a definite issue with the Amir's officials without a great deal of trouble, expense, and delay.

14. The interview with Faiz Mahomed Khan being concluded, we returned to Jumrud, and I returned to Peshawur and personally reported to your Excellency all that had taken place.

15. In conclusion, I would desire to bring to your Excellency's favorable notice the ready and courteous assistance I received from Colonel Jenkins.

The Khyber arrangements were managed by Arbab Fateh Mahomed Khan, and I purpose bringing his services to notice in due course.

The conduct of Major Cavagnari on this occasion cannot be too highly praised. He had thoroughly studied the oriental character, and it was his perfect knowledge of the peculiarities of that character,

added to his own natural courage, great presence of mind, and sound common sense that helped him to perform so admirably the difficult task with which he was entrusted. In allusion to this interview, Sir Neville Chamberlain records it as his opinion that, "but for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview, even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort were endangered." The following letter from Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins, who was with Major Cavagnari, and was present at the interview, will give a better idea of what transpired on the occasion.

From Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Jenkins, Commandant, Corps of Guides (Q. O.), to Captain St. V. Hammick, Military Secretary to Sir Neville Chamberlain—Dated, Camp Peshawur, 22nd September 1878.

I have the honor to make the following report for the information of His Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G. C. B.

2. According to his orders, I marched from Peshawur early on the 21st September, with the camp of the Cabul Mission, and reached Jumrud soon after 7 o'clock.

3. About 8 o'clock, Major Cavagnari arrived in camp, and told me that he was going up to Ali Musjid to get an answer from the Officer Commanding, regarding the passage of the Mission through Ali Musjid, and its safe conduct to Cabul.

4. After a short delay, to allow the headmen of the Kuki Khel Afridis to send some of their people ahead of us up the Khyber Pass, to tell Faiz Mahomed Khan that Major Cavagnari was coming to talk to him, and that he had only a small escort with him, Major Cavagnari and I started from Jumrud, having

with us Captain Wigram Battye and twenty-four men of the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

5. We marched by the gun-road made by Colonel Mackeson in 1840, which we found in very good order, and, before noon, reached a hill, from which we could plainly see Ali Musjid, about three-quarters of a mile distant from the fort.

6. When the people in Ali Musjid saw our uniform on the hill, they immediately made preparations to resist us. Some manned the walls of the fort, and some occupied a ridge, along the foot of which the road between us and Ali Musjid ran. At the same time, one or two signal shots were fired.

7. If we had advanced then I am sure that we should have been at once engaged with 300 or 400 hundred men under circumstances of great disadvantage, for we should have been fighting on the lower ground with the enemy strongly posted on our front and right flank. Besides this I am persuaded that the Amir's officers would have excused themselves from all blame for what might have happened by saying that we had rashly come into collision with their troops without giving time for explanation.

8. Under these circumstances, Major Cavagnari wisely, I think, decided to remain on the hill, where we were for a short time ; but it was agreed that if Faiz Mahomed could not be induced to come and meet us, Major Cavagnari and I with a couple of men were to go towards the fort and get an answer to the question he had come to ask.

9. After waiting on the hill for about two hours, during which more than one message was sent to Faiz Mahomed Khan, Afridi Khan, Arbab of Malazai, came back to say that the Sirdar was coming to meet us in the valley below where we were standing. Shortly after this, we saw Faiz Mahomed coming with fifty or sixty followers, and Major Cavagnari and I, with two men of the Guides, went down and met him. Major Cavagnari had also with him Fateh Mahomed Khan, Arbab Afridi Khan, and a few

of the Kuki Khel Afridis who had come with us up the Pass ; also Bahadur Shere Khan, the Bangash Chief.

10. After shaking hands with the Sirdar, we crossed the stream, and sat down under a tree close to the village of Lala China. Directly we sat down, several more of the Sirdars's followers turned up, and we had 150 or 200 of them close round us while we sat and talked.

11. Major Cavagnari began by saying that the British Government was sending a peaceful Mission to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, of which due notice had been given to the Amir, that the camp of the Mission was at Jumrud, and that he came to ask for a passage through Ali Musjid, and a safe conduct to Cabul.

12. The Sirdar replied that he had already written more than once to say that the Mission could not pass Ali Musjid without the Amir's sanction, which had not been received, and that we must wait, and that he would again refer to the Amir for orders on the subject.

13. Major Cavagnari said that the Sirdar's letters had been received, but that the British Government would not believe that a peaceful Mission going to the Amir on business of importance would be refused a passage, and had, therefore, sent one of its own officers to ascertain how matters stood. Major Cavagnari added that, as the Amir knew that the Mission was on its way to him, if it was stopped at Ali Musjid the British Government would consider that the Amir had himself stopped it.

14. The Sirdar owned that this was true.

15. Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the Sirdar would oppose the passage of the Mission ; and the Sirdar said that he would most certainly do so. In fact, the Sirdar never flinched from first to last, but gave us distinctly to understand that he would oppose the passage of the Mission by force, and that it was waste of time to argue with him.

16. Major Cavagnari then said to the Sirdar—

“ You are a servant of the Amir, and you take upon yourself to stop a Mission going to him from the British Government, with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the Amir himself will not be very angry with you for doing this ? ”

17. The Sirdar replied—“ What friendship is there in what you are doing now ? If the Amir had given me orders, I would have gone down to Jumrud to meet you, and bring you up the Pass ; but now you have come here on your own account and bribed the Amir's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afridis against Afridis and will cause strife and bloodshed in this country and call yourself friends ! ”

18. The Afridis who were standing round us applauded this speech ; and it would not have been prudent to have continued to converse in this tone. Therefore Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar—“ We are both servants—you of the Amir of Cabul, I, of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the Mission by force ? ”

19. The Sirdar said—“ Yes, I will ; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already. ” After this we shook hands and mounted our horses : and the Sirdar said again :—“ You have had a straight answer. ”

20. We returned to Jumrud by the road we came, and reached camp about 5 o'clock in the evening.

21. I was very much struck with the behaviour of the Kuki Khel Afridis who went with us up the Pass. Their conduct was excellent throughout the day.

22. I enclose a slight sketch of the ground about Ali Musjid to explain this report.

Thus the Mission failed. The result of Major

Cavagnari's interview with Faiz Mahomed Khan having been telegraphed to the Viceroy, Sir Neville Chamberlain received His Excellency's order to return with the Mission to Peshawur. Before doing so, Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed the following letter to Faiz Mahomed Khan :—

*From—His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
To—Faiz Mahomed Khan, Commanding H. H. the Amir's
Troops at Ali Musjid.—Dated Camp Jumrud,
22nd September, 1878.*

A.C.—You are aware that the camp of the British Mission arrived at Jumrud yesterday, with the object of proceeding to-day through the Khyber Pass on a friendly Mission to His Highness the Amir of Cabul. Major Cavagnari and two other British officers were deputed yesterday afternoon, under my orders, to hold an interview with you, in order to obtain from you, as His Highness' Commandant at Ali Musjid, the necessary assurances of safe conduct to enable the Mission to proceed on its journey.

The said officers were prevented from approaching the fort of Ali Musjid, as your pickets were posted commanding the road, and refused to allow them (the officers) to advance. After these British officers had sought and obtained an interview with you at a place (Lala China) some short distance this side of Ali Musjid, and after you had been warned by them that your reply would be regarded as that of His Highness the Amir of Cabul, you declared that you had received no instructions to permit the British Mission to pass your post, and stated that you would certainly oppose it by force if it advanced. I am, therefore, commanded by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to inform you that your reply is considered as being that of His Highness the Amir of Cabul, and the British Mission

is now returning from Jumrud to Peshawur. I again assure you that the British Government entertains nothing but friendly feelings and intentions towards the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan.

Sir Neville Chamberlain also wrote a letter to Nawab Gholam Khan, under the orders of the Viceroy, directing him to immediately take leave of the Amir, and to return forthwith to Peshawur. As the concluding portion of Sir Neville Chamberlain's report to the Government of India, is of deep interest, I need not make any apology for inserting it here. It runs thus :

The Mission had failed—it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amir's dominions with an affront delivered before all the world. It failed because of the Amir's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government ; whilst he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear the appearance of even a slight to his kingly privileges.

It seems to me that a reasonable way of judging of our position is to suppose the conditions inverted. Let it be supposed that the Amir had considered that his interests and his honor called for the immediate despatch of an Envoy to the Government of India to discuss pressing differences in a friendly manner ; that he had deputed a confidential Agent of rank to the Viceroy to announce the approaching departure and early arrival of a Mission ; that the Government of India thereupon had sent no direct answer to the Amir, but had endeavoured to bar the passage of the Mission through neighbouring friendly tribes ; and that, on its succeeding in reaching our most distant outpost, it had been met and turned back by the threat of a resort to force

if it ventured to continue on its errand. There can, I think, be no room for two opinions, unless the relations between neighbouring States are to relapse into the worst form of barbarism, and to be controlled only by brute instincts and by brute force.

It may be said with certainty that a Mission despatched under such conditions would have met with no success had it been allowed to advance, and that it was better to fail at starting through a direct insult, than to reach Cabul to arrive at no result.

Before concluding this report, I desire to correct a misapprehension which has prevailed as to the strength of the military escort attached to the Mission. It consisted of 150 cavalry and 50 infantry, or a total of 200 men ; and, considering the description of country to be traversed, and the habits of the tribes to be passed through, this number was not in excess of requirements.

My Mission was not of the nature of a surprise, and to be conducted secretly and expeditiously : it had therefore, according to custom, to be accompanied by a proportionate amount of camp-equipage, baggage, and transport animals ; whilst in addition to our own requirements was added the charge of valuable gifts to be presented to the Amir. I had, in fact, to go in the most open and formal manner, to represent the dignity of my Sovereign and the claims of my country ; and to do this suitably, a certain amount of outward state was customary and necessary.

No exception is ever taken by this Government to the amount of escort which accompanies any foreign Prince visiting India ; and whenever the Amir of Cabul, or one of the Princess of that house, has come to India, he has invariably been accompanied by an escort far in excess of that which I was to take ; although, be it added, any individual of any nationality may traverse the length and breadth of India, unarmed, with perfect security and without let or hindrance.

Finally, I would observe that so great was my desire to

prevent, if possible, any false rumours of armed preparations preceding me to Cabul, that I even requested the Brigadier-General commanding the Peshawur garrison to suspend the movement of troops ordinarily carried out at that period for the preservation of the men's health, consequent upon the setting-in of the sickly season.

Sir Neville Chamberlain ordered back the Mission to Peshawur on the morning of the 22nd. Before leaving he summoned the headmen of the friendly Khyber tribes, and thanked them for their assistance. One of them said, "What are we to do, if the Amir attacks us?" Sir Neville replied, "I promise you this, not from myself only, but from the Government, which, as you know, always keeps its promises, that as long a soldier remains in the ranks, and a rupee in the Treasury, you shall suffer no harm for the good service you have done."

The Mission reached Peshawur long before noon, and the next morning orders were received to dissolve it. Thus ended the first act of the drama.

THE CAMPAIGN.

THE ill-fated Amir Shere Ali had no chance of escape from the consequences which his wrong-headedness had brought about. He had not only declined the proffered friendship of the British Government, but had openly offered insult to that

Government by obstructing the passage of the British Mission, while he had honored a Russian Mission with a pompous reception at his capital. The repulse which Sir Neville Chamberlain's embassy had met with at Ali Musjid, must be avenged now. But with that considerateness and sense of justice which characterise the British Government in all its dealings with the allied States, the Viceroy before declaring the Amir an enemy of the British Government, addressed a friendly letter to him, demanding an apology and reparation within a prescribed time. The Viceroy's letter runs thus :—

*From—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,
To His Highness Amir Shere Ali Khan, of Cabul—*

Dated 29th October 1878.

A. C.—I have received and read the letters which your Highness has sent to me by the hands of my Sirdar Gholam Hossein Khan.

2. It will be in the recollection of Your Highness that immediately on my arrival in India, I proposed to send you a friendly mission for the purpose of assuring you of the goodwill of the British Government, and of removing those past misunderstandings, to which Your Highness has frequently alluded.

After leaving this proposal long unanswered, Your Highness rejected it on the ground that you could not answer for the safety of any European Envoy in your country, and that the reception of a British Mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing you to receive a Russian Mission.

3. Although such refusal to receive a friendly mission was con-

trary to the practice of allied States, yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass your Highness, accepted your excuses.

4. Nevertheless, your Highness has now received a Russian Envoy at your capital at a time when a war was believed to be imminent in which England and Russia would be arrayed on opposite sides; thereby not only acting in contradiction to the reasons asserted by your Highness for not receiving a British mission but giving to your conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British Government.

5. In these circumstances the British Government, remembering its former friendship with the father of your Highness and still desiring to maintain with you amicable relations, determined to send, after such delay as the domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fit, a Mission to your Highness in charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of the Government, who is personally known to you. The escort attached to his Mission, not exceeding 200 men, was much less numerous than that which accompanied your Highness into British territory, and not more than necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States; and are never refused except when hostility is intended. I despatched by a trusted messenger a letter informing your Highness that the Mission accredited to your Highness was of a friendly character, that the business was urgent and that it must proceed without delay.

6. Nevertheless, your Highness having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the Mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India in the person of her Envoy, the letter from your Highness affords no explanation or apology, nor contains any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two Governments; nor even an acknowledgment of my letter of condolence.

7. In consequence of this hostile action, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier. But I desire to give your Highness a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered in British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

8. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that your Highness should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory. It is further essential that your Highness should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my Mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you, and if any injury be done by your Highness to them, the British Government will at once take steps to protect them. Unless these conditions are accepted fully and plainly by your Highness and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness.

When no answer was received within the period prescribed, the Amir was declared an enemy of the British Government, and the British forces entered his kingdom on the 21st of November, 1878.

When military operations against Amir Shere Ali were necessitated by the circumstances already mentioned, our Government determined to direct them, not only to the punishment of an unprovoked

affront, but also to the prompt and complete attainment of the following objects :—

Firstly—The exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan ; and *secondly*, such a rectification of the Afghan Frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that State. These, at least, were the results, which it was the object of the British Government to secure.

The known strength of the Amir's army was about 60,000 men. Its artillery was believed to be good. With this army, it was anticipated, the Amir would have to garrison all his outlying provinces, protect his Persian flank, defend his capital and central districts, and at the same time resist the British advance. It was therefore not difficult to calculate approximately the maximum force he could oppose to the British at any given point. Our Government consequently determined to attack him on three different lines, thus obliging him to distribute his force, or else to leave one or other of these lines undisputed.

The three lines selected were those of the Khojak, the Khyber Pass, and the Kurrum Valley. Special importance was attached, to the Kurrum Valley force the command of which was entrusted to General Roberts. The force operating on the Khyber line was commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne,

whose instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the Amir's garrison from the Khyber, and occupy Lundi Kotal, Dhakka, or such other point as might be found most convenient at the head of the pass, thus threatening Jellalabad, but not advancing further.

The longest line of operations lay in the direction of Candahar. The command of the Candahar force was entrusted to General Stewart.

The Generals commanding the forces employed on the above-mentioned lines of advance were invested with the chief political authority beyond the frontier.

The campaign was opened on the 21st November 1878. On that date General Sir Samuel Browne entered the Khyber Pass and attacked the Fort of Ali Musjid. "The fire of the fort was well sustained and directed, and the defence made by the garrison of Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its spirit. But the position having been turned during the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy with the loss of all his guns, stores and camp equipage." After the capture of Ali Musjid Sir Samuel Browne marched to Dhakka without meeting with any resistance. In the month of December the General was ordered to advance beyond Dhakka and to occupy Jellalabad, which he did without resistance.

On the same day General Roberts entered the Lower Kurrum Valley, and soon after occupied the head-quarters of the district, without opposition. Continuing his advance into the Upper Kurrum Valley, General Roberts encountered a large Afghan force on the ridge of the Peiwar Kotal. This force he immediately attacked. "The attack resulted in the sharpest and most important engagement that has occurred during the whole campaign. The strategic strength of the enemy's position was very great ; but it was quickly turned by our troops who, under the skilful command of General Roberts, completely defeated and routed those of the Amir."

On the 26th of November General Biddulph entered Pishin, and found it already evacuated by the Amir's Troops. The small but unimportant district of Sibi, lying upon the British line of communication close to the Beluch border, had in the meantime been occupied by a British detachment on the 23rd of the same month.

General Stewart reached Pishin in December and assuming command of the Candahar Expeditionary Force, crossed the Khojak Range. On the 29th of January, after a skirmish with the Amir's out-posts he entered Candahar. The occupation of Candahar was effected without much resistance.

"Thus," to quote the Viceroy's despatch (dated Simla, 7th July 1879) to the Secretary of State,

“ within two days after the declaration of hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain’s Mission at Ali Musjid was appropriately avenged on the post where it had been offered. Within two weeks after the same date, the passes of the Khyber and the Kurrum were completely in our hands, and the Amir’s troops swept clean beyond the range of our operations. Not long afterwards, Jellalabad and Candahar were occupied without resistance ; and, before the end of January (that is to say, in less than three months from the commencement of the campaign) the greater part of Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmund to Khelati-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British Government. The rapid success of our military operations completely confirmed the calculations on which they had been based. The Amir’s standing army was defeated and dispersed beyond all possibility of recovery ; yet his Sirdars had not risen to the rescue of his power. His towns opened their gates without remonstrance to our summons ; their authorities readily responded to our requirements ; and their inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence of our troops.”

The victory of General Roberts at the Peiwar, Kotal, on the 2nd December, following so shortly after the capture of Ali Musjid and the expulsion of

the Afghan garrisons from the Khyber Pass, completed the destruction of Shere Ali's power. The Amir's troops were seized with a panic; their discomfiture was contagious; it infected the garrisons at the capital; and wholesale desertions followed. The Amir's standing army ceased to exist, and with it disappeared his authority which had no other support. On the 19th December the Viceroy received from Major Cavagnari, by telegraph, authentic intelligence that the Amir Shere Ali Khan had fled from Cabul, accompanied in his flight by the remaining officers of the Russian mission; and that in the last moment of his hurried departure, he had released from prison, and invested with the regency his long incarcerated son, Yakub Khan. The Amir announced his departure by a letter addressed to the British authorities. In this letter His Highness informed the British Government that he had abandoned his dominions, with the intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg for the purpose of there laying his case before the European powers.

THE DURBAR AT JELLALABAD—MAJOR CAVAGNARI'S SPEECH.

IN the afternoon of the 1st January, a Durbarat which Sir Samuel Browne received a number of chiefs

of the district who had come in and tendered offers of services, was held in the tent of Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the Division. The majority of the European and Native officers were present, and one end of the tent being thrown open, a mixed crowd of Natives assembled to see their Chiefs do due homage to the Sircar's representatives. The chief object in view was that the intentions of the British Government as conveyed to the Natives of Afghanistan in the Viceroy's Proclamation, might be explained in simple terms, and Major Cavagnari had prepared an address based on these lines. On Sir Samuel Browne taking his seat the various chiefs came forward in turn ; their names and generally their relations to the British Government or their standing in the country being explained by the Political Officer. They presented *nuzzurs* in the shape of rupees, tied in handkerchiefs, which the General just touched and then returned their salutation. About thirty-six Chiefs were thus received, and Major Cavagnari then said that, with Sir Samuel Browne's permission he would address the Durbar. He accordingly spoke in English as follows :

SIRDARS AND CHIEFS—This Durbar has been assembled in honor of the anniversary of the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria. We have received the melancholy intelligence of the death of Her Imperial Majesty's daughter, H. R. H. Princess Alice of Hesse, and I feel assured that this announcement will be received

with profound sorrow by Her Imperial Majesty's well-wishers amongst whom I number the members of this Durbar. His Excellency the Viceroy of India's proclamation announcing the commencement of hostilities with the Amir Shere Ali Khan has been circulated throughout India and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the present occasion affords a fitting opportunity for explaining to you the intention of the British Government. You have all heard of the favors conferred on the Amir Shere Ali Khan by the British Government, owing to which he was enabled to consolidate his authority and unite into one kingdom several provinces which previously had never recognized the Government of the ruler of Cabul. Lacs of rupees of treasure, thousands of stands of arms were granted by the British Government to the Amir Shere Ali Khan.

You are aware that about two years ago endeavours were made at the Peshawur Conference to effect a satisfactory understanding with the Amir; the terms proposed by the Government were rejected and the Amir lapsed into a sullen state of unfriendliness, even if it might not rightly be termed one of direct hostility. Attempts were made to incite the independent tribes along the British Frontier to a religious war, but these failed, because of the friendly relations existing between the Government and those tribes, and also because the principles enunciated were directly opposed to those of Mahomedanism. The late Akhund of Swat replied to the Amir that there were no grounds for a holy war against the English, as the Amir's object was a worldly and not a religious one. Every orthodox Mahomedan is aware that one of the principal conditions necessary to justify a holy war is intolerance against the Mahomedan religion, whereas you all know that the tolerance of the English nation in this respect is universally admitted, and that the learned men of Mecca (Ulama), when applied to for a "fatwa" (decision) on this point, declared that India was "Darul Islam" and not "Darul Harb."

It is only uneducated mullahs and Talib-ul-ilm (religious students) that work upon the feelings of the ignorant, and lead them to suppose that such attempts at sedition are right. It is for you to correct such erroneous impression.

The Amir further indicated the state of his feelings towards the British Government by putting to death, mutilating, imprisoning, or fining all parties suspected of being news-agents and several persons, peaceful British traders, were so treated. The Government forebore to mark its resentment of this conduct, until the ostentatious reception by the Amir of a Russian Mission at Cabul, after he had refused to receive a British one, rendered it necessary that some step should be taken by the British Government to assert the position it has hitherto maintained towards Afghanistan. Of the manner in which the British Mission was turned back by the Amir's authorities at Ali Musjid, it is unnecessary for me to dilate further than to remark, that although some of you may not be aware of the customs prevailing amongst European States, still you all know that the most petty Pathan tribe would consider it an insult for its "Jirga," or deputation, to be turned back without its being accorded an interview, and even during a state of hostility, it is not usual to refuse "Jirga" permission to pass.

Regarding the collapse of the Amir's army at Ali Musjid and the Piewar, you have heard full particulars, and have doubtless perceived that it is utterly hopeless for such troops to stand against the British forces; and by his flight from Cabul, the Amir has shown his recognition of this fact. A portion of the arms granted to the Amir by the British Government has been recovered, and I need only remark that the use made of them was scarcely to be expected from the Amir Shere Ali Khan's speech at the Umballa Durbar, when he stated that the sword then presented to him should be used against the enemies of the British Government. You have heard the assurances of the Viceroy of India

that the quarrel of the British Government is entirely with Shere Ali Khan and not with the people of Afghanistan. During the past six weeks the British forces have been marching through Afghanistan, and such is the high discipline of these troops that not a single complaint has been received from any of you as to any injuries or even annoyances committed by them. This will contrast favorably with your late experience of other troops.

It has been necessary in some few instances to inflict punishment upon evil-doers, but the Government is satisfied that the acts were committed by only a small proportion of the tribes we have come into contact with, and were repudiated by the majority who desire to live in peace with the British Government.

I further draw your attention to the concluding portion of the Viceroy's proclamation, in which it is stated that interference, by other Powers in the affairs of Afghanistan will not be tolerated by the British Government, and I have already informed most of you that the Russian Government has recently repeated its former assurances that it has no desire to interfere in Afghanistan, nor will it assist the Amir either with troops or money during his hostility with the British Government.

It has been my pleasing task to report to the Viceroy of India the hearty manner in which the leading Sirdars and Chiefs of this district came forward to tender services to the British Government, and it is hoped that others will speedily follow the good example you have set them. I should have been glad to have taken the opportunity of this Durbar to have presented to some of you with dresses of honor (*khilats*), but the light marching order necessary for campaigning prevented it being possible to carry about such presents. I hope on a future occasion to be able to mark in a suitable manner the appreciation of the Government of the services you have rendered.

A Persian translation of the address was then read by Mr. Jenkins, Assistant Commissioner, and

was attentively listened to by the Chiefs present. At its conclusion the principal Chief present, Sirdar Abdul Khalik, Khan of Besul, stepped forward and spoke as follows :—

On behalf of myself and the other Chiefs present, I wish to express our gratification at the arrival of the British troops in Jellalabad. We have been oppressed and ground down but now look forward to the prospect of even-handed justice and kindness at the hands of the British Government. We all know that the British Government scrupulously respects the religion and the honor of its subjects, where as the Russian Government, from all we hear, does not always do so. We are glad that the British Government has now taken Afghanistan under its protection. We beg to offer our services to the British Government and again to express our great thankfulness at your arrival in the district.

THE GUNDAMUCK TREATY.

EARLY in February 1879, Major Cavagnari received a communication from Sirdar Yakub Khan, which contained overtures for a reconciliation with the British Government, and an offer of his good offices, as an intermediary between the British Government and his father, the Amir, for the removal of differences which he regarded as susceptible of adjustment. A few days later Major Cavagnari received another letter from the Sirdar, communicating the death of the Amir, and his own accession to the

throne. The Viceroy authorised Major Cavagnari to respond the second letter by a suitable expression of His Excellency's condolences, and to the first by a plain statement of the terms on which His Excellency in Council was prepared to entertain negotiations for peace. Soon after this Major Cavagnari was deputed to have a personal intercourse with the Amir Yakub Khan, and the reasons which induced the Government of India to take this step are clearly set forth in the following extract from the Viceroy's despatch :—" So many and such mischievous misrepresentations of our Afghan policy, more especially in reference to territorial questions, had been propagated after the rupture of our relations with Shere Ali, that the Amir's reluctance to entertain any territorial basis of negotiations appeared to us very probably attributable to exaggerated and erroneous apprehensions as to the real character of the arrangements we deemed essential to the future security of our Frontier. We felt, however, that their moderation must be admitted, if they were compared with the conditions of a similar character hitherto dictated, at the close of victorious wars by conquering to conquered Powers ; and we believed that, if the object and scope of them were thoroughly understood by the Amir, the last obstacle would be removed from the conclusion of a mutually honorable and advantageous treaty of peace between His

Highness and the British Government. For this it was necessary that there should be between us a frank interchange of views and wishes on the subject of our relative positions. Such interchange of views could not be satisfactorily carried on by formal correspondence, or without personal intercourse ; but long and varied experience had convinced us that the policy of a European Government cannot be adequately interpreted, or represented by Asiatic Agents, however loyal and intelligent they may be. Many of our minor troubles on the Frontier have been caused by the employment of Asiatics as mediums of communication between the British authorities and the border tribes ; and whatever improvements have been effected during the last three years in our relations with those tribes and the neighbouring tribal States, such as, Beluchistan, are due to the personal influence of British officers. Warned by this knowledge, we felt that to entrust the detailed explanation and discussion of our views to any Native agent, would insure misconception and resistance on the part of the Amir. On the other hand, we reposed complete confidence in the discretion and ability of Major Cavagnari ; and for all these reasons, we were anxious to bring about, if possible, early and unreserved personal intercourse between him and the Amir of Cabul. Having regard to the Amir's position at that time, we did not feel justified

in proposing that His Highness should leave his capital for this purpose ; and, having regard to our own position, we were fully conscious that our motives in proposing to Yakub Khan a personal conference with Major Cavagnari at Cabul, would, probably, be misconstrued by the public, and possibly misrepresented to the Amir. We considered, however, that we ought not to be deterred by this consideration from taking the course which we had good reason to regard as most conducive to the early re-establishment of peaceful relations with His Highness upon a thoroughly sound and honorable footing. We, therefore, authorised Major Cavagnari to address to the Amir proposals for a personal conference at Cabul on the subject of our territorial conditions. These proposals having been accepted, the Native bearer of them was instructed to arrange with Yakub Khan for the proper reception of Major Cavagnari at the Court of His Highness."

In the meanwhile the inactivity of the British Troops on the Khyber line encouraged the people of Cabul and the intervening tribes to attribute their freedom from molestation on the part of the British their concealed inability to advance any further. The Amir assumed towards the British Government a more reserved and ambiguous attitude. The surrounding tribes, at the instigation of the fanatical mollahs, renewed their vexatious and harassing

attacks. "These attacks gave rise to two actions, in which severe loss was inflicted on the Shenwari tribe by Brigadier General Tytler and at Deh Sarrak, and on the Khugianis by Brigadier-General Gough, at Futtebad. The complete discomfiture of these tribes contributed to the encouragement of pacific influence in the councils of the Amir. At the same time, owing to the increasing heat of the weather, and the defective sanitary conditions of Jellalabad, General Sir Samuel Browne was authorised to advance a portion of his force as far as Gundamuck."

Within a few days after the occupation, of Gundamuck, a letter from the Amir, announced his intention of proceeding to that place, for the purpose of their entering into personal conference with Major Cavagnari. This was, clearly, a more satisfactory arrangement than the deputation of a British Envoy to Cabul. Major Cavagnari was, therefore, instructed to arrange with General Sir Samuel Browne for the honorable reception of His Highness, and was invested with full powers to represent the British Government in negotiations respecting which he had previously been furnished with detailed oral instructions by the Viceroy at Lahore. The Amir reached Gundamuck on the 8th of May, and was received there by the British authorities with all possible honor and hospitality. After the formal ceremonies of his reception, negotiations were opened by His Highness,

and continued without interruption till the 26th of May, when the Treaty of that date was signed in the British camp by the Amir on behalf of Afghanistan, and by Major Cavagnari on behalf of the British Government.

THE TREATY WITH THE AMIR YAKUB KHAN,
DATED THE 26TH, MAY 1879.

—o—
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

NOTIFICATION,

POLITICAL.

No. 1497 E.—P.

Simla, the 30th May 1879.

HIS HIGHNESS Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, having proceeded in person to Gundamuck to confer with the British Authorities for the cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan, and having there signed a Treaty of Peace with the British Government, the Treaty, as ratified this day by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, is hereby published for general information, together with the telegrams subjoined:—

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies concluded at Gundamuck on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Mahammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari C. S. I., Political Officer, on Special Duty in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Honorable Edward Robert Lytton,

Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, *and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empress, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.*

The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies :—

ARTICLE 1.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment, or molestation on that account.

ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against

any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Cabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part, depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, guarantees the personal safety and honorable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government, on its part, undertakes that its Agents shall never, in any way, interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his

dominions, so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through, the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments, and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurrum to Cabul shall be constructed by, at the cost of, the British Government: and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States, which has been attested and secured by the fore-

going Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, the towns of Candahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurrum, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and its Dependencies, agrees on his part that the districts of Kurrum and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Miohni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jellalabad districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir, in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir, and to his successors, an annual subsidy of six lacs of rupees.

Done at Gundamuck this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani, 1196, A. H.

(Sd.) AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN.

(Seal) (Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, MAJOR,

Political Officer on Special Duty.

(Sd.) LYTTON. (Seal.)

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla, on Friday, this 30th day of May 1879.

(Sd.) A. C. LYALL,
Secy to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

TELEGRAM, Dated 26th May 1873.

From—Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan,
To—VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA.

Now that the Treaty of Peace has been concluded, it only remains for me to express to your Excellency as the Representative of Her Imperial Majesty my sincere hope that the friendly relations now established between the two States may day by day increase.

TELEGRAM, Dated 27th May 1879.

From—VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA.

To—His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

I have received with sincere pleasure the news of the conclusion of peace between our two Governments, and your Highness' friendly telegram. I feel confident that the Treaty now signed will conduce to the mutual advantage of the two States, and to the consolidation of your Highness' authority; and I shall always earnestly co-operate towards the fulfilment of the good wishes expressed by your Highness, which I cordially reciprocate.

*By Order of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General
of India in Council*

A. C. LYALL,
Secy. to the Govt. India, Foreign Dept.

In his despatch to the Secretary of State, Lord Lytton makes the following remarks on the several articles of the foregoing Treaty :—

“The several articles of this Treaty were framed in the belief, that they fully secure all the objects of the war, which have already been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our paramount position in Afganistan, and our adequate control over the Amir’s external relations. Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign aggression is the legitimate consequence of this condition ; and it is required of us not less imperatively for the security of India than for the independence of Afghanistan. But the British Government could not have undertaken such an obligation, if the means of fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the residence at Cabul of a British representative, and for the right to depute British Agents, as occasion may require, to all parts of the Afghan Frontier. The Amir himself had requested that our permanent representative should reside at his capital ; and, from the opening of the negotiations, he has evinced no disinclination to the admission of British officers within his dominions. Such disinclination would, indeed, have been incompatible with any sincere desire for the advantages of British friendship and support ; and the Amir’s appreciation of these advantages has been manifested,

not only by his conduct during the negotiations, but still more effectually by the alacrity and loyalty with which he is already carrying out his treaty obligations in reference to the Amnesty clause, and other minor matters.

“Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the Treaty, His Highness engages to take measures for the protection and encouragement of commerce between India and Afghanistan. This engagement will receive practical development in a special Commercial Convention to be concluded within twelve months from the ratification of the Treaty of Gundamuck. Some such interval was required for the arrangement of details connected with the selection and improvement of roads, and for the examination of the nature and circumstances of the trade between the two countries, as well as for the reciprocal adjustment of duties. It is premature to forecast the ultimate results of arrangements, now for the first time possible, in reference to the security and expansion of the overland commerce of India with other Asiatic countries. But on our western Frontier access to and from India, although far from easy, is not impeded by such great natural barriers as elsewhere interpose almost insuperable obstacles to regular and frequent intercourse, by land, with the rest of Asia. On this part of our border the main hindrances to commerce have always been political ; and of late years such

hindrances were increased both by the chronic misrule and jealous isolation of the Afghan Government, and also by the inadequacy of internal restraints upon the marauding tribes who hold the Passes. When these impediments disappear, we may look for a considerable expansion of the landborne commerce of Northern India. Afghanistan itself is a country of no great productive resources ; but it commands the routes which penetrate into Central and Western Asia, and the commercial classes, not only of the country, but also of those immediately beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is principally in Indian hands ; and the Russian Governor at Taskhend recently promulgated a severe edict against the Hindu bankers of Turkestan, who are mostly emigrants from the western districts of India. The route by Herat and Candahar runs through the more open and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the important towns of Herat and Candahar. The Treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Khelat towards the close of the year 1876, effected the pacification of Biluchistan, and re-opened the great trade route through the Bolan Pass, which has not since been interrupted. By that arrangement the commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Candahar, is placed in safe connection with the railway system of India, and the rising seaport of Kurrachi.

There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in the number of caravans now annually passing the Bolan ; and the merchants of Sind have always been among the most industrious and enterprising of our foreign traders. With proper management, therefore, and under a judicious system of transit duties, considerable expansion may be reasonably expected in the external commerce of India upon this important line. All such considerations will receive our careful attention in the negotiation of the Commercial Convention which remains to be concluded with the Amir of Cabul. •

“It may be here mentioned that our political officers, who accompanied the columns withdrawn from Candahar in the spring of this year, have explored much of the country, hitherto almost unknown, which lies on the direct lines between Pishin and the Indian Frontier below Dera Ghazi Khan. They have ascertained that the routes through this country traverse elevated valleys and high plateaux, where the climate is at no season of the year very unfavorable, and where supplies and water are comparatively abundant. The tribes who inhabit this region are less unfriendly to strangers than the northern Pathans; and the construction and maintenance of good fair-weather roads present no serious difficulties. There is little doubt that this was the direction taken by the earlier trade routes into India from Persia and

Southern Afghanistan ; and on commercial, as well as on military, grounds the possibility of restoring those channels of communication deserves further examination.

“The Treaty of Gundamuck provides for the immediate commencement of telegraphic communication between Cabul and India. The advantages of such communication are obvious ; and the establishment of it will both illustrate and confirm the character of the change now effected in our relations with Afghanistan.

“The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir, are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber Pass has never formed part of those dominions ; while the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kurrum are obtained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security for our Frontier and for the proper maintenance of communication with our advanced garrisons which will observe and command the three principal Passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly, the towns of Can-

dahar and Jellalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gundamuck to the Amir of Cabul. The Passes of the Kojak Mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Pishin country, like the upper districts of the Kurrum Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan, has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Candahar exists only in connection with a system of Frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require, or have ever contemplated. Candahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Pishin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure, without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Candahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gundamuck. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his Government. Without Candahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Cabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would

have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence which the Treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

“Similar objections applied to the retention of Jellalabad. As a military position that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Lundi Kotal ridge. It can, at any moment, be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber ; and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation, as far as Gundamuck, of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our Frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and pretty Chiefships to the north-east of the Frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilising those tribes and chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Cabul ; and for the control or punishment of such action material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the Treaty, which secures to us the permanent military command of Cabul from the crest of the Chutar Gurdan. In short, we have framed this Treaty with an earnest desire to render all the conditions of it, not only consistent with, but also conducive to, the mainte-

nance of that friendly and mutual advantageous footing, on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan : and from those relations we have labored to eliminate every appreciate cause of irritation and disunion."

"The engagements thus concluded, at Gunda-muck, with the Amir Yakub Khan, represent and attest an important change in the whole condition of Central Asian affairs. The magnitude of this change will be best appreciated when our present position and influence beyond the frontier are composed with what they were during the greater portion of the preceding period between the Umballa differences and the recent Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the part of Afghan Princes. The late Amir Shere Ali throughout the whole period of his reign, was under a formal Treaty obligation to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Government ; but that engagement in no wise prevented his adoption of a course which led him into inevitable rupture and open hostility with this Government. We regard the present Treaty rather as the commencement, than as the confirmation, of a new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan. It provides for, and facilitates, the attainment of results incalculably beneficial to the two countries concerned. The

character of those results, however, will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadiness with which the British Government maintains, and the intelligence with which its local agents carry out, the policy that has dictated this Treaty : a policy which has for its object to substitute co-operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mistrust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise from ourselves that the practical value of the Treaty mainly depends upon the character and disposition of the Amir and his successors. Relations established with Afghanistan under the most favorable conditions, and with the most promising prospects, may, of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty of Afghan Princes, or by the alienation of their unrequited confidence. In either case, complications may arise, against which no present precautions on our part can completely guarantee our successors in the Government of India. But, though anxious to deal considerably with the Amir's susceptibilities, and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable requirements and legitimate interests of his Government, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British interests and influence in Afghan-

istan, a position substantially independent of the personal caprices of any Afghan ruler ; and for the effectual maintenance of that position the Treaty provides strong material guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place the British Power in permanent command of the main avenues from India to Cabul.

“Your Lordship will, of course, understand that, in thus speaking of British interests and influence in Afghanistan, we mean the interests, only of our alliance with that State in reference to external affairs ; and the influence, only, which is necessary to maintain and direct a common policy on behalf of those interests. We, in no wise, contemplate any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan ; and the British Envoy at Cabul will be strictly required to abstain from such interference. The small subsidy which we grant to the Amir will, we hope, strengthen his hands in maintaining his authority.

“Notwithstanding the conditions it imposes, the Treaty of Gundamuck, so far as we can judge, is regarded with satisfaction by the Amir, to whose possession it restores important tracts of territory which His Highness could not have recovered by the sword and to the peaceful consolidation of whose authority it will, we trust, powerfully contribute. We desire to record our high appreciation of the

signal ability with which Major Cavagnari conducted the negotiations to this successful conclusion ; and it is, we think, difficult to overestimate the value of his political services throughout the campaign. The political officers, generally, had difficult duties to perform, and they discharged them with great tact and efficiency.

“ We have also much pleasure in mentioning to your Lordship that not only the justice of the war, and the humanity with which it has been waged by the British Government, but also the fair and generous terms on which we have concluded it, are now receiving unreserved recognition in numerous communications spontaneously addressed to the Viceroy by Her Majesty's feudatories and Native subject in all parts of India.

“ By the Khan of Khelat (with whom our relation, four years ago, had been very unsatisfactory) the cause of the British Government throughout this war, has been well supported beyond the Frontiers of India. It cannot be doubted that the conditions of the Treaty signed with the Amir of Cabul at Gundamuck in 1879, have been greatly facilitated by the results of the Treaty, signed with the Khan of Khelat at Jacobabad in 1876. Certain it is, that the military difficulties of the war, and the political impediments to the peace, now happily concluded, would have been seriously aggravated by

hostile, or untrustworthy conduct on that part of the Sovereign and Sirdars of Khelat. For the fidelity with which the Khan has observed his treaty obligations, and for the uninterrupted sympathy and good-will of the Biluch tribes and Sirdars, we are largely indebted to the personal influence of Major Sandeman, and to the ability with which he has discharged his important duties as the Governor-General's Agent in Khelat. We shall take an early opportunity of submitting your Lordship the measures whereby we propose to mark our appreciation of the friendly and loyal attitude maintained by His Highness Khodadad Khan, of Khelat, throughout the progress and settlement of our disputes with that late Amir of Cabul.

"It now only remains to notice those conditions of the Treaty which have reference to the independent tribes of the Khyber and Michni Passes. We do not, of course, anticipate the immediate or habitual good behaviour of all these wild hill men, whose tribal organisation is infinitely various, and whose management will doubtless require much skill and patience on the part of the political officers intrusted with that task. But it is a task which presents no difficulties insurmountable by the steady exercise of such qualities. At no time since the annexation of the Punjab has the mountain border of that province been wholly free from depredation

and insult on the part of the surrounding tribes ; nor can it be reasonably expected that what successive Governments of India have failed to accomplish in the course of thirty years will now be accomplished all at once. We must be prepared for occasional misconduct (especially during the first two or three years of the new arrangements) requiring from us recourse to punitive measures. But, apart from the indirect advantage of such increased respect as our authority has acquired from our military successes during the war, our practical power of controlling the border tribes has been greatly strengthened by the Treaty. The Amir of Cabul has now neither the motive, nor the means to incite these tribes to acts of hostility against us. The policy applied during the last three years to the past tribes of Biluchistan has already effected the complete pacification of even their most turbulent section ; and the Bolan Pass, though unguarded by British troops, has been remarkably safe and quiet. These facts justify us in anticipating the most satisfactory results from the judicious and patient application of a similar system to the management of the Khyber and Michni Passes.

“We cannot close this narrative of the second Afghan war without bringing prominently to your Lordship's notice the high character maintained by Her Majesty's troops both English and Native, and

their admirable conduct throughout the campaign. The enemy's positions in the Khyber and Kurrum Passes were of great natural strength ; but, though powerfully armed and vigorously defended, they were rapidly captured. His forces, dislodged from these positions with the loss of their guns and stores, were not merely defeated, but dispersed. In the advance to Candahar, the superiority of the British cavalry was established as soon as tested at the outset of the campaign. Against the valour and steadiness of the British soldier the fiercest assaults of the most warlike mountain tribes were as ineffectual as the organized resistance of the Amir's regular troops. Under conditions more trying than those of actual combat, the strictest discipline has been maintained throughout all ranks of the field forces, and the life and property of non-combatants effectually protected. It would be out of place in this report to specify particular services of particular regiments ; but the Viceroy desires to record his high appreciation, in which we cordially concur, of the good service performed by the Native, as well as the European, regiments of the Army of India in Afghanistan ; where their discipline and courage were attested, not only by the uniform success of their arms, but also by the steadiness of their conduct under those trials and privations which are incidental to periods of inaction on the part

of an invading army in a wild and inhospitable country.

“We have also to acknowledge with sincere satisfaction the thoroughly creditable efficiency and patriotic spirit with which the contingents of the Native States have sustained their honorable part in labors of the late campaign.

We have the honor to be,

My Lord,

Your most obedient and humble servants,

(Signed) LYTTON.

„ F. P. HAINES.

„ A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

„ A. CLARKE.

„ J. STRACHEY.

„ E. B. JOHNSON.

„ W. STOKES.

„ A. R. THOMPSON.”

THE CABUL EMBASSY.

THE Treaty of Gundamuck was signed towards the end of May 1879, and the Amir Yakub Khan and the Viceroy exchanged congratulatory telegrams the following day. By the middle of July, Sir Louis Cavnari as British resident at Cabul, accom-

panied by a small escort, was on his way to take up his residence and duties at that city, and the *Times of India's* Correspondent thus writes from the Kurum Field force on the 22nd July :—

The Mission left Alikhyel and halted on the 18th at Karatiga, where to spend the night. I have just heard that Major Cavagnari has been made a K. C. B.—a title well earned, and which will give its holder a fitting position as our Envoy. Mr. Jenkins, Major Cavagnari's assistant, Lieut. Hamilton, V. C., and Dr. Kelly, were the only Europeans, and an escort of the Guides is the only force that accompanies the mission. I believe it was thought wise to excite as little jealousy as may be by restricting the numbers of the party as much as possible. About 8 A. M. on the 19th, Khushyal Khan, accompanied by a squadron of dragoons, came to the embassy camp; and after the necessary diplomatic delays, was admitted to an audience. When Major Cavagnari was ready to start, a guard of honor of one hundred men of the 67th Regiment was drawn up to grace his departure, and a salute of fifteen guns was fired by the Mountain battery. Matters were so arranged that there could be no doubt that the honor was intended for our Envoy. Khushyal Khan is a fine looking man, of a determined appearance, and his moustachios, which are of an unusual size, given him an appearance of fierceness.

He has with him as escort a regiment of Hirati horse. They are very fairly mounted, and are dressed in imitation of English dragoons—red tunics, blue breeches, jack boots, pipe clayed cross-belts, &c. The head-piece is a brownish felt helmet, which is so large that it falls over the eyes, and the chin straps, which are of brass chain, are so long that they reach almost to the breast. They are armed with carbine pistols and sword, the latter of Russian pattern with brass hilts. The men are small but wiry, and when galloping look as if they gathered themselves into a bundle, and yet they ride well, and go over the roughest ground at full speed with apparent ease and safety. Under European leadership they should make good irregular cavalry. At present, their want of discipline is painfully manifest. They keep together or not just as the fit takes them. The dress of the officers forms a marked contrast to that of their men : it consisted of a dark frock-coat and pants and Astrakan lambskin caps. Both officers and men answered questions clearly ; and, on the whole, received the mission as well as could be expected. The inhabitants of Karatiga were rather more inclined to stand off, and refused to hold the officers' horses. We are building a fortified post here, which it is proposed to place in charge of the head man of one of the neighbouring tribes, presently in our pay.

The Mission after starting proceeded over the Turki Kotal, or red hill, so called from the color of the soil : about fifty officers who had permission to accompany it to the summit of the Shutae Gurdan, were of the party. On reaching the Afghan Durbar tent, which was pitched the other side of the kotal, the whole party entered to partake of tea, and that the usual formal compliments might be exchanged. The tent was a fine one, of English manufacture, with spacious verandahs. In one of these a tank had been cut, and a rill of sparkling water had been introduced so as to run through it. The floor of the tent was covered with handsome Persian carpets. There were but a few chairs, and these were occupied by General Roberts, Major Cavagnari, Khushyal Khan, &c. The remainder squatted on the floor, with what grace they might, none succeeding in looking comfortable, or at home. Two armed attendants, carrying trays covered with cloths of red and blue satin, fringed with gold, and richly embroidered with silk, entered the tent, and placed the trays on the floor; another, supposed to be a person of some importance, his belt full of knives and pistols and a handsome gun slung over his back, followed and knelt down near the trays. In a remarkable solemn manner he removed the cloth from one of the trays and folded it. We beheld about ten Russian cups on a tray, they were of a blue and red color, and were

ornamented with raised medallions on which were painted various flowers. There was also a sugar bowl of the same pattern, but of a peculiar shape. Next he removed the cover from the other tray ; on it were four teapots ensuite with the cups, the tea (Russian) they contained was highly aromatic, and is supposed to have been prepared with cardamoms. The cups were next filled ; but, to the horror of all the dispenser of the tea in the most innocent manner used his fingers in placing the sugar in the cups. The oriental grace and solemnity was disturbed by whispers and growls, " the best using his dirty claws of all work. I won't touch the stuff, &c." However, all had drunk, and as the number of cups were limited, they had to be filled several times before all were served. The cups were not washed between either ; some did not like this. We are becoming rather fastidious since peace has been declared. The trays were then removed, but soon reappeared. This time we were helped to warm milk and sugar. Tea *à la* Afghan is decidedly novel, and the idea of administering the milk afterwards did not meet with much approval.

A move was now made ; and, after a short ride, we reached the summit of the Shutar Gurdan. Away beneath us stretched the Logar Vally, the streams running through it seeming like bands of silver, and the dark patches of cultivation and foliage standing

out in marked relief to the general plain surface. A softened aspect was thrown over everything by the summer haze which shimmered around. Behind a bend in the mountain, and within view but for it, lay Cabul. Major Cavagnari says that next year officers will be able to visit it in safety. Of the present party, most would have given a good deal to go there now, as they may never have an opportunity of seeing it again. Wishing the Mission every success, our last adieux were made, and we turn our horses' head homewards. At the foots of the mountain there is a halt, and halsters and havresacks overhauled to obtain the wherewithal to refresh the inner man. The announcement that the Amir had dinner prepared for the party was joyfully received, and all again proceeded to the Durbar tent; and seated themselves in a circle. Attendants entered, and laid down a splendid Dusterkhana (table-cloth) of Russian leather. This was covered by a white cloth. A procession now appeared, coming from the *bobercheekana*, about a dozen men carrying on their heads huge trays, about six feet long by three feet wide, made of papier mache, and tastefully ornamented. The contents of the trays were hidden by new white cloths. The trays were placed on the table cloth, and the cloths removed. Then the domeshaped leaden colored covers with which each dish was covered were removed, and a most varied array of

viands met his eye. Kabobs, curries, game, fish, pillaus, fowls, kids roasted whole, and a number of Native dishes, whose names were unknown, but whose toothsome properties were admitted. Forks, spoons, or knives, were waited for in vain. At last it was made known that these articles *de luxe* were not the fashion in Afghanistan, chupattis serving as plates. The attempts made to do the correct thing was really ridiculous. Some poured the contents of a dish on to their chupatti, and raising the whole thing to the mouth tried to eat ; others, shielding their fingers with pieces of chupatti, tried to fish out some dainty morsel ; others boldly plunged their hands into a pillau ; and manfully gnawed at the treasure in their greasy fingers, some one or two put their fingers in the dishes, and sucked them. It was a thing to be remembered this dinner, *a le main*, in contrast. The imperturbable gravity of our Afghan host was a contrast with laughter and gaucherie: not a muscle showed their appreciation of the situation and whether indifference, amusement, or contempt were their feelings. One might pretty safely assert that they gave vent to a fine volley of maledictions on our departure. Water in peculiar looking vessels was bought and poured over our hands and the wash was very decidedly needed. Tea was again served, and the usual compliments having been got through the party, were soon in the saddle, and

en route for Waykula, which we reached safely. On the arrival of the Mission at Cabul, Yakub, who is only waiting for it, will start north to try and establish his authority in the rebellious districts. Should he fail in this, the Candahar force may have a chance of seeing some service : still in any case, they are not likely to be removed till matters are more settled than they are at present. The Mullahs, it appears, are preaching against the English, and the hatred which Shere Ali so assiduously fostered is now rebounding on his son. However, we are in for it now, and will have to stick to our bargain.

General Roberts in temporarily leaving the force, addressed an order complimentary to its discipline and efficiency ; and expressed his desire, that should occasion again require, he might be so fortunate as to command such a fine body of men.

The force fully reciprocates the compliment, and if their services were called for, all would long to be under their old chief. In addition to personal popularity, General Roberts had obtained the confidence of the men, who would have followed him to any place. No one in the force worked harder than the General, and his care for the well-being of the men was incessant, and extended to every detail affecting their health and comfort.

General Massy commands in his absence. A court-martial on the men of the 8th implicated in the

Kotal Dadel is to take place in a few days. The general health of the force is fair, but the 72nd Highlanders have a big sick list : they went through a good deal of exposure last cold weather. The heat in the single fly tents at midday is very trying. The men have to wear their helmets in the tents—a fact which needs no comment, and the results of which will appear sooner, or later. Some ripe fruit is now being brought in for sale to the men this should be found to benefit their health very much. Is it not funny all telegrams for the Press, of whatever nature are refused, unless they bear the signature of the General commanding. Why ? one may well ask the question. Postal communication with Major Cavagnari is kept up by means of runners to the Shutar Gurdan, thence to Cabul by sowars.

THE *Civil and Military Gazette's* own correspondent of July 21st, gives the following graphic picture of Major Cavagnari on the Afghan Frontier :—Major Cavagnari, with Mr. Jenkyns and an escort of the Guides, have passed through Ali Kheyl. On the 18th they started for Karatiga, which is on the frontier line, as it is proposed to be marked out, but the actual delimitation of frontier has not yet been laid down. We are building a fortified post here, which will be held for us by one of the headmen of a neighbouring tribe for a consideration. The Mission rested at Karartiga on the 18th about 8 A. M. On

the 19th Khusyal Khan, who has been deputed to escort the Mission to Cabul, arrived to pay a visit to Major Cavagnari, he was accompanied by a troop of cavalry ; after some diplomatic delays by which he was made to dance attendance for a little, he was admitted to an audience when the usual eastern convenances were strictly observed. When Major Cavagnari was ready to make a start, a guard of honor of one hundred men of the 67th was drawn up, and a salute of fifteen guns was fired. Matters were very cleverly arranged, so that Khusyal Khan should see that it was our Envoy, and not him for whom these arrangements were made, and our politicals are quite satisfied at the result. The escort to accompany the Mission to Cabul consists of a regiment of Cavalry which met it at Karatiga, and some Artillery and Infantry which will join it at Kushi. The Cavalry, a Herati regiment and mounted on Herat horses, were brought up at the close of the war, but were too late to join in it. They were dressed in red tunics, blue pants and jack boots, and were armed with carbine, pistol and sword, the latter, of a Russian pattern with brass hilts. They had white cross belts, and were got up in imitation of an English Dragoon regiment. Their heads were adorned with brown felt helmets some sizes too large, with brass chin straps, several inches too long, the men were small and wiry, and when galloping had a

huddled up appearance ; this taken with their independent and irregular movements, their grinning and chattering, caused them to strongly resemble a lot of mounted monkeys in a circus. With training and under European leaders, doubtless they could be made into serviceable irregular cavalry. They fell out to water their horses, to have a look round, or a smoke, as the humour took them, and then rejoined the main body, at a breakneck pace over very rough ground. The officers were a great contrast to the men, they were dressed in dark semi-frock coats, dark pants, and lambskin caps, and did not look the soldier at all. Khusyal Khan was similary dressed. He is a striking looking man of a rather determined appearance, and rejoices in a most ferocious suit of moustachios, as the Yankis would say. The Mission, its ranks swollen by about fifty officers, who had obtained leave to accompany it as far as the Shuter Gurdan, soon passed the limits to our territory, and crossing the Turki Kotal, red hill, so called from the color of the soil, reached the Durbar tent. This was a very fine English built tent with specious verandahs, in one of which a tank had been made, and a rill of crystal clear water ran through it, which had a pleasing effect. The floor of the tent was covered with rich carpets, and there were a few chairs and which were occupied by General Roberts, Major Cavagnari, Khusyal Khan, &c. The remainder of the party

squatted on the carpets, with as near an approach to Oriental ease as they could assume. Tea was now served, it was brought in on two trays by armed attendants. The trays were covered with red and blue satin, cloths fringed with gold and richly worked in silk, with red and yellow patterns, they were deposited on the ground in the middle, and a man very much armed, his belt full of knives and pistols, and a gun on his back entered, and solemnly knelt near the trays, then he reverently raised the cover from one, and exposed to our curious gaze about ten Russian tea cups. They were about the size and shape of ordinary coffee cups, and were half of a blue, half of a red pattern and with raised medallions on which were painted roses and other flowers; this tray also contained peculiar looking bowls of similar pattern to the cups which contained sugar. The knight of the tea tray then removed the cloth from the other tray, on it were four tea-pots of the same design as the cups, he then filled the cups with a very highly flavoured tea. I believe that the tea used is Russian, flavoured with cardamoms. The above proceedings were conducted and observed in solemn silence, but when the operator proceeded to pick up a lump of sugar with his fingers and drop it into each cup, the feelings, not quite blunted by a campaign, got vent. "The fellow, with his dirty fingers" and similar expressions of a very decided

character were whispered about ; " I won't drink the stuff," &c. However, all had to take it, and as there were over fifty the cups had to be used several times (without being washed). The trays were now removed, but soon appeared again, this time we were all treated to warm milk and sugar. The partakers of afternoon tea at home should give it a la Afghan, if they want a new sensation. After the usual salutations, &c., the party proceeded *en route*; and, after a short ride up the slope of the mountain, reached the summit. To those who had not previously been here, the scene must have been very interesting; below and away into the far distance stretched the Logar valley, its surface of mottled green and brown relieved here and there by silver streaks of water, the distant objects softened, and their outline deadened, by the summer haze that hung over everything. Behind a mountain and clearly discernable, was Cabul, the promised land which many of us, like the old Israelites, are destined only to see from a distance. Major Cavagnari says that officers will be able to visit it in safety next year, but by that time, the present party will be pretty well scattered. All wished the Mission a hearty God-speed, and after another round of tea, which was served to us here, the party turned and retraced their steps down the mountain ; at the bottom there was a halt and a general emptying of holsters to find comforts

for the inner man. These were speedily discarded, on the welcome intelligence that the Amir had prepared a dinner which all were expected to partake; very cheerfully the invitation was accepted, and soon all were squatted in a circle in the Darbar tent. An attendant now entered, and placed a splendid Duster Khana table-cloth on the floor. It was of very fine Russian leather, this was covered with a white cloth. Then there appeared a procession of ten or twelve huge trays each about six feet long by three feet wide, they were of *papier mache*, and were very tastefully ornamented; each was carried on a man's head, and the contents were hidden by a white cloth. At the door of the tent two attendants removed them from the heads of the bearers, and placed them on the Duster Khana. When all were arranged, the cloths were taken off, and the dome-shaped covers, with which all the dishes were covered, were removed. To our hungry gaze was exposed a goodly array of kabobs, pillaus, curries, fowls, fish, dried fish, sweet-meat and game. Kids roasted whole, Native dishes of unknown names and mountains of huge chupatties, but knives, forks, or spoons, there were none. There was a pause, no one knew how to commence, at last some one said use the chupatties for plates, accordingly some made use of a whole chupattie, and poured some of the contents of a dish on to it, others covering their hands with chupattie essayed to scoop

out of the dishes what they wanted, others would introduce a finger carefully into a dish, and then suck it meditatively. The cooking was unanimously voted good, and the food far superior in quality to what most of us have been enjoying for some time past. Our host sat stolidly gazing at the scene, and shewed not a sign as to whether he was indifferent, amused, or disgusted, at our behaviour, which must have appeared to him very *gauche* indeed. Doubtless, he, and his grim attendant of the double barrelled rifle were bottling up any amount of curses of the Kaffir, of which they relieved themselves on our departure. Tea was again served, the youngest of the party relaxed to the extent of slyly pelting each other with sweetmeats when unobserved; and young and old enjoyed the affair as much as schoolboys out for a treat. We now, after the usual greetings, mounted our gallant steeds, and made tracks for Dray Kula, where our escort was waiting, and the next day returned to Alikhey. The whole affair went off very smoothly, and every body appeared to be pleased. On the whole, the Mission was received with as much cordiality as could be expected. The officers and men of the Afghan escort were cheerful in their replies; but the Natives about Karatiga rather reserved in their manner, would not hold officers' horses, &c. Yakub is said to be anxiously awaiting the arrival of Mission as he is then to start on a

tour to endeavour to restore obedience to his authority in the northern portions of Afghanistan. Should Herat offer a successful resistance, very likely the Candahar force will be given a chance of seeing some fighting ; in any case they are not likely to be removed from there till Yakub feels himself more secure than he is at present. The Mullahs are preaching a crusade against the English, and the hatred of us which Shere Ali fostered is now rebounding on his son on account of his alliance. General Roberts, who is temporarily leaving the force, has issued a farewell order in which he hoped that if called on again to fight for the Empress, he hoped to have as fine a force as the one he at present commands. The members of the column will only wish to have him as a commander, if they are again actively engaged. He had gained the affection and confidence of the troops, and they would have cheerfully followed him to any place ; no one in the force worked harder than General Roberts ; and his efforts for the well-being of the men were untiring. A court-martial on the men engaged in the races at the Kotal will take place in a few days. Major Cavagnari has communications established with us by means of runners as far as the Shurter Gurdan, and from thence to Cabul by means of sowars. Can any one explain why Press telegrams of whatever nature will not be despatched without countersignature ; it sounds funny that, in

time of peace a telegram will not be received for the Press without the Major-General's countersignature. The general health of the force is fair, and the sale of fruit which has now commenced, should be found to benefit the men. The heat at midday is still very great; the men have to wear their helmets within their tents. I don't think that this will benefit them much. Double fly tents are needed here.

The Embassy entered Cabul on the morning of 24th July, and received a brilliant reception. The Amir's demeanour was most friendly and the British resident and his escort took up their residence in the Bala Hissar, the citadel and the residence of the Amirs. There has been considerable discussion regarding the wisdom or unwisdom of sending a British Resident to Cabul, and it may not be unappropriate to state that Sir Louis Cavagnari was the third British envoy to Cabul. Before describing these missions, it may be stated that our duty to our Envoys renders it incumbent upon us to take as many precautions as possible to keep them out of unnecessary danger, and for that reason alone the condition of Cabul must undergo a very considerable change, before it would be prudent for us to risk the life of another Envoy among its fanatical people. It is this consideration which gives a practical value to the suggestion made in the columns of the *Times* that the capital of the State should be transferred

back to the old Durani city of Candahar. Not only are the Candaharis much less turbulent and with fewer antipathies towards foreigners than the Cabulese, but they have lately given unquestionable demonstration of their friendly feeling towards England. The welcome which the troops returning from Pishin, received the other day proves conclusively that the sentiment of the Candaharis is a friendly one. This has more or less always been the case. The residence of the Lumsden Mission at this town during the worst portion of the Indian Mutiny will be remembered, and it may be asserted with some confidence that, had it been stationed at Cabul, its fate, despite Dost Mahomed's firmness, would have been the same as that of Burnes and Cavagnari. The question of principle is, that a British Envoy should reside at the Court of the Amir; it is a matter of detail that must be decided by local causes where that Court shall be.

The first British Mission to Cabul was that of Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1808; but as it only proceeded to Peshawur, we can but simply refer to it. The journey of Mr. Forster to the Court of Timur Shah in 1783, had given Englishmen a clearer knowledge of the Durani Monarchy, and when it appeared probable that the influence of France was obtaining the upper hand in the Councils of Teheran, it suggested itself to Lord Minto that it would be

well to repair the check received in Persia by a great success at Cabul. Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone was, accordingly, despatched to Cabul to negotiate a treaty with the King against France and Persia. That the British Government "would not hesitate to adopt any plan of hostility against Persia consonant to the views of the King of Cabul" formed the chief part of Mr. Elphinstone's instructions. These were, however, altered in consequence of the progress of events in Europe and the failure of the French schemes in Persia. The reception given to our representative at Peshawur, then in the hands of the Afghans, was magnificent. The King's "hospitality was profuse." Shuja-ul-Mulk, who, for a brief space, had established his authority, was most gracious. The least fanciful of his expressions was that "the Creator had designed England and Cabul to be united by bonds of everlasting friendship." On the other hand, it is necessary to remember that much of this friendship was due to the fact that this Embassy was conducted on a grand scale. The presents it brought were most costly. The expense was characterized by Lord Minto some time afterwards in an official minute as "enormous." But it had come at an unfortunate moment. Afghanistan was on the eve of a civil war which was to cost Shuja his crown; and the best advice the Shah could give Mr. Elphinstone, after the signature of a

treaty of friendship, was to leave Peshawur without delay.

We have to pass on for nearly 30 years before we come to the second British Mission to the Afghan Court, and the first to reach the city of Cabul. This time, instead of being a move of high politics, it was ostensibly one produced by trade considerations alone. Its very title proclaimed its character. It was the Commercial Mission to Cabul. Towards the close of the year 1835, Lord Auckland became Governor-General of India, and in the spring of the following year he received a letter of congratulation from Dost Mahomed, at that time the predominant chief in Cabul, Jellalabad, and Ghuzni. The Dost was hard pressed by the Sikhs in one quarter, and the rivalry of the members of his house was a constant source of trouble to him. Moreover, there hung over him the great cloud of the pretensions of the Sudosyes, the pensioners of Ludiana. He was eager to participate in the security afforded by British protection. He asked Lord Auckland for suggestions as to the settlement of his affairs, and, in truly Oriental language, told him to consider him and his country "as your own." The result of that letter was that the Governor-General resolved to "depute some gentlemen" to Cabul to discuss commercial and other kindred questions. There was a darker cloud on the horizon beyond the border-lands of India, and

the rumours of Russian intrigues at Teheran and Russian activity against the Khirgiz beyond the steppe had served to give additional interest, and importance to a scheme, that had suggested itself some years before to Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Malcolm, and which had given rise to the second Mission into Afghanistan. The gentleman Lord Auckland selected for the delicate mission was Alexander Burnes, who, by his proficiency in Native languages and his skill as a draftsman, had distanced all his contemporaries in the service. In 1830, when he was 25 years of age, he had visited in an official capacity Runjit Singh at Lahore, and had seen Shuja-ul-Mulk at Ludiana. It was this journey that brought Burnes under the immediate notice of Lord William Bentinck, who saw in this traveller full of enthusiasm and eager to explore the countries of Central Asia, the very man for "opening up fresh fields of geographical and commercial inquiry." In December 1831, Burnes left British territory, ostensibly as a private traveller, but with special passports from the Government. Travelling with three companions through the Punjab, he entered Afghanistan by the Khyber, and met with a most flattering reception at the hands of Dost Mahomed. He arrived at Cabul on the 1st of May 1832, and remained there until the 18th of the month, when he resumed his journey, and travelling over the Hindu Kush, reached Bokhara, where he

resided two months. Returning by way of the Kara Kum desert and Meshed to Bushire, he was back in India early in 1833, having accomplished what was certainly the most remarkable journey that had at that time been achieved by an Englishman. During his residence at Cabul he had ingratiated himself with Dost Mahomed and many of his principal Sirdars, and was made the most welcome of guests. He had succeeded, because he had acted with the most remarkable tact, and the same quality which carried him safely through the dangers of fanatical Cabul helped him among the still more fanatical people of Bokhara.

No man then appeared to Lord Auckland to be better fitted for the task he had in hand than Burnes, who was spoken of as "the friend of Dost Mahomed." A mission of amity to Cabul would have an aspect of sincerity, if it were intrusted to that ruler's old guest. While performing a delicate task at the Court of the Amirs of Sind, Burnes received orders, therefore, to hold himself in readiness to undertake the charge of the Embassy to Afghanistan. On the 26th November 1836, he set out on his second mission to Cabul. Travelling through Sind and Bhawulpore, he, with four companions, reached Peshwur shortly after the battle of Jumrud between the Sikhs and the Afghans; and pushing on from that place they traversed the Khyber without accident,

although the deputation of the pass tribes to conduct them had not arrived. On the 20th of September 1837, they entered Cabul. They were received "with great pomp and splendour." Akbar Khan came out in person at the head of a fine body of Afghan cavalry, and Burnes entered the capital seated on an elephant beside the heir to the throne. Special quarters were provided within the Bala Hissar, and the Mission lived as "the guests of the King." On the following day, Dost Mahomed received Burnes in state, and expressed to him; "his high sense of the great honor conferred upon him," but the real interview was held on the 4th of the following month, when other schemes than the extension of trade by an improvement in the navigation of the Indus were discussed. Dost Mahomed's great grievance was the loss of Peshawur. For the recovery of that he would do anything. Burnes could hold out very small hope that Runjit Singh would relax his hold on that possession. The month of October was passed in repeated negotiations on this and similar topics, and while the Candahar Sirdars were gravitating more and more towards the Shah and his Russian advisers, the Cabul ruler's alliance with the English was becoming firmer and more patent in the eyes of the neighbouring peoples. The problem became more involved with the arrival of the Russian Envoy, Vickovitch, who reached

Cabul in December. At that conjuncture Cabul had as its guests at the same moment, for the first and perhaps the last time an ambassador from Calcutta and another from St. Petersburg. For two months Vickovitch received but cool treatment ; but then, it having become known that the English Government would not concern itself in the question of Peshawur, a change occurred, and the Russian officer was placed on a better footing. Numerous other abortive interviews were held, and at last Burnes took his departure from Cabul on the 26th of April, seven months after his entry into the city. So far as the objects of the Mission went, it had been a failure. Neither commerce nor policy was benefited by Burnes' long residence at Cabul, and when he set out on his return journey, he left Vickovitch apparently master of the field.

History shows us, therefore, that there have been three English Missions to Afghanistan, two of which have resided at Cabul. They were successful in that respect which persons would now assume it was impossible for them to be. They returned in safety. Several English travellers, both before and about the same time, performed the same feat without any unpleasant consequences, and, on the principle that what has been should occur again, it may be asserted that there is nothing insuperable in the way of deputing resident British officers even to Cabul. Tact and judgment on the part of the Envoy would avoid

petty annoyances, and it cannot be doubted that our measures on the present occasion will have the effect of impressing upon the Afghans that the murder of British Envoys is too dangerous an amusement to be indulged in.

The TIMES OF INDIA's correspondent writing from Ali Kheyl on the 31st August, thus describes the state of affairs during this month :—I find that the disturbed state of affairs in Cabul noted in my last letter, has not improved. According to the latest accounts they are even more formidable than was supposed. In Badakshan Yakub's authority is set at naught. In Herat, it is almost nominal. Some Herati regiments that had come to Cabul, suffered from a severe attack of cholera of a very malignant type. A great number died. Of the remainder, the principal part bolted for their homes, and the few who did not desert, received permission from the Amir to visit their homes. This is an unfortunate occurrence, as every effort was being made to get together as large a force as possible, so as to overawe resistance when the Amir goes to pay his recalcitrant subjects in the north a visit. New regiments are being raised for the Amir's service ; but time is now pressing, and if Yakub means to do anything this year, it is time he were moving. The winter season sets in early, and might very seriously interfere with his operations.

On the Khyber route, there has been considerable disturbance, several caravans have been plundered, and Ayoub Khan appears quite unable to maintain order. On the Shutar Gurdan Road, nearly all the fruit-traders, who have passed, have been, more or less looted. Not satisfied with robbing them of any valuables, a considerable portion of their fruit was seized (levying duty in kind.) Padisha Khan could make the road perfectly safe by a mere expression of his will, but he is playing a waiting game. By no overt act will he offend the Amir, but assist him he will; not, till he receives a *quid pro quo*.

Religious fanaticism, which has always played such an important part in the politics of Afghanistan, is being excited to the highest pitch by the preaching of the Mullahs, and Yakub must use some means to win them to his side, or he may find himself deserted by his troops upon the first emergency. Loyalty to the Amir does not exist in Afghanistan. The power of the Amirs and obedience to their rule has been established, and must be maintained by force. Any clannish feeling of the Afghan is merged in his more immediate chief. The chiefs are so inflated with pride that they would acknowledge no superior, had they the power to maintain their independence. The English are more disliked and dreaded than the Russians, or any other "infidel." It was to appease this feeling that Yakub

begged so hard for an immediate withdrawal of the troops on the Khyber side. Our complacency has cost us the lives of hundreds of brave soldiers. This feeling of aversion towards us and the blind bigotry of religious intolerance are being used by Yakub's enemies as levers to upset his rule. The chiefs within his reach have many of them assumed a passive attitude, which is more embarrassing than actual resistance. But the conflict cannot be long deferred which will decide the establishment, or destruction of the present ruling power. Indirect help we will afford Yakub as far as we can. Should we eventually have to assist him with men, the assumption of the actual rule of the country will be forced upon us. Foreseeing this, we are now endeavouring to withdraw all our troops from the territories of the Amir. The course that events will take during next winter, will be a guide as to what may be expected from Yakub's reign. Already attempts are being made to shake his determination to adhere the English alliance. He is unable to fulfil the conditions for the protection of traders ; but a Ghilzai merchant can travel through any part of Afghanistan. One of the tribe, who came from Cabul the other day, was unmolested on the way ; and, when asked, if he did not fear being robbed, or murdered, said, " Oh no, if I were killed, four men would be killed for me." This fact is so well understood by the other

tribes, that they allow the Ghilzais to travel unmolested. An injury to one of them would be resented by whole tribe. Robbery of them is, therefore, too dangerous a business for most tribes to indulge in. The man I speak of, had, in addition to some country manufactured cloth, &c., a large bag of Cabul rupees with which he did a good trade by exchanging them for English ones. The Cabul rupee is roughly manufactured. It is made of very pure silver, and is equal in value to about fourteen annas of our money. Would that we took a lesson from the Ghilzais, and taught the tribes that molestation of any one under our protection would entail on them far more terrible consequences than they would expect to suffer from injuring a Ghilzai. We reward the tribes that plunder us, and murder our followers and soldiers. The lungi and a lecture are administered, and they are dismissed with a request not to do it again. I do hope that a rumour which has reached here, and, apparently, has some foundation in fact, is not true. It is that the Zaimukhts have been squared by a money payment. If it be a fact, we shall undoubtedly receive compound interest in lead.

On our main line of communications, murders and robberies have been sufficiently numerous. The Duffedar at the Kotal must have met with a pretty painless death. The wound which nearly severed

the head from the body must have been the first received, as though there were several other wounds on the body, the ground did not show any traces of a struggle. There is a mystery about this murder, which has yet to be explained. Then, there was the murderous affray on the road to Chinack, ending in the death of two of our men, and the wounding of two so severely that they are not expected to recover. Of the enemy, one killed (body bagged), and some wounded, but uncaptured was the result. The 67th, you will remember, had been moved to a new camping-ground, owing to an attack of typhoid, from which they were suffering. There were several small camps established. This breaking up of them into small parties, together with the very broken nature of the ground, on which they were encamped, favored the operations of thieves. Four mules were stolen, and have not been recovered ; a lot of cloth, ditto ditto. Next a fine mare, the property of Major Cardew, was stolen. The loss was known almost immediately the theft had taken place, and pursuit was made by several parties of men ; but as it was night-time, without success. A sergeant returning at daybreak came on the tracks of the animal, and after tracing them very cleverly for over three miles, ran her to earth in a village. The Mullick of the village and the Pathan orderly did not want him to enter ; but the sergeant would not be denied ; and, after a search, found the

animal in the country-yard of one of the houses. He returned to camp with the mare, and the two Mullicks of the village as prisoners. Three camels have been stolen from the 92nd, and a detachment of the 72nd had some of their cooking things stolen. Captain Connolly, our political, appears to understand these people. He has a number of them now in prison, and he succeeded in recovering the value of some of the things stolen. I expect that he will not be allowed to inflict any severe punishment, and for mere fines they do not appear to care much.

The telegrams sent by Cavagnari to the Viceroy, by him to the English ministers in London, give no hint of the dangers which ultimately overwhelmed the British Envoy this gallant companions. Here are the closing telegrams :—

30th July, 1879.—“Cavagnari telegraphs :—‘Cabul, 27th July. —All well, Had interview with Amir and delivered presents.’”

6th August, 1879.—“All continues well at Cabul, Envoy and Staff rode through city bazar on 30th July. People orderly. Officers of Embassy more freely about city environs. Amir very friendly, and shows every disposition to act up to treaty. Has sent horses and specimens of country produce to Embassy.”

13th August, 1879.—“Reports from Cabul state that turbulence of some regiments recently arrived from Herat had caused some excitement ; now subsiding.”

21st August, 1879.—“Cabul reports all well.”

28th August, 1879.—“All well with Cabul Embassy.”

3rd September, 1879.—“All well in the Cabul Embassy. Fresh outbreak of cholera reported.”

Dr. Kelley had opened a dispensary and daily treated patients who came to it. It is quite apparent now, that Cavagnari and the gallant Lieutenant Hamilton, as well as Dr. Kelley realised the danger of their position; and met their oath like true men. On the morning of Sunday the 7th September all England and India were startled, and moved profoundly by the following telegrams :—

FROM THE PRESS COMMISSIONER.

AN OUTBREAK AT CABUL—THE BRITISH RESIDENCY
ATTACKED—BRITISH TROOPS ORDERED TO ADVANCE
ON CABUL.

SIMLA, 6TH SEPTEMBER 1879.

Late at night, on 4th September, a Ghilzai messenger reached Alikheyl, having come at full speed from Cabul, and reported to Captain Conolly, the Political Officer at Alikheyl, that the British Residency at Cabul had been attacked by several Afghan Regiments, who had mutinied for their pay. He said that the Embassy and Escort were defending themselves. The intelligence reached the Government at Simla, early on the morning of 5th September, when orders were at once issued to General Massey at Alikheyl, for an immediate movement upon Shutur Gurdan, while General Roberts was instructed to start for Peshawur, to take command of troops for immediate advance on Cabul. General Stewart was ordered by telegram to hold Candahar. All troops on that line, now under orders for return to India, have been directed to concentrate again on Candahar. The British forces in the Khyber to prepare for operations, by Jellalabad when reinforced. On the night of the 5th, Captain Conolly telegraphed the substance of letters received at Alikheyl, from the Amir himself. These letters state that certain Afghan Regiments, which

had already shown strong symptoms of mutiny against the Amir, had been assembled in the Bala Hissar to receive arrears of pay which they had demanded. They suddenly broke out into violent mutiny and stoned their officers. They next made an attack on the British Residency which is inside the Bala Hissar ; but were received by a heavy and effective fire from the British Escort. The city mob then poured into the Bala Hissar, plundered and destroyed the Amir's Arsenal, Magazine and stores and joined the mutiniers, in attacking the Residency in overwhelming numbers. The Amir was taken entirely by surprise ; but appears to have used every endeavour to control the tumult. He sent to the Envoy's assistance General Daud Shah, who, on approaching the Residency, was attacked and unhorsed ; and is said by the Amir to be dying of his injuries. The Amir next sent his son and the Governor-General of Cabul, and also some influential personages of the Town ; but the mob was completely beyond control. The attack and defence appear to have continued all Wednesday until evening, when the Residency took fire. On Thursday morning the Amir, writing in a tone of the greatest distress and anxiety, said that he was himself besieged, and had no certain news of the fate of the British Officers of the Mission, nor is it yet known what has become of them. General Roberts leaves Simla this afternoon to assume command of the force, which will be immediately directed on Cabul, and which will be speedily reinforced and supported.

The following is from the *Pioneer* :—A sudden and most lamentable misfortune has again befallen the English nation. On Wednesday last, our Residency in the Bala Hissar of Cabul was attacked by Afghan Mutineers ; and messengers from the Amir Yakub, himself besieged in his place hard by, have come in haste to the English outposts to say that,

having tried in vain to send help to our officers, he knows nothing for certain of their fate. But there is little room for uncertainty. The dwelling given over to the Embassy, was a large building on the south-east wall of the Bala Hissar, enclosing a spacious courtyard on two sides of which were the houses our officers lived in—one of two stories, the other of four. Here were the four Englishmen, Sir Louis Cavagnari, Mr. William Jenkyns, Lieutenant W. P. Hamilton, V. C., and Surgeon A. H. Kelley, with their little escort of 50 infantry and 25th cavalry of the Guides. On the morning of Wednesday last, several Herati regiments of the Amir's army, in which signs of disaffection had, for some little while past, been visible, broke out into a sudden mutiny, stoned their officers, and attacked both the English in the Residency, it would seem, and the Amir in his palace. The infuriated soldiery were soon joined by a mob, swarming out from every street and byeway in the city. The regular population of Cabul, it should be noted, numbers very few Afghans. Nearly half the people are Persian Kizzil Bash; there is also a large Usbeg section: and allowing for Jews, Armenians, Hindus, &c., there would remain but few Afghans proper in the city, apart from the regiments quartered there. But the mixed mob was animated, no doubt, by the same cruel thirst for blood. The Ramzan, the Mahome-

dan fast, had begun on the 20th of August, and religious hatred may have added to the general fury and excitement. The mutineers and rioters burst into the Amir's arsenal; they surged round the walls of the Residency. Our men, as we might know, even without the assurance given in the telegram, fought bravely. Less than a hundred fighting men, they kept up a heavy fire all day. The Amir tried to send help: he sent Daud Shah, his Commander-in-Chief, who was driven back wounded, and barely escaped with his life. Yakub then sent his own son, together with the Governor of Cabul and other chief men; but the infuriated mob ceased not from the attack till Wednesday evening, when they fired the Residency. Writing the next day "in the greatest distress and anxiety" Yakub could give no news of the fate of the British officers. It is too early to inquire now, why the Amir never went himself to the help of his friends; the sad question to be asked is about the probable fate of our countrymen. And the answer, as we have said, seems unfortunately too certain. Their house was fired, and there is but a very slight chance that one or two of the party might have escaped in the confusion, to some refuge in the city. There is nothing to show that the attack was organized, or that the mutineers obeyed any leaders. Their own officers they had stoned. Otherwise, there might be

some faint hope that the members of the mission had been taken prisoners ; though even this would seem too improbable—as we write, telegrams come which say unmistakably, that the Embassy has perished. The accursed knives of the Afghan have once more done us irreparable harm. Once more have Englishmen, distinguished for wisdom and courage, fallen fighting at their posts ; and our only consolation for this great and national disaster is that the duty they were engaged in was noble, that their end was valiant and true. There is no after thought here, that the livesso valuable to us were lost in a fight which may have been unjust. The British Embassy to Cabul was sent on no mission of intrigue ; its objects were neither to enlarge our boundaries, nor to spread discontent amongst the lawful subjects of a neighbouring nation. Its errand was of peace ; the outcome of a policy conspicuous alike for the justice of its aims and the success, till now, of its operations. That this sudden misfortune should dim—for a moment, and indeed, for ever—the history of those operations, is, of course, inevitable ; and it may, perhaps, seem that the Government ran too great a risk of an accident. The escort, even at first, was thought small ; and that Sir Louis Cavagnari had so few men to defend him will now be most deeply regretted. But there were risks of many kinds, which no escort could have re-

moved. Candahar was occupied by an army, yet Major St. John escaped assassination almost by a miracle. Again, it was at one time far more likely that the Embassy would be attacked by cholera than by rebel Afghans. This is not the time, however, to wonder, if an escort of two or three hundred men would have saved our Envoy ; it will be well for us to look forward. It is vain, also, to call up memories of an even larger disaster—the massacre of an English army in Cabul. The attack on the Residency last week bears no relation to the outbreak of November 1841. Our misfortunes then, were the direct result of our own negligence, and of a recklessness in every direction which to-day seems incredible. This time we shall mete out punishment for an outrage utterly unprovoked, and only imagined as possible in idle, or morbid fancy. It is retribution and a vindication of the national honor that we must think of now ; stimulated by the deepest sorrow for the fate of Cavagnari and of those who, we fear, have perished with him. The telegraph shows how swiftly will this outrage be avenged ; fools were the Afghans to lay hand on our Envoy when armies able to avenge were still so near. The orders have gone forth, and Candahar is as much ours as Lahore. The place was to be evacuated by to-day, but the telegram from Candahar and a letter just received and published elsewhere show how strongly

it will be re-occupied. Whilst General Stewart at Candahar keeps Southern Afghanistan quiet, simultaneously movements on the capital will be made from Kurrum and by Jellalabad. There will be no political reasons for delay this time. General Roberts should be in Cabul soon enough almost to rescue the Amir, though whether Yakub can ever again be Amir of Cabul seems very doubtful. But the political aspect of affairs will be plainer when further information is received. There is only one point that will be suggested to nearly every one. India has been condemned to spend vast sums on a long and wearisome war ; to lose many valuable lives in battle and by disease ; and lastly, the Mission, representing in itself, the highest qualities of which Englishmen are capable, is brought to an end by treachery and bloodshed. To whom do we owe such constant and at last such grievous trouble ? There seems no reason, as yet to suspect Russian intrigue in combination once more with the villainy of the Afghans ; but this is certain, that, as being the accident of our Afghan policy, the outrage on the Embassy may be traced, by no means indirectly, to the unceasing ambition, and the unscrupulous dishonor which forced that policy on our rulers—to the only nation which will be base enough not to deplore our misfortune. The debt we owe Russia is growing still larger, but big though it

is a time will surely come when England will pay it.

The following appeared in the *Times* :—Our special correspondent with the force under General Roberts sends us the following description of the attack upon the Residency at Cabul, and the events preceding it, written by a Native who had formerly served in a high position in the army of India :—

“ Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir L. Cavagnari and the Mission, six regiments of infantry arrived at Cabul from Herat. They encamped for three days at Debori, about one *kos* distant from Cabul. On the morning of the fourth day they marched in order through the streets of Cabul, headed by their officers and with bands playing. While marching along they shouted out, abusing the Envoy by name, asking why he had come there, &c. They also abused all the Kzil-Bashis, saying that they were not men and that they (the Herati soldiers) would show them how to act ; that they would soon put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to their camp at Shirpore. The residents of the city said nothing to them ; they appeared neither pleased at what was going forward nor the reverse. I was present when this took place, and at once took the news to the Envoy, who said, ‘ Never fear, keep up your heart ; dogs that bark don’t bite ! ’ I said,

' These dogs do bite, and there is real danger.' The Envoy said, ' They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our deaths will be well avenged.' I then went to Mr. Jenkyns and told him what I had heard and seen. He asked me if I had been to the Envoy, and, if so, what he had said about it. I told him what had passed, and Mr. Jenkyns said, ' what the Envoy says is very true ; the British Government will not suffer from losing the three or four of us here.' A day or two after this, these Herat regiments were all paid up most of their arrears of pay ; and were given 40 days' leave to revisit their homes. At this time cholera was raging violently. About 150 men out of their number died in one day ; and the men dispersed to their homes in a fright. Placing their arms in the Bala Hissar, they did not even wait for their leave certificates. Up till date none of these troops have returned. In my opinion, the greater part of them will not rejoin, though some of them may do so. The Commander-in-Chief (Sipah Salar), Daoud Shah, was present when the troops marched through the city as above mentioned, and was also abused by them. He did not reply at all. Some of my own countrymen were serving in these regiments ; on my asking them what the meaning of all this was, they answered, ' Do you think soldiers would have acted thus

without orders. We were ordered to act as we did by our officers, and to shout out as we marched alone."

"I called upon a well-to-do Hindu, whose son is a servant of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan (the elder brother of Yakub Khan). He knows the ins and outs, of what goes on in the house of the great men. He had been to see the Envoy twice before. I called him up and sent him to report to the Envoy ; he went towards the Residency for that purpose ; he came back to me and told me that the Amir's sentry would not let him pass, and stoned him. I reported this to the Envoy, who said, 'it is untrue, the man lies.' The next morning another man endeavoured to get speech of the Envoy ; this man was also stopped by the sentry. I don't know who this man was, but I reported this also to the Envoy and asked him, 'What is the use of being kept like a prisoner, and no one allowed to come near you ?' He answered, 'I will have that sentry removed.' A day or two after this the sentry was removed by the Envoy's order. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent to order the sentry's removal, which was accordingly done. I heard that the Amir was very angry at the removal of this sentry. A day or two after this the Envoy asked me whether I knew what the Amir's intention was—to travel with him to the frontier as he had engaged to do at Gundamuk, or whether he intended not to go.

“ I have omitted to mention one thing. Before the arrival of the six regiments from Herat, mentioned above, the Envoy, agreeably to a suggestion of mine, wished to pay Wulli Mahomed Khan a visit, to condole with him on the death of his mother. The Envoy said that he wished first of all to ask permission from the Amir before going. He did so, and the Amir answered, ‘ Go.’ The Envoy then told me what he had done, and said that he intended to visit Wulli Mahomed Khan the next day, ordering me to go and prepare Wulli Mahomed Khan for the visit. I went to Wulli Mahomed Khan’s house and told him this, and the Sirdar made every preparation to receive him. The next day, however, the Envoy told me that he had asked Ghyas the Mehmandar whether the Amir would really like his paying this visit, and that Ghyas had answered, ‘ No, the Ameer will not like you going.’ I then said, ‘ I warned the Sirdar that you were coming ; and every one expected that you would have paid this visit, and all the Sirdars, hearing that you have put it off, have begun to tremble in their hearts ; saying “ We wonder what our fate will be if the Sahib is afraid of going, or is unable to go and visit our chief Sirdar.” ’ When the Envoy asked me about the Amir’s intentions, as to his proposed journey with him round his frontier, I replied, ‘ He will not go ; he has made no preparations for it at

all ; if you wish to make further inquiries call the Mustaufi Hubibulla Khan.' The Envoy ordered me to call him. I went to the Mustafi, who said, ' I am not well to-day ; I will go to-morrow. Give the Sahib my salaam.' I went to the Mustaufi the next day at 10 A.M. to call him, as he had promised to be with the Envoy at 8 A. M. The Mustaufi went to the Amir and stated that the Envoy had called him. The Amir gave him permission to go, but said, ' Don't go alone ; take Shah Mahomed, the Vazir, with you.' They both accompanied me to the presence of the Envoy, who made the three of us sit down, and entered into conversation. He then said to them that he had heard that the Amir was not treating well the Sirdars, who had accompanied him (the Envoy) ; that he had stopped giving them the income they were entitled to, and which the Amir's father had given them regularly ; that they had nothing to live upon, and would suffer in consequence ; that the British Government would not let them be the losers, and would pay their allowances, if the Amir refused to do so ; and that the Amir would not be pleased at this. The Mustaufi said he was unaware that this was the case ; that he would mention it to the Amir : and say that if this was the case it was not proper. The Envoy then asked the Mustaufi whether it was the Amir's intention to travel with

him, as promised, or not. Both the Mustaufi and the Vazir said, 'He cannot go this year, because the country is unsettled ; but he will go next year.' The Envoy said, 'Very well.' He then asked them, whether the Amir intended to go to meet the Viceroy in India. The Mustaufi said, 'Yes, he will go about December.' The Envoy said to them 'Ask the Amir again about this.' They said, 'We will ask him.' They Envoy then dismissed them and asked me my opinion as to whether the Amir intended to go to India or not. I answered, 'No, he has thrown up the idea of going on this tour with you, and he does not intend going to the Durbar.' I heard shortly afterwards from a friend of mine that he heard from a friend of his, who was present at the time, that on the Mustaufi and Shah Mahomed leaving the Envoy, they went straight to the Amir and mentioned what had taken place at the interview. The Amir was very angry. The Mustaufi said, 'Why are you angry ? If you do not give these men anything, and the British Government gives nothing to them either, they will suffer from actual want.' The Amir then asked Daoud Shah what he thought of it. Daoud Shah answered, 'I am a soldier ; I don't understand this sort of thing. I think that the promise with the British at Gundamuck ought to be carried out.' The Amir answered, 'This country is Afghanistan ; we cannot

get on here without practising deceit.' On this the Naib Lall Mahomed (Farasbanni) said, ' If this is true, what you say, that Afghanistan cannot be managed without practising deceits, then we may look upon Afghanistan as on the way to ruin ; it will go out of our hands.' The Amir made no reply. On hearing all, I reported it to Cavagnari, who said ' The Amir can do as he likes.' (This took place some eight or ten days before the 3rd of September.)

" About three days after this, the Envoy said, ' I will go and call on the Amir to-morrow.' When I went to the Amir's Durbar the next day I saw the Envoy sitting alone with the Amir. When he returned to the Residency, I came and spoke to him. He told me that he had a private interview with the Amir, that lasted two hours ; that the expression of the Amir's face was a pleased one ; that it was the same expression that he had seen him wearing at Gundamuck. On the 2nd September, the Envoy told me that he had asked Shah Mahomed to secure a house for Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, somewhere in the Bala Hissar, but away from the Residency. This Shah Mahomed had refused to do. The Envoy asked me to look out for one for him either in the City or Kzilbash quarter, or some other place than the Residency ground. I had selected one, and was coming towards the Residency the next morning at

7 o'clock to report having done so. On arriving at the gate of the Bala Hissar, I heard a report that Daoud Shah had been killed by some men of a regiment. I went on and saw three regiments, and a few bazaar people going towards the Envoy's quarters. I followed them with two of my own retainers. Some of the men of one of the regiments recognized me, and said, 'Kill him ; he is Cavagnari's father. They were unarmed as a rule ; some of them had side arms. Two men attacked me with sticks. One struck me on the shoulder and another struck my horse, which reared and turned round. I found that I could not get to the Envoy's, so I went up a by-street to Sirdar Wulli Mahomed Khan's house, and leaving my horse in his stable, I went inside the house, where I found Wulli Mahomed, who was taking his bath (hamam). I called out to him to come out ; he did so, and said, 'What is the matter ?' I said, 'Men have gone up to kill Cavagnari.' He said, 'Don't stay below ; go upstairs,' and from there, 200 yards off, through a window I saw all these people go up to the Envoy's stables, and begin stoning the syces, and undoing the horses and plundering. Some went on to where the sowars' horses were, and began to stone them, and began to plunder and unfasten the horses. The sowars armed immediately, and I then heard two or three shots evidently fired by the sowars. I cannot

tell whether any damage was done by these shots ; but they all retired at once, and some 200 of them went to the upper part of the Bala Hassar to fetch their comrades, the rest of the soldiers going out by the Shah Shahir gate of the Bala Hassar to fetch their arms from their camp.

“ I heard that when the men had gone to fetch their arms, the Envoy wrote a letter to the Amir and sent it to him by a Chuprassy. I heard that this letter reached the Amir, but did not hear whether he sent any reply or not.

“ In about half an hour's time, at about 7-30 or 8 A. M., the soldiers returned with their arms, and a regular fight began. Firing went on without intermission on both sides. The Afghan soldiers had capital cover, and surrounded the Residency on all sides. The officers of the Afghans directed their men. They had looted the magazine of the upper Bala Hissar, and had plenty of ammunition with them. All the clothing stores, Treasury and other storehouses are near the Residency. The storehouses were looted. They attacked the Treasury, but were stopped by the regiment on guard there. This regiment was I suppose about 500 strong and remained at the Treasury all the day. The Amir's house is about 250 yards from that of the Envoy. Besides the regiment on duty at the Treasury, I suppose there were some 2,000 followers of the Amir who had come in-

to the Bala Hissar early that morning who were all round the Amir's house. They were all armed. None of those joined the attacking party, though some of them did so at about 2 P. M. I hear that the Amir several times said, "Some of you go to the Envoy's assistance," but whenever any did go towards where the fighting was going on they only shouted out 'kill, kill.' This is only hearsay.

"At about 9 A. M., when the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers of the Embassy charge out at the head of some 25 of the garrison. They drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. When charged, the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. About a quarter of an hour after this, another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head (Cavagnari was not with them this time) with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkyns and Hamilton) leading. A fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jamader leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go up to the upper part of the house, and fired from above. At about half-past 11 o'clock, part of the building, in which the Embassy was, I noticed to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders, finding themselves so few, fired part so as to have a less space to defend. The

firing went on continually all day. Perhaps it was hottest from 10 A. M. to 3 P. M., after which time it slackened; and the last shots were fired about 8-30 or 9 A. M., after which, all was quiet and every one dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman, to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sirdar Wulli Mahomed Khan, what was going on. She sent her son to find out. He said. They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency. The whole of the day the dead bodies, stripped, remained in the Residency. On the next day, I heard that the bodies of all Mahomedans, Hindus, and the two British officers, Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, were all thrown together into a place dug for the purpose. I heard that the body of Mr. Jenkyns was taken to the Amir. I know nothing more about it. Cavagnari's body was not found. I am of the opinion that it must have been burnt in the house. I heard that, on the 4th, the soldiers found some money in the Residency. On hearing this, the Amir posted sentries over the house; and on the 5th caused the bodies to be buried; and from other money he found there, he paid each Sepoy of the regiment, that had guarded the Treasury, a present of seven rupees each man. I asked Wulli Mahomed Khan to send me to some safe place. He gave me three ponies. I dressed as a grass-cutter, and with one grasscutter riding one pony

in front, and the second behind me, with the other pony, we got safely to Aoshaho, where I remained in hiding about nine days, when, hearing that the British Force was at the Shutar Gurdan, I travelled by night and reached that place in safety and reported myself to the Brigadier-General commanding there. On about the 13th or 14th of September, the man in whose house I was concealed came to his house, and stated the following facts. He said:—‘The Amir called up the Sirdars of every clan—the Ghilzais, Khostanie, Cabulis, Kizlbashis, Tajis, &c.,—and asked them whether they intended to join in a “ghaza”(religious war) to fight the British, and if so, he requested that he would send their families to Kohistan and the Ghilzais’ country or some other place of the way. They answered, “We are not going to send away our families. Let the Ghilzais bring their families to Cabul, and we will then fight.” The Amir at this reply was very angry, and abused Tainullabudin, the man who had collected all the Sirdars together, and had said that they would agree to fight. Abdul Karim Khan Safi, the most powerful man in Kohistan and a friend of the late Envoy’s, was cut into small pieces by order of the Amir about ten days ago, the Amir fearing that he would, probably, seize him (the Amir) and make him over to the British, in case he wished to fly to Balkh or Kohistan.”

Further details regarding the massacre are thus summarized by the *Pioneer*:—The following account of the circumstances under which the Cabul massacre took place, is forwarded to us by a correspondent in the Kurrum, who has collected its details from such evidence as he has been able to procure. The story differs in various ways from that previously told. The final conclusions on the subject will have to be formed by piecing together and comparing the various narratives :—

“On the morning of Wednesday, the 3rd instant, some of the Amir’s troops were paraded—without arms, as is usual on such occasions—to receive their pay. They demanded two months arrears, but were only offered one, whereupon they refused to receive it, and said they would go and appeal to the English Elchi (Ambassador) for justice. A number of them crowded into the courtyard of Sir Louis Cavagnari’s residence in the Bala Hissar, clamouring for his assistance in having their grievances redressed. He became angry at their thus invading him, said the matter was not one in which he could interfere, and ordered his escort to turn the intruders out of his courtyard. On this being done, the rioters rushed for their arms, came back, and opened fire on the premises occupied by the Embassy. Sir Louis Cavagnari, his officers and escort, went to the upper part of the house, and returned the fire from the

windows, killing and wounding a great many of the assailants. At last it occurred to the latter, whose numbers by this time had been swelled by portions of twelve regiments and by a great number of *bud-mashes* from the city, to set fire to the doors and wooden verandah at one side of the house occupied by the Embassy. This they did at about 1 P. M., at which time the ammunition of the inmates is believed to have been almost, if not quite, exhausted. Under cover of the smoke the assailants rushed upstairs, and entering the room where Sir Louis Cavagnari was, they spilt his head open with a blow. He fell back against the wall, and just about the same time the burning roof fell in, and his body must have been immersed in the flames. It is said that Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns had previously been either killed, or badly wounded; and that their bodies were also buried in the burning ruins. Dr. Kelly is believed to have been wounded, and to have survived till the following morning when some of the murderers returned and cut him to pieces, cutting and hacking at the same time the bodies of any of the Embassy escort they could find, and in some of which life was not then extinct. The defence was of the most stubborn and heroic character, and the numbers slain by Sir Louis Cavagnari and his gallant followers (British and Native) are estimated, by some, at over

four hundred, and by others at less than three hundred."

The following statement of Rassul, Sepoy 7th Company Corps of Guides, of Mainsai, Yusafzai, was taken at Lundi Kotal on the 16th September 1879 :—

"About 14th days before the attack on the Residency, four sowars of the Guides were attacked in the Cabul bazaar, but escaped. On the 14th day after this, in the early morning, some regiments—I don't know how many—were drawn up below the Bala Hissar, but inside the walls, to receive their pay. I do not know the names of the regiments ; but they were unarmed. They suddenly broke into open mutiny with cries of, 'kill the Kaffirs.' I was then in the Residency in a building beside the house in which the British officers were. The troops came running up from the north, and entering our enclosure, began throwing stones at us, and plundered our things which were in the yard. Mr. Hamilton came up, and shut the gate leading from the courtyard into the road. We ascended the roofs of the houses on each side of the courtyard. The troops attacked us then with stones only, and were warned. Major Cavagnari ascended the roof of the Residency, when a high officer of the Amir, whom I do not know, came from the parade-ground, and entered the Arsenal, which is a good stone's throw to the west of the Residency buildings. The troops threw the stones

down out of their hands, and followed the Amir's officer into the courtyard. We had not fired upon the troops; they went back without our firing at them. In fact, Mr. Hamilton told us not to act on the offensive, but to keep quiet. The sowars of our party also came inside the outer courtyard of the Residency, leaving their horses in their lines, which were between the Residency and the Arsenal. Then the troops began to fire at us from the Arsenal; and I heard, that at the same time, they attacked their General; but this I did not see. Four shots were fired at us from the Arsenal; and then Major Cavagnari, who was on the south-western corner of the roof of the Residency, fired, and killed a man standing at the gate of the Arsenal. We were then on the roof of the Sikhs' quarters, Mr. Hamilton with us. After this the firing became general from the Arsenal. There is a parapet on the roof of the Sikhs' quarters; but none on that of the *cavalry quarters*. The Afghans stood at, and near, the Arsenal Gate. The Arsenal stands on higher ground than the Residency and commands its roof and that of the Sikhs' quarters, clearing the houses of the cavalry lines. Major Cavagnari fired four shots lying on his face on the roof of the Residency, when Mr. Hamilton, who was with us, said he had been wounded; but I don't know where he was hit. Up to this point, none of us except Major Cavagnari had fired; but at this time

we got orders to fire, and did so. Shortly after I and a few others descended into the courtyard, and went thence into the Residency courtyard, in order to prevent a small door leading from it to the east being forced. I and four other sepoy—2 Sikhs and 2 Mahomedans—sat there, when a Cabuli, who was a servant of the Mission, came up and said, he had been sent by Major Cavagnari with a letter to the Amir. We let him out by the little door we were guarding, Mehtab Sing, Jemadar, giving the order. The door between the two courtyards was always open. Then the Afghans broke through the wall south of the door where we were, and four of them came into the courtyard though we fired. One of them was shot. Major Cavagnari was wounded at about 8 A. M., when we went to the small door. Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Kelly also came into the Residency, the roof of which, to the north of the courtyard, is one storey higher than the roof of the part to the south. I don't know where Major Cavagnari was. Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jenkyns, and Dr. Kelly were all in the Residency with us after the wall was broken in. Mr. Jenkyns and six or eight sepoy went on the roof, and fired from its north-western corner on the Afghans. The troops then placed ladders on the roof of a house at the north-eastern corner of the Residency, and came on to its roof. This was about noon. Many of us were killed and

wounded there. Mehtab Singh, Karak Singh Havildar, a Duffadar, and others were dead. About this time the Afghans brought up two guns, and planted them to the north-west of the Residency. They had also made holes in the thin courtyard wall. When the Afghans had seized the roof of the Residency, we went below into the building. Mr. Jenkyns took post in the rooms at the west corner; Mr. Hamilton, Dr. Kelly, myself, and other sepoy also went to the west of the same building. The Afghans entered after us, and began to plunder and set fire to the Residency from below; then they left the building by the roof and the ladder. At about 2 P. M., the fire began to make the house untenable, and we leaped from its roof on to a narrow wall, and thence on to the roof of the Sikhs' quarters. But I was the last, and was driven back by the flames. At that moment, I saw at the east end of the roof a Cabuli, whom I knew. His name is Dost Mahomed, and he was among a lot of men who rushed up to kill me. Seeing me he called out loudly in Pushtu don't kill him; he is my *Ustad*. He then caught me in his arms, and dragged me to one side, another Afghan snatching my rifle from me. Dost Mahomed took me away to his house in the Bala Hissar. We were all in plain clothes, not having had time to put on our uniforms. I told Dost Mahomed to run, and bring me news of what was happening, and he went at once. His house is

close by. He told me the Afghans had brought up ten guns close to the gate, of the outer courtyard, and had blown in the gate and fired the buildings. They had killed some of our sowars' horses, and carried off the rest. He said that when the gate was blown open—at about 3 p. m.—Mr. Hamilton charged out of the gate at the Afghans, and was killed in the gateway with Dr. Kelly and Jenkyns, who also charged out at the head of the sepoy who remained alive. All were killed. Some others, however, have escaped. Six sowars were out on grass-cutting guard : four were killed, and two are said to have escaped ; so I hear. I did not see any corpses of British officers, nor did I go to see for fear of my life. Dost Mahomed told me, that next morning they put all the bodies in one place below the wall of Bala Hissar. It was a waste plot of ground not far from the latrines. They dug a trench, and put all the bodies in it—British, Sikhs, and Mahomedans—with a little earth over them. Next day I left Cabul to go down to Peshawur. About four *kos* from Cabul I came to a village, the name of which I do not know : there were some troops of the Amir's there. They beat me for being 'a Kaffir,' and were about to cut my throat, saying, 'let us kill this Cavagnari-ite,' when a soldier whom, I told I was a Mahomedan, begged me off, and took me away to the village called Sarasia, when they were again

about to kill me, when I fell at the feet of a Miah, who protected me ; and I spent three days there with one Shamshudin. I left on the fourth day, but was again arrested at a village three *kos* this side of Sarasia ; the people beat me, but let me go. Some officers of the Afghan army heard that I had escaped, and again I was arrested, and taken back. But after stripping me, they let me go. After that I came along by night, and in the hills. I left Jellalabad on the evening of the 14th. There was no force in Jellalabad, nor in Dhakka, nor are any coming, so far as I know, or have heard. Everybody along the road is afraid ; but they are not preparing for resistance, though I have heard that some Mullahs are inciting the people to resist. The regiments were paraded for their pay in the open ground inside the Bala Hissar when they mutinied. I have heard that Daud Shah is wounded ; that Wali Mahomed has fled to Kurrum ; and that the Amir is in deep distress at what has happened."

The Bala Hissar and the Residency are described in the following terms by the *Times* of India. It is somewhat difficult, from the meagre material at hand, to form an accurate idea as to the nature of the building behind which, Sir Louis Cavagnari and three other English officers, with a handful of Native troops, defended themselves so gallantly against the soldiery and populace of Cabul. We know, how-

ever, something about the Bala Hissar in which the English Residency was situated. The city of Cabul is triangular in shape, and the south-east angle is completely filled by the Bala Hissar, the Citadel or Acropolis, which is built on the slopes of a ridge 150 feet high, having the rest of the city hidden away behind it, and only connected with the citadel by a narrow neck of houses. At once the citadel and the residence of the Amirs, the Bala Hissar is a little town in itself, with a population of more than thousand. It is about half a mile long and a quarter of a mile broad. The walls are of stone, differing from the city-walls which are only of mud ; they are strengthened, here and there, by towers, and are surrounded by a broad stagnant moat. But Shere Ali, who was building another stronghold in the midst of his large barracks, allowed the fortifications of the Bala Hissar to fall out of repair ; and a recent letter from Cabul says, that the general appearance of the inside of the Bala Hissar was that of dilapidation and decay. The walls, however, such as they are, embrace an area large enough to contain the royal palaces and gardens, and the various public offices, which, like the narrow entrance from the city, are supposed to be commanded by the guns in the fort, on the highest point of the ridge. The Residency appointed for the reception of the Embassy was a large building "on the south-east wall of the

Bala Hissar," close to the royal palace. The Residency, according to a correspondent writing to the *Pioneer*, enclosed a spacious courtyard, on two sides of which are, he adds, "the houses in which we live—one of two stories, the other of four." It was this building then, a quadrangle round a court-yard, partly two stories high, and partly four stories, that Sir Louis Cavagnari with the three English officers of his Embassy, and some sixty-six men of his escort, defended with a heavy and effective fire all day long on Wednesday. The Amir must have lost every vestige of authority, before the troops ventured to attack his guests under his very eyes. Having once gained access to the Bala Hissar, under some pretence connected with their pay, they seem to have at once become the complete masters of the situation. This sudden and overwhelming success may not be unconnected with the arrival of six fresh regiments from Herat, where, as our Military correspondent has insisted, all along, peace has never been properly accepted. There was, at all events, no opposition save from the little body of our troops. The guns in the fort, which gives its name to the whole enclosure, never appear to have opened fire; and the gates were entered without resistance by the city mob. Everything that passed within these four walls were, probably, visible to the Amir; and few monarchs, even in the East, ever looked out more

helplessly on a more terrible scene. He could do little to assist in the gallant defence made by our Embassy, for he had no troops to send. But if the telegrams are accurate, he despatched his son to reason with the mob, but only to be stoned to death ; he sent General Daud Shah, who was unhorsed and met a similar fate. Finally, when the Afghan troops and the Cabul mob could not silence the English fire otherwise, they burned the Embassy to the ground. The city, like the citadel, seems to have been in the hands of the insurgents, for though Cabul is built in six *mohalas* or divisions, each one of which is planned as a separate fortress against the rest, we hear nothing of fighting in any one of them. Cabul, it may be as well to recollect here, contains an average population, slightly increased in the summer, of 60,000 souls. The bulk of the population are not of Afghan descent, the more influential section, some 12,000 in number, being Kuzzilbashes, who are Shiahs and not Sunis like the Afghans, and are more skilled in the art of intrigue than in war.

The following are the terms of the Viceroy's telegram to Lady Cavagnari apprising her of the death of her husband :—

“ It is with much unspeakable sorrow that I convey to you the intelligence of the death of your noble husband, who has perished in heroically defending the British Embassy at Cabul, against overwhelming

numbers. Words cannot express the depth of my sympathy with your bereavement, nor my grief for the loss of my beloved friend, nor my sense of the irreparable calamity sustained by this country. Every English heart in India feels for you."

The following extract from a letter, dated Edinburgh, Tuesday, the 9th ultimo, may interest our readers. It shews how Lady Cavagnari received the sad news of the massacre of her husband. Her Ladyship was paying a visit from Edinburgh to friends in North Berwick at the time, and not in Ireland, as has been stated :—

"On arrival of the terrible news from Cabul, special interest has been felt therein in this neighbourhood, from the circumstance that Lady Cavagnari, wife of the murdered Envoy, is, at present residing here. She has, for a short time, been a guest at "Parson's Green," once the property of the wealthy family of Mitchell Innes, but now possessed by Mr. Nicolson of the Palace Brewery. On Friday, Lady Cavagnari had gone to North Berwick ; and while there, the news had to be broken to her, that her husband had fallen a victim to the Afghan people, in whose possible assent to his residence at Cabul he had so much faith. The preliminary news, that trouble had broken out, reached the unhappy widow shortly before the Viceroy's confirmatory telegram addressed to her came forward. All that the sym-

pathy of a sovereign and a nation can do has been offered to Lady Cavagnari; but the news has, nevertheless, come on her with great severity. Yesterday, by the Queen's Command, Lord Provost Boyd, as Lord Lieutenant, called on her ladyship on her return to Parson's Green, to make inquiries as to her condition, and offer what sympathy words might express. But there is reason to believe that the Queen has not been satisfied with official and vicarious expressions, but has herself shown how deeply she feels for the widowed lady.

"Her Majesty the Queen sent from Balmoral on Sunday a gracious message to Lady Cavagnari expressing deep sympathy with her in the terrible bereavement she has sustained.

Lady Cavagnari came home from India about 18 months ago. It seems that a Grand Durbar was to have been held at Cabul in February, and it was the intention of Lady Cavagnari to leave this country, and join her husband in time to be present at this ceremonial."

Mr. W. Palliser writes to the Editor of the *Times* from the Army and Navy Club respecting the above lady as follows :—

I should feel obliged, if you would have the goodness to help me in bringing the claims of my friend and neighbour, Madame Cavagnari before the public. All Irishmen will join with me in a feeling of pride

at learning that the gallant Cavagnari was the son of an Irish lady. She is the daughter of the late Mr. Hugh Lyons Montgomery, of Launcetown House, County Down; and her mother was the daughter of the very Rev. Suart Blacker, Dean of Raphoe. She married Adolph Cavagnari, a Major in the French army, and a member of an old Purmese family, who, until his death, was Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte. It is only a few weeks since, that I met Madame Cavagnari full of a mother's joy and pride, on receiving my congratulations upon the honours bestowed upon her son. It is only a few hours since I met her at the very same spot, bowed down and broken-hearted by her terrible bereavement. Her grief, although unknown beyond the circle of her immediate friends, has not escaped that vigilance, which ever seeks to soothe the woes of those who mourn for the death of a distinguished public servant; and the following gracious allusion to her son in a message from Balmoral, has afforded the greatest consolation to the widowed mother :—"The Queen commands me to convey the expression of her deep sympathy with you on the death of your gallant son." It is remarkable that the very death of Sir Louis Cavagnari has been the means of affording the strongest proof of the great value of the public services which he has rendered to the State. For the

immediate and unopposed advance in Afghanistan, converging as it does from three separate points, demonstrates the great value of the new strategical frontier which he had obtained for our Indian Empire, and in the consolidation of which he lost his life. Some years ago, owing to unforeseen circumstances, Madame Cavagnari, on the death of her husband, lost all she possessed.

Her son since then gave her an annuity, but of this she is now deprived by his death. It is right that the public should know these facts, in order that the hands may be strengthened, of those whose duty it may be to consider the claims of the widowed mother of the man, who has sacrificed his life, in the performance of the most brilliant and valuable services to a great and wealthy empire."

It forms no part of the purpose of this brief record of events, to detail the history of the Third Afghan War. The insult to British Arms and British honour has been wiped out ; and the memory of the devoted men who gave their lives to duty, and the honour of England will not readily die. The following may fitly close this brief sketch.

KOHAT DISTRICT MEMORIAL—To the late Sir LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister, Plenipotentiary to the Court of His Highness the Amir of Kabul.

At a meeting held at Kohat, on the 17th October, 1879, it

was resolved that a Committee, composed as below detailed, with power to add to their numbers, should ascertain and report on the best form of Public Memorial to be erected, by voluntary subscriptions from the Nawabs and Chiefs, and others of the district in the city of Kohat, to the memory of His Excellency the late Sir Louis Cavagnari, K. C. B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, who had, for eleven years, administered the District as Deputy Commissioner, and who, with his Personal and Military Escort, fell on the 3rd September, 1879, in the gallant, though desperate, defence of the Residency of Kabul, against overwhelming numbers of mutinous Afghan troops.

President: Major T. C. Plowden, Deputy Commissioner.
Members: Sir Khwaja Muhammad Khan, K. C. S. I., Nawab of Teri, Khan Bahadar Bahadar Sher Khan, Nawab of Bangash (since deceased); Muzaffar Khan, Khan of Miranzai; Gholam Muhammad Khan, Khan of Shakardara; Ghulam Haldar Khan, Kiyani; Muhammad Amin Khan, of Upper Miranzai, (since deceased); Lala Wera Mal, Shikarpuriya; Shahzada Sultan Ibrahim, Saddozai, Extra Assistant Commissioner (since left the District); Sahib Ram Tehsildar, of Kohat; Sayid Muhammad Amir, Inspector of Police.

Honorary Secretary: Captain E. B. Nixon, District Superintendent of Police.

Major Ross Commanding 1st Sikhs, and at Kohat, together with the British and Native Officers of his Regiment, were also present.

The Committee subsequently decided that a clock-tower, to be erected in the Garden of the Kohat Municipality—a spot central for the City, Cantonments and District Courts—would be the form for the Memorial to take; and a design prepared by Mr. B. C. Bonsley, Assistant Engineer, Kohat, has been approved. The estimated cost of the Memorial, including the clock and a

peal of bells (from J. W. Benson & Co., Ludgate Hill, London,) will be some £1,200 (Rs. 12,000), towards which the Kohat Municipality are prepared to assist, on the terms noted in Minute No. 9 of a Meeting held at Kohat, on the 27th September, 1880, and herein below given :—

“ Proposed by the President, that Rs. 5,000 be voted towards the erection of a Municipal clock tower to be erected in the Municipal Garden (as per design submitted), in memory of the late Sir Louis Cavagnari, Envoy at Kabul, who was for many years Deputy Commissioner of this District, *provided* the balance necessary is made up by private subscriptions.—Carried *nem. con.*”

The following is a brief description by Mr. Bensley, Assistant Engineer, of the proposed Memorial Tower :—

“ The building will be erected on a conspicuous site in the Municipal Garden, facing the Kohat and Thull Road. It will stand 70 feet in height, exclusive of the platform which will form its base.

“ It is proposed to construct the tower of the very finest description of brick-work, with dressings, &c., of blue limestone and white marble. The brick-work in cornices and other traceries will be coated with fine and durable stucco.

“ The dial of the clock will be sufficiently elevated to be visible from the City and Cantonments. The dial of the clock is to be four feet in diameter, and to be of opal, so that the clock may be illuminated at night. The clock will work five bells (placed in the open cupola above) which will chime the quarters and strike the hours, so as to be heard at night for a mile round. The clock and bells will be obtained from Messrs. Benson & Co., London. As a finish to the design round the terraced base will be a space enclosed by iron railings, and laid out as a garden. The building will cost probably from Rs. 7,000 to Rs. 10,000. The architecture of the building may be termed a modified Arabesque, *i.e.*, semi-oriental, inasmuch as it is to be

built by voluntary contributions, and a large number of the subscribers will be natives of India and of this district."

The Political services of the late Sir Louis Cavagnari, on the North-Western Frontier of Punjab in the Kohat and Peshawar Districts from 1866-78, and latterly in the First Afghan war of 1878-79, were so numerous and conspicuous, and are so well known, that an elaborate account of them here is not called for. His name will to the last be associated, in the history of this war and of his country, with his heroic defence of the Residency at Kabul : whilst the people of the Kohat District will ever feel proud that one, for so many years their Deputy Commissioner, was chosen, at so early an age, for the high and important duties in the discharge of which he gave his life for his Queen and country.

APPENDIX.

THE BRITISH MISSION TO CABUL.

THE following are extracts from a letter, received by his father from Dr. Kelly, the medical officer in charge of the British Mission to Cabul :—

“ British Embassy, Cabul, Aug. 16.

“ Our quarters in the Bala Hissar, or upper fortress, are rather picturesque. They are built in true Oriental style, and, although the best in the whole of Cabul, are not quite up to our ideas of a house. To guard against earthquakes, which are of frequent occurrence here, the walls all contain wooden supports, upon which the roof and floors rest. Between these the walls are built up with the ordinary sun-dried bricks. The fronts of the rooms are altogether wooden, something like a shop front. In lieu of glass, the windows are closed with wooden shutters. The quarters all look into a central courtyard. The backs of the houses from the outside wall, which, for defence, has no openings or windows in it.

“ We are treated with every consideration by the Amir, who insists upon our being his guests. We, our servants, horses, and the men of its escort are all fed at his expense. The people are however, rather fanatical, not yet quite accustomed to our presence, so we always go about with a troop of cavalry on our rides. The people have not shown any hostility or disrespect ; but still there might be a fanatic among them who would, if he could, do us damage.

"Some names in Russian are written up in my dressing-room, probably, the General's, or one of his staff; I mean the fellows who were here this time last year.

"I have absolutely nothing to do save looking after any little work there is to be done about our messing arrangements, which is not much; but in a short time, I will have a dispensary and something to amuse me in it.

"Our movements are not at all certain. The Amir wishes to visit Turkestan and Herat, which are not in a very settled state. On the other hand, Sir Louis Cavagnari is anxious that Amir should attend at a big Darbar which it is proposed the Viceroy should hold in Agra about the middle of January. This would prevent Yakub Khan going to Turkestan. I do not know which I would like myself best—a six months' trip to Turkestan and fishing in the Oxus, or the Durbar.

"The city of Cabul is a miserable place indeed, and surpasses any I ever saw in dirt. The houses are all jumbled together; the best streets only allow two horsemen to ride abreast. The principal shops are the fruit-sellers and the leather-workers.

"We always heard a great lot about the Turkestan and Herati horses. Since our arrival here I have have seen many of them, but none to compare in any respect to the two Whalers I have. Hamilton, since our arrival here, brought two horses, but very quickly get rid of them both. The ponies, or small Galloways, are the best. Anything above 14 hands runs to legs. They are all nasty, squealing brutes with heavy shoulders and coarse, short, thick necks. The Amir gave us all presents of horses, but not one of them is worth anything.

"The climate of Cabul is delightful. We arrived at the hottest time of the year, and even then it was not warmer in the house than you have it often during the dog-days at home. Now it is getting much pleasanter, and the nights are fresh and nice. In the winter, there is usually 4ft. or more of snow, and the cold

is described as intense, but of course, dry, and none of the wet and slop you have.

"I do not expect to get very much variety in the shooting line. Quail and snipe, with some wild fowl, will be the only things to be got; but, then, I am the only one among us who cares about this sort of sport, so I ought to have a little of it, should we remain here during a part of the cold weather. Four miles from this there is a big lake about three miles long by three quarters broad; along the edges of this, the long bills are sure to abound, when the time comes for their visits from colder regions. The Natives say that, by and by, the water will be alive with all sorts of duck and geese.

"Cavagnari is an awfully good fellow—a nicer could not be found. Three of us are Irish, namely, Cavagnari, Hamilton, and myself. The fourth is a Scotchman. Hamilton got his V. C., I am glad to say, for the action at Futtehabad, where Battye was killed. Hamilton is an awfully nice fellow, and only 23 years of age.

"August 25th.

"Something has gone wrong with the post this week for we are behind with the English mail. You need not trouble yourself to send me any newspapers, for we have a very good collection of all the English papers, besides a fair supply of the monthly magazines.

"Nothing very striking has occurred here lately. We generally go out for a ride in the mornings, and now are familiar with all the surrounding places of interest. This morning we paid a visit to the Amir. He is always very gracious. This is the time of the Mahomedan chief fast of the year. Between sunrise and sunset, they neither eat nor drink; but old Yakub gave us tea this morning.

"By all accounts, the Russians will be obliged to cross a very difficult country before they reach Merv. There is one desert of

12 marches, in which there are only a few springs of saltish water to be met here and there—nothing for a large body of men and baggage animals.

“The mails are carried by the ordinary post up to Alikhel, where there are British troops; after that by runners on here. The latter get good pay; and to show you there is no difficulty about it, one tribe on the road, of whom none were employed, petitioned that through their country the mails ought to be carried by some of their men; four of them were accordingly put on the duty. On the 23rd what appeared to us a curious circumstance occurred by which a man was rescued from what appeared a certain death. According to the Mahomedan law, a man who kills another, when caught and the case is proved against him, is made over to the deceased's relatives for them to do what they like with him. Some days ago a soldier of the Amir's artillery killed a man in a row. It was a clear case of homicide. He was caught, and after some investigation was handed over to the relatives, who determined that he should be put to death by having his throat cut. The 23rd was fixed for it to come off; and when they were just in the act of putting their determination into effect, the man's colonial came forward, and ransomed him for 1,000 rupees. A similar case again occurred this morning.

“Cavagnari has just told me, that the Viceroy has settled upon the end of next February to hold the Durbar. We shall probably take Yakub Khan down, a month before hand; and shew him Bombay, very likely taking him by sea to Madras and Calcutta, and then up by train to Agra. It would be a very nice trip; and I should like it immensely. I only hope we shall be able to carry it out, for Cabul, at present, is not in a very quiet state; and it is just possible that Yakub may not like to be absent from it on such a long journey.”

YAKUB KHAN'S PALACE AT CABUL.

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[FROM THE "PIONEER'S" CABUL CORRESPONDENT.]

THE dismantlement of the Bala Hissar has made such rapid progress, that within the walls, the houses now are in ruins, all the beams and wooden supports, as well as every scrap of timber of every kind, being in course of removal to Sherpore. We are looking forward to a severe winter ; and, however snug our quarters may be, in the long ranges of barracks built here by Shere Ali, there will be much discomfort, not to say sickness, if firewood runs short. There are no large forests, from which large supplies can be drawn ; the hill-sides all around being bare rocks or shingly deposits, on which no vegetation can grow. Some of the large houses in the Bala Hissar, though now deserted and partially demolished, show signs of luxury and comfort which speaks highly for the pains taken by rich Sirdars to enjoy life in their own rude way. The palace in which Yakub Khan lived was furnished luxuriously, no doubt in his estimation ; thick Persian carpets, bright colored rugs and *durries* covering the floors ; while English-made tables, side-boards, and chairs were ranged side by side with the usual eastern pillows, cushions, and *rezais*, which are the delight of indolent loungers. One small room had the ceiling so closely hung with glass-chandeliers that to move about was to risk a small shower of pendants falling ; while the shades for the candles were of such brilliancy, in light-green and pink, that the effect in the brilliant sunshine was quite dazzling. "Pearls and barbaric gold" there were none to be seen, —they had been removed, for safekeeping, to his father-in-law's house in the city, where the ladies of the harem were also lodged,—but such gimeracks as usually light up the houses of the poorest classes in England were not wanting. Cheap pictures in common gilded frames, the kind turned out by the

thousand in Germany, all gaudy colors and painfully real were hanging on the walls, while a few well-executed portraits of Russian officers, in full uniform and bedecked with orders, were found scattered about. These were all neatly framed in wood; and were so well got up, that most probably they had been presents to Shere Ali from the Embassy, whose stay in Cabul gave rise to such serious results. One small picture was come across, which is certainly a great curiosity. It is plainly the work of an Afghan artist, and carries us back to the disasters of 1841-42, when, for a time, our arms suffered so serious a reverse. The subject of the drawing is an Afghan on horseback, in his full splendour of gold-braided coat of many colors, enormous black Astrakan hat with its characteristic cone shape, small black boots peeping out of the white drapery of his wide-flowing trouser, and the silver scabbard of his sword dangling at his side. His saddle is gorgeous in red and gold, while the trappings of his charger are bright with elaborate gilding. The horse is, in the language of heraldry, *rampant*, while his rider sits proudly in the saddle, staring out over the wide wide world, with an expression of haughty contempt, which is extremely awe-inspiring. On the green foreground, which represents the grassy sward of the Cabul plain, a dog, abnormally developed in some particulars, gambols along, barking joyously (if the protrusion of a crimson tongue as big as his head means anything), and thoroughly enjoys his master's triumph. What that triumph is, has yet to be told: on the flank of the horse, and so close as to be in danger of its heels, is the figure of a British officer, clad in the old Pandy uniform, with a musket at the trail in his hand, and crouching in the most abject fear. His face, that of a boy-subaltern, is turned upwards; while his eye, full of fear and respect, is watching his Afghan conqueror with great intentness. He is at the double to keep up with the horse, and the artist has cleverly depicted in figure and expression the humiliation he is

undergoing. Nothing could be finer than the contrast between the black-bearded Afghan, with his enormous pouting lips, of a purple tinge, and staring eyes, and the smooth, boyish face, full of timidity, of the unlucky Briton he is leading captive. He can afford to laugh at the picture now, for "the wheel has come full circle," and the subject now for an artist to draw would be an English Lancer, beautiful in his array as a lily of the field, leading captive at his stirrup a typical Afghan (say Yakub Khan for example) with a halter round his neck and clad in all the simplicity of a *dhotie*. The picture I have described is a standing curiosity in camp, and is to be the nucleus of a future Cabul Picture Gallery.

A LETTER FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I. TO SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN.

THE following is a letter from Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., to Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, dated the 5th March, 1879, of which the official translation is :—

After the expression of sympathy and sorrow, which is the customary mode of racers of the straight path of this transient world, I beg to inform you that, at this unfortunate moment, I have received your mournful letter, intimating an event, in recording which, the pen sheds the tears of sorrow; and the paper utters the sounds of pain, *viz.*, the departure of His Highness the Amir Sahib Bahadur from this transient world (to which every one must bid adieu) to the everlasting one, which is the real abode of all (human) beings. This sad news has caused an indescribable sorrow and pain to sincere friends.

Since "every being on the face of the earth must respond to the call of death," and quit this fleeting world, it behoves all survivors and the lonely travellers of this world to recline against the cushion of patience and submission to the will of

Providence, since no good can result from the opposite course, as Urfi has said—"Were a meeting with a beloved one to be procured by weeping, one might weep for a number of years in the hope of obtaining the desired meeting."

I can suggest no other course than to have patience. May the most High and Glorious God, through His mercy and grace, assign the deceased Amir an abode in the highest heaven, and bestow on his heirs patience and comfort.

On the 6th of March last, the following telegram was sent to Major Cavagnari, Jellalabad :—

Your telegram to Viceroy, 26th February. Following reply should be sent to Yakub Khan. Letter begins :—

I have received the letter, dated 20th February which your Highness has sent me ; and it has been laid before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

His Excellency has instructed me to reply to your Highness that it has always been the desire of the British Government to maintain peace and friendship with the Government, the Sirdars, and the people of Afghanistan. The events which caused the rupture of friendly relations between the two Governments, and which compelled the British Government to declare war against the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, had been publicly proclaimed, and are well known to your Highness.

His Excellency the Viceroy has now received with satisfaction the expression of your Highness' anxiety for the renewal of friendship between the two Governments, and the assurance of your desire to make every exertion for that purpose. I am consequently authorized to communicate to you the preliminary conditions upon which, if they are agreed to, the Viceroy is prepared to entertain negotiations for the conclusion of peace, and for the restoration of a friendly alliance between the two Governments.

In the first place, the following arrangements respecting the territories now in possession of the British forces, are necessary

for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the north-west frontier of India :

1. The Amir of Cabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes leading from Jellalabad into the Peshawur district, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these Passes.

2. The District of Kurrum, from Thull to the crest of the Shutar Gurden Pass, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi will remain under the protection and control of the British Government.

In the next place the foreign relations of the Cabul Government, must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and European British officers accredited to the Cabul Government must be permitted to reside with suitable personal guards, at such places in Afghanistan as may hereafter be determined upon.

It is necessary for the conclusion of any friendly settlement of affairs between the two countries, that the Government at Cabul shall agree to these preliminary conditions : the Viceroy will, thereupon, be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace, and a cordial alliance, on a basis conducive to the common advantage of the two countries, and to the stability and prosperity of the Cabul ruler. The letter ends."

Bukhtiyar Khan can take this reply to Yakub, with any subsidiary instructions.

Acknowledge receipt of this message.

THE TURKISH THEORY REGARDING THE MASSACRE AT CABUL.

[FROM THE "TIMES" CORRESPONDENT.]

CONSTANTINOPLE, OCT. 10.

THE Turkish public here hold a theory regarding the massacre of our Embassy at Cabul, which will, probably, be new to the

majority of the British public. It originated some weeks ago, in a small Afghan colony in Stamboul, some of whom professed to have received intelligence direct from their native country. It being then physically impossible that letters from Afghanistan could have come here so quickly, I concluded that the story was one of those thousand and one rumours which have no value except as harmless amusements for the longers in the *cafés* and bazaars. The Turkish Press, however, have taken up the matter seriously, and use it as a text, on which to preach a political sermon, to the British Government. The people of Cabul, so the story runs, noticed that large boxes were being forwarded to the unwelcome foreign guest, and, on surreptitiously making examination, found to their horror that the boxes contained Bibles and Korans, printed by infidels on infidels' paper. At once it was assumed, that the text of the sacred, uncreated revelation confided to the Prophet had been tampered with; and that the false texts, in conjunction with the Bibles, were intended for Christian propaganda. The discovery, and its interpretation, caused great excitement among the fanatical Cabuls; and the attack on the British Embassy was the result. Accepting this stupid story as authentic, one of the Turkish papers points out that though religious books may be safely introduced into civilized countries, it was a grave mistake to do so, under diplomatic protection, among a half-savage people; and that in view of the hostile attitude of Russia, British statemen ought to have carefully refrained from interfering with the religion, the customs, and the liberties of the Afghan nation. Even in Turkey, it is thought, that religious propaganda ought not to be encouraged; and in this respect, the organ, in question, quotes an incident which has just occurred in Constantinople. It seems that an agent of an English missionary society had made a Turkish translation of the Book of Common Prayer, and also of some religious tracts, and had employed a khodja, or Mussulman schoolmaster, to correct the

manuscript. When this was reported to the ecclesiastical authorities, the khodja was at once arrested and placed in confinement by order of the Sheik-ul-Islam. The comments made on the incident show, that even among those young Turks, who profess to have adopted modern Liberal ideas, there is still a considerable amount of old Mussulman fanaticism. The poor khodja is called an abject, miserable creature, who has been induced by his own wicked heart, and by the instigations of the Evil One, to commit an act of sacrilege, for which he is condemned by the curse of heaven to eternal torture. In reply to the khodja's defence that he had accepted the work in order to save himself from starvation, the writer declares that this is no excuse; and that the miserable creature should receive an overwhelming punishment, so that the example may deter others from selling their religion for a few pence. So much for religious toleration among the educated Mussulmans of constantinople. Those who hold, that there is at present, a recrudescence of fanaticism throughout the Mussulman world can point to such facts as this, in support of their opinion. It is, however, only fair to add, that though the Turks have always shown a certain contemptuous tolerance towards those who have the humiliating misfortune to be born Giaours, they have always acted with great severity towards Mussulmans, who endeavoured to lead their fellow-believers away from the Mahomedan fold.

OPINIONS OF THE CONTINENTAL PRESS ON THE CABUL DISASTER.

(*La Republique Francaise*, Paris, Sept. 9.)

WITH whom does the responsibility rest, for the murder of the English Envoy? In the dearth of details which we share with

the English Government, it is very hard to form an opinion. To suspect Russian emissaries of being the instigators of this crime as the *Standard* does, seems a very hazardous opinion. It is a grave accusation to bring forward, without proofs in support of it. To pretend that the Amir Yakub Khan has lent himself to that atrocious violation of the law of nations is, until further information reaches us, a flagrant injustice. The authority of Yakub Khan was set at defiance; it is gravely menaced; and the Prince who, on ascending the throne, understood that all resistance to the English army had become hopeless, cannot have madly launched into so bloody an adventure. The Afghans are a barbarous race, fanatical, and untameable. Foreigners, especially Christians, are hateful to them. Is it to be wondered at that the sight of Envoys of the Anglo-Indian Government installing themselves in the capital, and loaded with honors by the Prince and his courtiers, should have exasperated a ferocious population? On the other hand, regiments, or rather bands, of proud and covetous warriors, took the initiative of the *emeute*, which has ended so deplorably. These people, no doubt, imagined that, on the arrival of the Feringhis, they would roll in gold. They were disappointed, demanded their pay, and did not get it at once. In those countries that is quite enough to cause a revolution. The like has occurred often enough at Constantinople, even since the commencement of this century. For the present, then, we are bound to regard the massacre of the English Mission as an appalling accident, but one which the known temperament and manners of the Afghans can account for. Cabul had witnessed another drama of the same kind. In 1842, the English and the Prince they had installed on the Throne were cut to pieces. England wrought a terrible revenge for these crimes; but her Government had the wisdom not to occupy the country. The same course will, probably, be pursued now. When the culprits shall have been punished, England will, probably, keep within

the clauses of the Treaty of Gundamuck, and will be right to do so. Any other course would earn for the policy of the present Government the appellation of *politique de casse-cou et de coup de theatre*.

(*Journal des Debats*, Paris, Sept. 8.)

We can well understand that England has no desire to rush into an adventure, the perils of which are manifest, but the advantages of which are less so. If, however, she does not annex Afghanistan, what will she do? It is now seen how her agents are treated, and the Sovereigns, who are to be her more or less disguised vassals. She cannot, therefore, continue to use the method which, when scarcely tried, has produced such sanguinary results. If she abandons direct action by the presence of an English Resident at Cabul, her influence will, probably, not survive what will be regarded as an enforced retreat. Will she be content with retaining and strongly occupying the Passes of her North-West Frontier? It would assuredly have been more prudent to have been satisfied with deriving this already considerable advantage from the war. But what would have been politic and adequate, three months ago, is no longer so. The question is really very delicate. The necessity of inflicting exemplary chastisement on Major Cavagnari's assassins is the first necessity, for without signal reparation England's *prestige* and influence would be for ever forfeited in those countries where force alone commands respect; but the real difficulties will arise afterwards, when means will have to be found of imposing English influence on the Afghans without the obligation of occupying their territory. This problem, which could not be solved in 1844, and which, it is now too evident, was not solved by the Treaty of Gundamuck, will still, doubtless, long perplex English statesmen.

(*Le Temps*, Paris, Sept. 8.)

The misfortune which has overtaken England obliges her to undertake another war, which will have to be carried on to Cabul, and probably farther ; and when this campaign, which will be long and difficult, shall have been happily ended, what fruits can England expect to reap from victory ? She cannot return to the policy formulated in the Treaty of Gurdamuck. After the check she has received, there will only be one of three courses to choose. Either the Amir must be reduced to a state of vassalage, and his subjection guaranteed by a military occupation, or Afghanistan must be annexed, or that State must be abandoned, and a military force concentrated on a scientific frontier for its protection.

(*Le National*, Paris, Sept. 8.)

The brilliant reception of Major Cavagnari was but superficial, and must, if anything, have still further exasperated the feelings of the multitude, humbled in its patriotic pride and wounded in its religious faith. Their coarse and ignorant minds were only too prone to account for the disasters that had overtaken them by imputing them to treachery, and the presence of the handful of Englishmen who represented the conquering power in their midst must have lashed their passions and religious fanaticism into frenzy. After the Afghans are defeated, will they be conquered ? The geographical conformation of their country, which is favorable to revolt, and religious fanaticism as well as wounded national pride, will make each inhabitant the personal enemy of every invader. Wherever warfare is regular, victory will be on the English made ; but the resistance will be made by merillas. The Afghans would not have minded being stripped of a scientific frontier ; but they presented a fixed sojourn of Cavagnari at Cabul, it being too flagrant a sign of British

domination. This condition imposed by Lord Lytton spoiled everything. The revolt is the ironical answer destiny gives to the boastful speeches of Lord Beaconsfield. The English Premier, perhaps, will have to go a great deal farther than he intended, when he first plunged into the question of scientific frontiers.

(*Le Soir*, Paris, Sept. 8.)

Yakub Khan is suspected of complicity in the tragic event at Cabul ; but it is not improbable that he had not sufficient influence to prevent it. In this case, the Amir would be compelled to place himself under the protection of England, if he would preserve his throne ; but the English are not, at present, very sure of becoming so powerful in Afghanistan that Yakub Khan could without danger be turned into a simple British Governor, when they have avenged themselves upon the assassins of their Envoy. Much will remain to be done in order to prevent a repetition of similar occurrences.

(*Dix Neuvieme Siecle*, Paris, September 10.)

It becomes Russia less than any other Power to address a remonstrance to England through her official journals. For all that has taken place, and all that is still taking place in Afghanistan, the Russian Chancellery is responsible. It is the fault of Russia that England has been obliged to enter into an adventurous expedition in Afghanistan, for, if they had not undertaken it, they would have lost all their authority in India. The Russian journalists, therefore, must not now assume towards England the tone of the moralist, and say " it is a misfortune ; but we warned you of it, and now you see what it is to wish to establish a resident at Cabul." We leave it to our readers to imagine what kind of sentiments such language is likely to arouse

in England. As for us, we wish our neighbours may prudently carry out and bring to a rapid and successful issue the new campaign which the murder of their Embassy has necessitated.

(*Le Nord*, Brussels, Sept. 8.)

The explanation given by the telegram as to the cause of the rising seems on a *prima facie* view somewhat strange. One cannot but feel surprise at the English Embassy being held responsible for the arrears of pay due to a few Afghan regiments, and if this question of pay has really been the chief cause of the outbreak, it would seem only natural that rioters should appeal to the Amir and his Ministers rather than to Major Cavagnari. The eagerness with which the population of Cabul joined the insurgent soldiery would alone lead to the belief that the movement must have been due to more general causes, and we think, we are not far wrong in attributing it to the antipathy which the Afghans have always felt and shown against the installation of English Resident Ministers in their country. It is known that the refusal of Shere Ali to consent to the establishment of a British Embassy in his capital was one of the causes of the last war. It will also be recollected that the predecessors of Lord Lytton in the Viceroyalty of India, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, have all expressed themselves most categorically against the establishment of permanent missions in Afghanistan regarding them as more prejudicial than beneficial in promoting the good relations between the two countries. In a speech delivered as long ago as last November, Lord Lawrence quoted on this very point an interesting letter he had received from Mr. Seton Karr, who was Indian Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1869. In this letter, the Amir said that he personally had no great objection to an English Envoy residing permanently at Cabul. But he urged that the Afghan chiefs and nobles would

regard it as an insult, and on that ground he could not assent to it. Yakub Khan had to assent to the arrangement which his father had always rejected. The question arises whether the English Government was wise in imposing upon him a condition so repugnant to the feeling of the Afghans. This will be ascertained when full details of the events at Cabul shall have come to hand ; but, without any intention of prejudging the conclusions to which fuller information must lead, it has appeared to us interesting to note that the opinion of Lord Lytton's predecessors was adverse to the design which he and Lord Beaconsfield laid themselves out to realise. In any case the *emeute* at Cabul threatens to render necessary a new campaign, which is likely to be as long and as arduous as the last.

(*Tagblatt*, Vienna, Sept. 8.)

The disorder in Cabul will demand the most peremptory satisfaction ; for both the Ambassador himself and all the members of his Embassy are acknowledged to be inviolable by the law of nations. At Cabul, the lives of all of them have been sacrificed. Everybody who knows how jealously England, under her present rulers, protects, against attack, all her subjects, even persons who do not hold nearly such dignified positions as her Ambassadors, must feel convinced that she will not suffer any delay to take place in demanding, even if necessary, by the sword, that full atonement shall be made for the consequences of this attack on her Embassy, so recently established in Cabul. No body would, at present, venture to contemplate what may be the final outcome of this event, but the general disquietude which has been caused by the events of the past week has been greatly increased by what has since become known.

(*Golos*, St. Petersburg, Sept. 8.)

All the money expended on the Afghan expedition is thrown away. The Treaty of Gundamuck is torn into shreds, and the conquest of Afghanistan becomes as fatal a necessity as the routing of Cetewayo's army after the disaster of Isandhlana.

The conduct of Yakub Khan during the 3rd September does not prove that the attack on the Embassy was made against his will and without his cognisance.

(*St. Petersburg Gazette*, Sept. 9.)

The massacre of the English Mission in Cabul obliterates the scientific frontier, and necessitates the occupation of the whole of Afghanistan by British troops; but this is incompatible with England's assurance to the St. Petersburg Cabinet, with whom there must be an understanding regarding England's measures of satisfaction, an understanding which may finally put an end to the independence of Afghanistan. The impossibility of England's predominating by peaceful means affords an opportunity for a direct junction of English and Russian dominions in Central Asia by dividing Afghanistan between the two Powers, thus destroying, by mutual arrangement, the present intermediate zone, the cause of continual trouble between the two countries.

MAJOR CAVAGNARI ON BRITISH AGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

A correspondent writes :—"The lamented but heroic death of our Envoy at Cabul has imparted a peculiar, if somewhat painful, interest to the opinion expressed by him as to the appointment of British officers in Afghanistan (see Blue Book, page 142). Major Cavagnari then (April 1875) considered that the Amir 'would, probably, declare that the unsettled state of his kingdom pre-

vented his being able to guarantee the safety of the officer appointed'; and after pointing out the advantages which would result from the presence of English Residents in Afghanistan—advantages which must be patent to all careful observers—he says—' But should the Amir refuse, or unwillingly assent to the measure, it would possibly be productive of very evil results. Everything would be done to thwart the action of the Resident; and not unlikely some insult would be offered, which would either result in his having to be withdrawn or supported in his position by force of arms.' Some light may be thrown on the primary causes of the recent calamitous outbreak at Cabul by the following observation of our Envoy's. "The Sirdars, who, probably, hope to become governors in the different Afghan provinces would, like the Amir, be adverse to the appointment of European British officers. They, probably, fear that the appointment of such Residents would be merely a preliminary to annexation.' The foregoing extracts are a remarkable proof of the sagacity and political foresight of that brave and skilful officer, whose loss all parties must so deeply deplore."

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF THE LATE SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI.

THE following account of personal recollections of the late Sir Louis Cavagnari is from the pen of Mr. William Simpson, the well-known Special Artist of the *Illustrated London News* :—

During the first part of the Afghan campaign I was attached to the Peshawur Field Force, which acted on the line of the Khyber, Jellalabad, and Gundamuck. It was to this force that the late Sir Louis Cavagnari was attached in a political capacity; and as I saw a good deal of him during the six months, which was about the time the campaign lasted, the Editor of the *Illus-*

trated London News has asked me to relate any recollections I have of the man, thinking that they would be of interest just now to the public. My first introduction to him, at that time Major Cavagnari, was at Ali Musjid on November 21, last year. The guns of the Afghan fort had opened fire, and were continuing it against our artillery, which had begun to reply from the Shagai heights, and while the usual civilities which such engines send to each other, were knocking about, Major Cavagnari, seeing that I was sketching the ground, introduced himself to me, to point out the village of Lala Cheena and all the spots connected with the stoppage of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, which had occurred in the September previously, and to which Mission, it may be remembered, he was attached. When we advanced to Dhakka, my tent chanced to be placed next to Major Cavagnari's, and although our stay at this place was short, it gave me some experience of the man. It was here I made the sketch of him holding a Jirgah, held just behind our tents, with the Shinwarries an illustration of which appeared at the time in the *Illustrated London News*. I began also at this place to see evidence of his activity and devotion to the functions of his appointment. I found at times in the morning that Cavagnari was gone, his tent was empty, and he was reported to have started during the night on some expedition, or another. It might be a raid, or an attempt to capture the Mir Akhor, or a rush off with a small escort to arrange with some Afghan Chief about guarding the roads.

Sir Samuel Browne's head-quarters reached Jellalabad on December 20. On the morning of our entry I started off early with Major Cavagnari, Major Sanford, and one or two more of the head-quarter staff. I dropped behind before we reached the town, so that I entered by myself a few minutes later than the others.—Up to that time we had had no experience of Ghazis, those who hope to reach Paradise by killing *Kaffirs* or Infidels ; but their attempts a few days later upon the lives of our soldiers

led to the order given afterwards that no one was to enter Jellalabad without a sufficient escort. So I rode in that morning at the Peshawur Gate and through the bazar, all alone, thoughtless of danger, returning the salute of "Salaam Alaikoom" to the Mahomedans, and saying "Ram, Ram" to the Hindus, who seemed delighted, for to them our occupation of the place was a gratifying event. The same day Major Cavagnari received a letter from Shere Ali, announcing his departure from Cabul. On my expressing a desire to see and sketch the seal of the Amir, Major Cavagnari at once submitted the letter to me for inspection. The document was written in Persian, on the usual brownish Oriental paper. The seal was in the *Torgha* character, and about the size of a six pence.

During our long stay at Jellalabad, my intercourse with Major Cavagnari became more intimate, and when he learned that I was desirous of making explorations in some of the Buddhist remains on that region, he at once provided a working party for such operations, on the condition that all sculptures and coins were to be the property of Government. He rode out with me one morning, shortly after the digging had been commenced to the Ahin Posh Tope, where the men were at work ; and on seeing remains of architecture beginning to appear which had been buried for at least a thousand years, he desired me to have more men put on, and gave orders to double the number. The final result of all this, after about two months' work, was that I brought to light important details of the ancient Buddhist architecture, all being quite new to students of that subject, and I was fortunate enough to come upon a deposit of twenty gold coins, every one dating from about the first or second centuries of the Christian era, and a gold relic-holder, all of which I handed over to Major Cavagnari, who sent them on to Lord Lytton at Calcutta. The Natives hearing of these explorations came and reported the existence of other remains, regarding which they

told their own traditionary belief, and offered to show the places to Major Cavagnari. Instead of going himself he asked me to do so, and I went on more than one of these inquests. One was a cave at Hada, which, according to the Native who reported it, went under ground to an unlimited distance. I had experience of tales of this kind before, and consequently knew what to expect ; but, being anxious not to allow anything which might be important to escape notice, I went and found, as I anticipated, that the cave had nothing remarkable about it. Another excursion of this kind I made, was across the Cabul River, and up the Kunar Valley, about fourteen miles, to see some Buddhist remains in that quarter. At Kona-deh, there is an old tope which the Khan said we might explore ; but I judged it useless to go such a distance to work when we had better ground nearer at hand in the Jellalabad Valley. This was a very pleasant visit, for Major Cavagnari had arranged that Major Stewart, of the Guide Corps, should go with me, and his familiarity with the language was most useful in getting information ; and Ahmed Khan, of Shewa, one of the chiefs, went about with us, and treated Major Stewart and myself to a repast in the Afghan style of hospitality, sitting under the mulberry-trees close to the door of his village.

A day or so after the advance to Gundamuck, General Gough made a reconnoissance as far as the Surkpul, on the Surkhhab. I went out with this party, and Major Cavagnari also accompanied it. We had General Maunsell and a number of the head-quarter staff with us : and Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan was also in the party. On our return we came by Isphan, and visited the Zialet of Shaik Rahim Dad, known as the Dabad Zialet, from its having the reputation that cases of rheumatism can be cured at it. A sketch of this shrine appeared in the *Illustrated London News* two weeks ago. Seeing me making a sketch, Major Cavagnari called my attention to a chuprassi, his

constant attendant, who was circumambulating the grave with the most serious aspect, at the same time beating his limbs, with a bunch of dried seeds. He said "put him in, I never saw him before saying his prayers, but I suppose the bare possibility of a cure for his rheumatism is too good a chance to be lost." As I saw a good deal of this man, I have been watching the late news from Cabul to see if it might contain any news of his fate. I am inclined to fear that the poor fellow's rheumatism will not now trouble him. The people in the district about Gundamuck, hearing of our explorations at Jellalabad, brought in objects which, they said, had been discovered in topes; one of these was an old brass lamp which, they affirmed, had been got in a tope near Nickar Kheyl. From the ornament on it I was inclined to doubt that its antiquity could possibly be so far back as the Buddhist period. It was some time before we managed to get any one able to make out what appeared to be letters, but, at last, Major Lovett was able to decipher on it *Allah il Allah*, and its post Buddhist character was settled. Before this had been made out, Major Cavagnari had determined to present it to the Royal Asiatic Society in London, and for that purpose he sent it home to the care of Colonel Yule, and this interesting relic will now be preserved. This lamp led to an excursion. It became important, while the date of the object was under discussion, to see the tope in which it was said to have been found. For this purpose Major Cavagnari made the arrangement for me to go and see the place, and he also made one of the party himself, taking with him Haider Khan, one of the principal chiefs of Gundamuk. The occasion was considered favorable for giving the survey officers a chance of fixing some of their points; so we had them and Colonel Jenkyns, commanding the Corps of Guides and one or two officers of the 10th Hussars also accompanied us. Thus we formed a large party. We ascended the Suffaid Koh, on the eastern side of the guoge, from which the Murkhi Khyel

steam flows out of the hills. At about 8,000 feet, I stopped to make a sketch of the country, looking across the Isphan plain to Jugdulluk, which gave a very fine view, with glimpses of the Hindu Kush in the far distant beyond. The surveying officers and most of the others went up about 1,000 feet higher, and reached the snow ; but Major Cavagnari remained with me while I sketched, and his faithful chuprassi kindled a fire of wood, for it was cold at that height. We had an old man with us, named Mullik Mir Alum, a Khugiani, belonging to Murkn Kheyl, who remembered all about the former war ; and while Cavagnari was sitting here, he kept up a conversation with him about the details of the retreat from Cabul in 1842. This old fellow told how the few stragglers made their last fight on the hill near Gundamuck, and that they fought like devils. No one would go near them while their ammunition lasted, but when that was done, the attack was made. The position on Sept. 3 of the Residency at Cabul was so similar, as a life or death contest, to what was described to us sitting on the sides of the Suffaid Koh on that day, I cannot help thinking that it must have come back to the mind of Cavagnari even in the midst of the tumult and excitement of the last dreadful struggle. When our party came down the hill, Haider Khan led us to one of the villages, where we all sat down to an ample feast. It was in Afghan fashion ; we used our fingers as forks ; and a *thick chupatie*, or cake, served as a plate, while a large thin chupatie did duty as a table napkin, or could be eaten as bread, according to taste. On the day that the Treaty of Gundamuck was signed, I went in the morning to Major Cavagnari's tent, and found that he had been up till two o'clock in the morning writing out himself the English version on the two copies of the treaty ; and on my entrance I found Bakhtiyar Khan busy on one of them, writing the Persian translation, while Mirza Mahoffimed Nabi Khan, the Private Secretary of Yakub Khan, was flat on the ground with

the other copy beneath him, to which he was adding the Persian version. Habibullah Khan, the Mastaufi, was on his knees carefully watching that no mistakes were being made by this writer, while Cavagnari and Mr. Jenkyns were on the other side keeping a look out for the same purpose on Bakhtiyar Khan. That same afternoon the Treaty of Gundamuck was signed by Yakub Khan, on the one hand, and by Major Cavagnari, for the Government of India, on the other; and Mr. Jenkyns, during the night, started with them for Simla—riding back to Peshawur in an incredibly short space of time—for ratification by the Viceroy. One copy would be retained by our Government, and the other handed over to Yakub Khan. (Our Special Artist's Sketches, engraved for this week's publication, show the scene in Major Cavagnari's tent, when the Secretaries were writing out the Treaty, and the subsequent act of signing the Treaty at Gundamuck, on May 26, by the Amir and Major Cavagnari.) This ended the Second Afghan war. As I had entertained hopes of visiting the colossal figures and city of caverns at Bamian before I came home again, I felt anxious to know what Major Cavagnari's movements were likely to be, and in this I found him with his usual frankness as to giving information. He was to return to India, and then, after a month, or perhaps two, he was to proceed to Cabul. Had his orders been to return to Cabul with Yakub Khan, I should have asked to go with him, and I have no doubt but I should have accompanied him, my desire being strong. I also offered to go with Yakub Khan, or with any of his people, but this could not be arranged. What my fate might have been had I gone, who can tell? I can only repeat what a Native of India would say, *Khuda Jana* or "God alone knows."

These notes of my contact with Sir Louis Cavagnari will show that he was a man with sympathies beyond his own particular duties; for they tell that while he was busy carrying on a com-

plicated and important political campaign, he found time to interest himself in other matters. I have seen it lately stated in one of our leading journals that he was a over-sanguine man. From what I saw of him, I would not indorse the statement. To be sanguine is one of the necessary conditions of success. At least, a couple of months before the treaty of Gundamuck was arrived at, he told me, that he would bring the whole matter to a peaceful solution. This he accomplished. He was sanguine; but when a man realizes his intentions the words "over sanguine" do not apply. If any one thinks that Sir Louis Cavagnari went to Cabul and was unconscious of danger, I should say he was mistaken. He went there perfectly well aware of the risk; but he was a brave man, and ran the risk. I always found him quiet and collected, and never seeming as if there was anything of the slightest importance going on. Always open in giving information, when he could do so; and if he could not equally frank in saying that he must be silent. The campaign became a political one; there was no real army to fight with, so the generals had no chance of distinguishing themselves. The whole onus of the campaign centred at last in Major Cavagnari; and by the able manner in which he managed the duties cut out for him, he won for himself the only reputation of note which was made during the late war. The ability and judgment which he manifested was honored at last by Knighthood, and it is deeply to be regretted that the ability and judgment have not been spared for the use of his country in a region where such high qualifications are likely to be much needed in the future.

The other officers, who have nobly fallen along with Sir Louis Cavagnari, had also become familiar friends during the late campaign. Mr. Jenkyns was a master of the Persian language, and interested in all the dialects of Central Asia. He caught a *nimcha* at Jellalabad, and made an effort through him to get down some of the *Siah-Posh Kaffirs*, so as to get details of their

language. These *Kaffirs* were long supposed to be the descendants of Alexander's Macedonians, but the study of the language seem to be destroying this theory. This *nimcha*, as the name implies, had been born a *Kaffir*, but had been converted to Mahomedanism. I was indebted to Mr. Jenkyns for getting a sketch of this man's physiognomy, which lately appeared in the *Illustrated London News*. Mr. Jenkyns was a man, who, had he lived, would have made his mark in the profession to which he belonged. Lieutenant Hamilton might have been described, with his fair, almost beardless face, as a mere boy, but he was a lion at heart. He was already a V. C., from his gallantry at Futtahabad, and his charging the mob of assailants in Cabul three times, carrying death with his own hand as he dashed among the enemy, is enough to show the kind of stuff he was made of. Dr. Kelly, of the Guides, was also well known to me. Returning evil for good is not a happy sentence to be recorded. But it must be written in this case. Dr. Kelly had opened a dispensary in Cabul, and was doing all he could for the good of those who required his services. At Gundamuck he attended to many of the men, who had been wounded in the Futtahabad engagement ; in some cases I know he performed operations. And after all these humane services he has been murdered as his reward.

(*Globe*.)

With regard to the question which has been raised as to the dates at which the telegrams from the Viceroy published by the Home Government were forwarded to Lord Lytton from Cabul, it is no doubt the fact that the telegram of September 3rd was forwarded from the Viceroy on that day. Several previous telegrams bore the dates of their despatch from Cabul, and to this fact is due the misconception under which this particular communication has been regarded as coming from Sir Louis Cavagnari on that date. For this misconception, however, the Government

can, in no way, be blamed. We believe that they have given to the public, fully and frankly, all the information which they were in a position to make known; and the fact that there are four other telegrams, which bear no date from Cabul is of itself sufficient proof that they have published the Viceroy's communications as they were received.

THE INDIAN COUNCIL AND THE DISASTER.

Lord Cranbrook arrived at the India Office from Hughenden shortly after noon on September 10, and presided over a meeting of the Indian Council at which there were present, in addition to His Lordship, Mr. Yule, Mr. Dalzell, Sir R. Montgomery, and General Foster. —Another Council was held on September 11, but the meeting was chiefly occupied with the routine business of the department. Sir Louis Mallet, the Permanent Under-Secretary for India, was among those present in attendance at the office during the day. Constant communication was held by telegraph with the Indian Government, and a lengthy message from the Viceroy, giving full particulars of the military situation, was received during the evening after Lord Cranbrook had left the office. Viscount Cranbrook was to leave town on (Sept. 12) on his return to Mr. Cunliffe Brooks' shooting quarters in Aberdeenshire.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE ON THE CABUL MASSACRE.

In a speech at Topsham on the 8th ult., the Chancellor of the Exchequer said :—Allusion has been made to one, and we speak of it necessarily with pain and sorrow. No one can help feeling the deepest sympathy and the deepest grief for the fate of the gallant men of whose loss in Afghanistan I fear we have received

tidings which cannot be doubted. (Hear, hear.) It is a matter which must fill every one's heart with the greatest sorrow. (Hear, hear.) They were men who have been sacrificed, we do not precisely know under what circumstances, to an outbreak of fanatical fury, against which, as far as the accounts enable us to judge, they contended with a courage and determination, worthy of Englishmen, and worthy of those gallant men themselves who have rendered such service to the Empire. (Cheers.) They contended, as I understand, to the last in defence of the building which they occupied. The mutineers, though far exceeding them in number, were unable to storm the Residency, until, at last, they succeeded in setting fire to the door; and even then, when they broke in, our gallant countrymen sold their lives dearly—for I fear we must admit that their lives have been sacrificed. It is impossible that England can fully appreciate the very serious loss which we have sustained by the death of one so eminent, so worthy of our gratitude, as that distinguished man, Sir Louis Cavagnari. (Cheers.) We cannot but deeply feel that loss, but it is premature, at present to say anything more about it. We know not what the circumstances were. So far as we can judge, it appears to have been an unpremeditated outbreak, on the part of a certain number of mutinous regiments. So far as we can judge, the Amír has been entirely true to us, and the last message represents him as imploring our assistance. Of one thing we may be quite sure—that assistance will not be withheld. (Cheers.) We may be sure that Englishmen will be prompt to go to succour those who have fallen on their behalf, and those who are holding out in consequence of attacks directed against them; and we do not doubt that our gallant troops are far on the way to the city of Cabul; and that we shall soon hear of their having restored peace to that place. (Cheers.) But we cannot, as I said, undertake to speak as to the circumstances which have occurred, and I am sure that you will all feel, and England will feel, that it is

but right that for the moment we should abstain from mere conjecture, or mere hasty judgment of any sort. (Hear, hear.)

THE COMMISSION SITTING AT CABUL TO ENQUIRE INTO THE LATE MASSACRE

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[FROM THE "PIONEER'S" CORRESPONDENT.]

CAMP, SIAHSUNG, 30TH OCTOBER.

SINCE the issue of the proclamation, and the close confinement of Yakub Khan to his tent two days ago, there has been no further development of the situation; and it seems as if we should quietly wait here for the winter; in order to allow events to develop themselves, without further demonstration of our force. We have Cabul city and its guilt to deal with; and though there are few outward signs of the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the massacre of our Embassy, there is a steady under-current of work running on, the results of which have yet to be declared. This has been done chiefly by Colonel Macgregor, aided hitherto by Hyat Khan, Assistant Political Officer, who has done good service in searching out persons likely to give evidence; and now that Dr. Bellew has arrived, still further progress is being made in unravelling the complicated web of falsehood, which has been drawn about the occurrence. Sixty witnesses have been examined privately; and, as each one is quite in ignorance of what has been said before, the truth of the various stories told can be tested, by the comparisons drawn between the testimony of the friends and enemies of Yakub Khan. Such of his late confidential advisers and adherents, as have come under cross-examination have generally injured his cause by affirming too much; and plausible stories had been

concocted, to divert attention from his shortcoming, in not affording material aid to Sir Louis Cavagnari. Much, for instance, has been made of the little flash of energy he shewed in sending Daud Shah and 30 men to remonstrate with the mutineers ; and it has been asserted that the determined attitude of the rabble was proved by Daud Shah being bayoneted, and all his escort killed. But when this episode is looked closely into, and a little independent evidence is taken, it becomes apparent that Daud Shah had merely a few attendants with him, and none of these were killed ; while he himself was by no means so maltreated as he would have us believe. There is another incident, too, which assumes a new complexion when carefully examined. Soon after the massacre, Yakub Khan put to death Abdul Karim, a powerful Kohistani chief, whose English proclivities were very pronounced. The explanation of this act, as given by Abdullah Gyaz (a confidential adviser of the ex-Amir arrested yesterday) is that Yakub Khan sent that chief from his palace to remonstrate with the troops, and that, instead of carrying out his orders, he gave direct encouragement to the mutineers, and urged them to continue their attack upon the Residency. Upon Abdul Karim's return to the palace, Abdullah Gyaz affirms, Yakub Khan was informed of his treacherous disobedience, and, after the massacre had taken place, ordered that he should be executed. This story is so utterly improbable that it is scarcely worth consideration ; but its falsity has been proved very directly, as the name of every man of importance, who went near the mutinous troops, has been obtained from various sources, friendly and otherwise, and Abdullah Karim has never before been mentioned in the list. The inference that suggests itself is, that the wirepullers about Yakub Khan, were distrustful of Abdul Karim, whose honesty of purpose and known sympathy with the English, rendered him a dangerous personage in their eyes, and on the principle, that dead men tell no tales, they worked upon the then Amir to sanction

his execution. He probably knew too much, and was put out of the way before he had an opportunity of using his knowledge. In an investigation such as that now going on, it is only possible to shape out conclusions by inference, for even such witnesses as profess unbounded friendship towards us, lie so circumstantially to serve their own ends, that very little reliance can be placed on them. It is not as if a long period had elapsed since the events took place : the occurrence must still be fresh in the minds of everybody : but there is such a tendency to intrigue, now that our power is established beyond a doubt in Cabul, that distrust is bred in our minds in an increasing ratio as the evidence accumulates. There is no bottom to the well in which Afghan truth was sunk ages ago, and it is disheartening to sound it now. The ex-Amir's partizans have lied honestly enough to shield their master, while he was still protected by us ; but now that he is a nonentity and all semblance of power has passed from him, there may be a change in their attitude. They have a certain rude idea of faithfulness to their salt ; but when they see that the chief among them is arrested without a word of warning, after being allowed to move freely among us for weeks, their fortitude may not be equal to the emergency, and they may seek to purchase their own safety by voluntary disclosures. For these we must wait.

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To-day two men were marched off to execution, and they richly deserved their fate. The one was the *jemadar* of the rascally *hotwal* of Cabul, himself hanged on the 20th ; and inasmuch as he had carried the head of Sir Louis Cavagnari, or one of the other British officers into the city, there was not much chance of his escaping. Like the *hotwal*, he was most servile in offering aid to us *after* our arrival, and, on the night of the 8th, acted as a guide to some troops marching up the Bala Hissar ridge, in connection with the action against the rebels on that day. The

second prisoner was a Mahomedan resident of Cabul, in whose house a box, marked "Cabul Embassy," was found by a search-party of the 28th Regiment. He could give no explanation of how he came by the box, except the colorless one that it had been placed in his rooms by an enemy. Several guns and swords were also found in his house; and nothing in his favor being forthcoming, he was sent to execution with very little delay. The guilt or innocence of the confidential friends of Yakub Khan, who are now prisoners, is still a question of doubt; but none are arrested without justification, and their cases will undergo the usual scrutiny.

DESCRIPTION OF CABUL.

"The climate is extremely delightful, and there is no such place in the known world, for its verdure and flowers, which render Cabul, in spring, a heaven. Drink wine in the citadel of Cabul and send round the cup without stopping; for there are at once mountains and streams, town and desert."

It is pertinent to observe here, while talking of the climate, that snow generally covers the hills round Cabul about the beginning of October; but that in the plains it seldom snows before December. Then it remains on the ground, until middle of February. After the cessation of the snowy season, the wet ensues, and generally continues until April. The remaining months of the year are dry. It may be as well to state that Cabul is 6,247 feet above the sea.

The founding of Cabul is lost in the mists of antiquity. It has its traditions, and there is a common belief, that it is a most ancient city. Its age is even given at 6,000 years! But it is not 100 years, since it became a capital for the first time. It is affirmed that ten centuries ago, it, together with Ghuzni, was tributary to Bamian, that destroyed city, the gigantic idols and

sculptured caves of which still exist to testify to its past magnificence ; but before Bamian had fallen under the destroying scourge of the Monguls, Cabul had been severed from it ; and in common with most of the adjoining countries, had passed into the hands of that far-famed conqueror Mahmud of Ghuzni. When the Ghaznvide dynasty fell, it became a possession of the House of Ghor. For more than two centuries after Baber's conquest, it was an appanage of the rulers of Delhi, and then it passed into the hands of the Persian conqueror Nadir. The Afghan Chief, Ahmed, who established himself in the possessions of that great ruler to the east of Persia, acquired Cabul shortly after Candahar ; but being a wise man as well as a skilful General, he refused to make any other place his capital than that Candahar which was revered by every Durani as the centre of their power. In 1776, Timur Shah, not equally wise, transferred his seat of power to Cabul. When the Sadosye dynasty fell, the Barakzais were not astute enough to see what a favorable opportunity they had for winning over public opinion to their side by restoring the ancient capital. Dost Mahomed perpetuated the plunder of Timur Shah. It remains, perhaps, for some future Afghan chief to repair the mistake past rulers have made on this point. Apart from its historical associations, Cabul is a place entitled to considerable attention on account of its trade. Burnes called it a most bustling city, and told us that the noise in the streets in the afternoon was so great that it was impossible to make an attendant hear. The principal articles of commerce are fruit and merchandise from India. An active trade is also carried on with Bokhara and with Candahar. There are separate bazars for each trade, and there was a great bazar, called " Chouchut " or " Char Chouk," for the whole city. This had been styled an elegant arcade, being about 200 yards long and ten yards across. It was blown up by Pollock's orders in 1842, but Dost Mahomed took steps for repairing the damage that was then done. The

present edifice is said to have no claim to architectural beauty. One of the most remarkable sights is the public cooking shops, which are very numerous, as few people cook at home. The *kababs*, or cooked meats of Cabul, are famed far and wide. To these must be added a list of delicacies in the shape of fruits, sweets, and cooling drinks, that have earned for Cabul an imperishable name, as a place where good quarters and good living can be obtained at a very moderate cost. The population of the city is generally estimated at 60,000 people, and the number does not appear too great. The gardens of Cabul are well known for their beauty, and those in particular may be mentioned which are called the Garden of the King Timur and that round the tomb of the Emperor Baber. The latter of these is considered to be the favorite promenade of the townspeople. Burnes and other travellers have discoursed of the beautiful view that is to be obtained from the towers and hills of the city for 20 miles round, and those who have approached it from Jellalabad have told us of the favorable impression it has made upon them after traversing the barren and rugged country of the Khurd Cabul and Jagdalak passes. Cabul improves, also, on acquaintance, for except in the wet weather, it is a clean town, and the air is at all times salubrious. It is particularly well suited for Europeans.

Cabul is enclosed on the south and west by rocky hills of considerable altitude. There are walls round the city, but these are in the most dilapidated condition. The defences of Cabul are contained and summed up in the capacity of the Bala Hissar to resist attack; and that is very meagre indeed. The founding of the Bala Hissar is attributed to Baber, but his successors added greatly to what he commenced. So late as the reign of Aurangzebe extensive vaults were constructed under it in which that monarch intended placing his treasure. These are to be seen. Situated on the eastern extremity of the town, and on the summit

of a hill, the Bala Hissar, with its great walls and lofty buildings, is a conspicuous object enough; and it commands the town as completely as the castle dominates Edinburgh. The Bala Hissar is divided into two portions, a citadel within a fortress. The former is small, and could only hold a limited number of men. It is probably here, that Yakub Khan has taken refuge. The main portion of the fortress is large and commodious, and could hold 5,000 men. Despite, however, its imposing appearance and its elevation above the town—it stands 150ft. above the plains—the Bala Hissar is in too dilapidated a state to be held for any length of time against an English army. The only occasion on which the Bala Hissar has undergone an assault in modern time was when Dost Mahomed besieged it 50 years ago, and captured it, by blowing up one of the towers. In fact, the Bala Hissar has been always held as the royal palace, because it was a place sufficiently strong to resist the seditious rising on the part of the populace; and because it afforded place of scrutiny against any sudden outburst of rebellion. It was also very convenient as a prison-house for rivals or refractory vassals. But as a fortress, against the attack of disciplined troops, the Bala Hissar is practically incapable of defence. It will, probably, surrender to us without any attempt being made to defend it. The Afghans, as they have always done before, both in their wars with us and among themselves will evacuate it on the approach of an English army. The Cabul river is crossed by three or four bridges, and one of these is in the heart of the Kizilbash quarter of the city.

The Kizilbashes are of Persian descent. They are supposed to have settled in Cabul in the time of Nadir, although some records date their residence further back. They occupy a quarter of the town separated from the rest of city; and have always been considered an industrious portion of the community. We had many friends among them during the old occupation; and the house,

which Sir Alexander Burnes occupied, was situated close to their quarter. At one time they used to form the body-guard of the Kings, but Barakzais have curtailed their privileges. There is also a large Hindu element in the population ; but the most numerous and the most aggressive class is that of the Afghan nationality, who are termed Cabulese. Cabul is, after Bokhara, probably, the city in Asia, where the fanatical zeal of the Mussulmans runs highest. The Mullahs are a numerous and all-powerful class ; and darvishes are met with in great numbers. Cabul is, therefore, a true metropolis. In its bazars are to be seen the numerous tribes of northern Afghanistan, as well as travellers and merchants from Turkestan, Bokhara, Khiva, Cashmere, and India. It has flourished on the trade which has been brought to it by these numerous wayfarers. But singular as it may appear, these cosmopolitan advantages have, by no means, modified the natural character of its inhabitants. They are still, as they have ever been, the turbulent Cabulese. It is a matter for regret, that the future of a spot so favoured in every way as this city should have been placed in danger by the fury of its mob ; and that the barbarous act, which has just sullied for a second time its streets, should quite possibly entail upon it the loss of those privileges which it has only possessed for the purpose of abusing them. The greatest punishment that could be inflicted on the Cabulese would be to remove the capital of the State back to the old Durani city of Candahar.

THE CALCUTTA CORRESPONDENT OF THE *TIMES*
ON INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

THE MISSION STOPPED.

CALCUTTA, SEPT. 22, 1878. 10-22 P. M.

OUR relations with the Amir have assumed a very critical

character. The Cabul ruler has at last thrown off every semblance even of outward friendliness and courtesy, and has chosen to adopt in preference, an attitude of marked and open hostility. Our special correspondent with the Mission telegraphs, that it left Peshawur yesterday, and proceeded as far as Jumrud, a place on the actual Frontier, though within British territory. Thence it was recalled by a telegram from the Viceroy, and accordingly it marched back to Peshawur. This morning private advices from Simla, upon which absolute reliance can be placed, state that on the Mission being ordered to march to Jumrud, Major Cavagnari rode forward to Ali Musjid, escorted by Khyberries in order to ask for a safe passage. The Amir's officer, however, at Ali Musjid positively refused to the Mission to advance. He threatened resistance, and crowned the surrounding heights commanding the route with armed men in order to dispute the passage. The interview between the Chief and Major Cavagnari lasted three hours; and though the former was warned over and over again, that the Amir would be deemed responsible for his conduct, he expressed an unflinching determination to resist the passage of the Mission by force. Not the faintest shadow of a doubt is entertained that this officer was acting under full instructions from the Amir, inasmuch as Nufti Shah and Akhor, two responsible officers of the Amir, have been despatched from Cabul to Ali Musjid within the last few days. Both of these officers have been mentioned in Cabul news-letters as favorably disposed towards, and engaged in direct communication with the Russian Embassy. Two important facts require to be noted—the first that this insolent rebuff occurred in presence of the two Indian Princes attached to the Mission, who were personal witnesses of the interview between Major Cavagnari and the Amir's officer; the second is that the Russian Envoy is still residing at Cabul. The Mission will be now withdrawn. In view of the long-continued ungracious and hostile conduct of the existing

ruler of Afghanistan, aggravated as it is by the present contemptuous slight offered to our national dignity, all possibility of renewing friendly relations with this uncompromising and morose barbarian is utterly hopeless; and even if the prospects were still hopeful, their realization could only be accomplished at the complete sacrifice of proper self-respect; and at the grave risk of very considerable loss of *prestige* in the eyes of our Indian subjects and of our feudatory Princes. In consequence, therefore, of the present conduct of Russia, and the future policy for us which this conduct now decisively indicates, and against which fortunately for India, the Government and the English people are most fully and completely warned, this important question of Frontier policy will henceforward cease to be treated from a merely Indian standpoint. It at once travels out of the domain of provincial into that of imperial considerations, and those of the very highest magnitude. No one is more keenly alive than the Viceroy to this new development of the question; and he clearly discerns that it is only by the united efforts and energetic co-operation of the English and Indian Foreign Office, that this dangerously complex state of matter can be finally brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The Indian Government are backed by ample military resources to enable them promptly and severely to punish the Amir for his insulting attitude of disrespect; but the significant fact is fully recognized, that the Ameer is but the puppet, while Russia stands behind as the *deus ex machina*. The measures, therefore, to be adopted in view of the Amir's conduct cease to be a question of Indian policy, but are at once resolved into a very serious problem of English foreign politics, which can only be dealt with in strict accordance with the settled principles of the English Cabinet. Meanwhile, the immediate object of the Viceroy is to endeavour to make it clearly understand that we have no cause of quarrel with the Afghan people, and to endeavour to win over and secure all the border tribes. The

Khyberries have, on the present occasion, behaved well, and have shown every disposition to remain friendly.

THE LATE LORD MAYO AND SHERE ALI.

THE following conversation between Lord Mayo and the Amir Shere Ali, took place at the Umballa Darbar in 1869 :—

The Governor-General.—"In the name of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Sovereign of India I heartily welcome your Highness."

The Amir.—"I am overpowered by this reception, and will love the British Government all my life."

G.—"I trust that your Highness received proper attention from all Her Majesty's officers; and that the journey was not uncomfortable."

A.—"I have been astonished at the kindness which I have received."

G.—"What does your Highness think of the Railway? It has just conveyed me from Calcutta in forty-four hours."

A.—"The Railway and all that I have seen is wonderful; but the most wonderful thing is your Army."

G.—"So renowned a soldier as yourself, will appreciate the Army. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will give you every opportunity for further inspecting the troops. I have asked several renowned soldiers to meet you. What do you think of the Highlanders?"

A.—"The dress of the Scotch is beautiful, and indeed terrific, but is it decent?"

G.—“ The people from whom these soldiers are recruited, are divided into clans similar to these in Afghanistan; and each clans is distinguished by the colors of its tartan.”

A.—“ In my country the same division exists, but the clans are known by the cut, not the color, of the cloth.

G.—“ Your Highness is fond of armies.”

A.—“ I should think so. I was born a soldier, and have done nothing but fight for forty-five years.”

G.—“ Is your Highness fond of hunting ?”

A.—“ I have been too busy as a soldier. I leave hunting to others. But *my eldest son*, Yakub Khan, is a good sportsman.”

G.—“ You are interested in guns; you have seen the Snider the Enfield and the Armstrong guns.”

A.—“ Yes, and we could make them in our country quite as well as you; but the cartridges are the difficulty. We could not make them.”

G.—“ You do wrong to depend on England for your supply. How are they made ?”

If Captain Grey hesitated for a moment in his Persian it was on this occasion, when he evidently found it difficult to find in that language words to express certain of the processes, but the explanation was given to the Amir's satisfaction.

G.—“ Your Highness is fond of horses. I have procured some for your acceptance. They are the best I can obtain, but they do not satisfy me.”

A.—“ That is not wonderful. I never saw a perfect horse. A Turkoman costs from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 10,000.”

G.—“ We breed good horses occasionally. I have paid attention to the subject.”

The Amir replied as if he doubted the possibility of breeding good horses at all, or out of Arabia; and asked why Indian officers do not use Arabs as they used to do. The difficulties placed in the way of exportation were explained.

G.—“I hope your boy has been amused; he is a pretty fellow,” (translated by Captain Grew,—He has eyes out of which the man shines.”)


A.—“He is the true stamp of a man (*Sikka murdana*. He comes of a family of men,

On this, the presents of fifty-one trays, valued at upwards of half a lac of rupees, were brought in; and the Earl of Mayo, taking a sword, with jewelled scabbard, presented it to the Amir with his own hands, remarking: “May you be victorious over your enemies and with this defend your just rights!” The Amir replied that he would use it also against the enemies of the Queen of England.”

THE END







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